Ramming cars into the #FBI (or #CIA) gates: symbolism and emotions of the voice populi – Google Search https://google.com/search?q=Ramming+cars+into+the+FBI+(or+CIA)+gates%3A+symbolism+and+emotions+of+the+voice+populi&rlz=1C1ONGR_enUS1133US1133&oq=Ramming+cars+into+the+FBI+(or+CIA)+gates%3A+symbolism+and+emotions+of+the+voice+populi&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIHCAEQIRiPAjIHCAIQIRiPAtIBCjExMzY3MGowajeoAgCwAgA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
AI Overview
The emotion from those who support or are drawn to such attacks is typically anger, driven by a perception of injustice, rather than fear. Ramming a vehicle into the gates of the FBI or CIA is a symbolically powerful act intended to express intense anti-government sentiment.
Symbolism of the attack:
Attacking the state’s authority: These attacks target federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, which represent the power, security, and integrity of the United States government. Breaching their physical defenses, such as a security gate, symbolizes an assault on the government’s authority and a rejection of its legitimacy.
Emblematic target: An attack against the FBI or CIA is symbolic precisely because of the agencies’ powerful public image. For those who view the government as an overreaching and corrupt entity, these agencies are seen as prime instruments of state oppression. Striking at them is a direct assault on the perceived source of that power.
Act of defiance: A car ramming can be an act of defiant resistance for an individual who feels powerless against a monolithic government system. It is a way to make a bold, public statement with an easily acquired, everyday object turned into a weapon.
Targeting an “out-group”: For extremists, the act is a form of political violence against what they perceive as an “out-group” of corrupt officials, elites, or an unjust system.
Voice of the people (vox populi) emotionsFor those who may empathize with the motive of such an attack, the underlying emotion is often outrage, not terror. The symbolism is not meant to instill fear in a general audience but to express anger and contempt for the targeted institutions.Rage against injustice: For those driven by a “rage narrative,” these attacks are viewed as retaliation for perceived government overreach or abuses of power. This is in contrast to the “fear narrative” that typically follows attacks on civilian targets.
Perceived persecution: In many cases, the attacker or their sympathizers feel that they have been personally wronged or persecuted by the government or its agents. The act is seen as justified retribution for a perceived injustice.
Polarized anger: Responses to such attacks are often filtered through strong political biases. An individual’s emotional reaction may be driven by partisan anger, with views shaped by a deep-seated distrust of government institutions. Some recent research has shown that anger, rather than fear, has become a more prominent response among certain groups following political violence.
Motivated by repression: Studies show that political repression, or the perception of it, can motivate anti-government violence. For individuals who feel their voice is being repressed, a violent act may seem like the only option left for expressing their grievance.
The lone actor as a symbolHistorically, attacks on FBI and CIA gates are often carried out by “lone wolf” or “stray dog” perpetrators who are ideologically motivated but not part of a larger, coordinated group. This makes the individual attacker a symbolic figure representing the frustration of marginalized or disillusioned citizens who feel they have no other recourse. Their actions are often influenced and amplified by online extremist propaganda.
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AI Mode
Ramming cars into the FBI (or CIA) gates: symbolism and emotions of the voice populi
. While the specific emotions of the general public (vox populi) can vary greatly, the act is often interpreted by supporters as a powerful, anti-authoritarian statement.When an individual rams a car into the gates of a federal agency like the FBI or CIA, the act carries significant symbolic weight related to anti-government sentiment, distrust of authority, and perceived violations of individual rights
Symbolism of the act
Targeting authority: The FBI and CIA are iconic symbols of U.S. federal law enforcement and intelligence. They represent the might and authority of the government, including surveillance and control. A physical assault on these institutions’ gates is a direct, tangible expression of defiance against that authority.
A “poor man’s” weapon: The use of a car as a weapon is symbolic of the perpetrator’s perspective. It requires minimal resources or specialized training, allowing a “marginal actor” to use a mundane, everyday object to inflict damage and sow fear. This method is especially appealing to lone actors who feel powerless against a perceived tyrannical state.
“Come and take it”: In some cases, the act echoes historical anti-authoritarian symbols. For example, the Gadsden flag, with its “Don’t Tread on Me” slogan, has been co-opted by some anti-government advocates as a sign of resistance to perceived tyranny. Some perpetrators may view their actions as a contemporary version of this defiance.
Messaging and provocation: Many attacks on government buildings and personnel are not spontaneous. They are performed to “demonstrate an ideological goal” or communicate a message. The perpetrator’s actions, and any accompanying items like notes or flags, are specifically chosen to provoke a response and garner attention for their cause. In the recent Pittsburgh FBI case, the suspect wrote vulgarities on the car and left an American flag, explicitly framing it as an attack.
Emotions of the vox populi
While there is no single public response, and emotions range across the political spectrum, the general reactions often include:
For supporters of the attacker: For those who share the anti-government ideology, the act may elicit feelings of validation, empowerment, or even inspiration. The perpetrator is viewed not as a criminal, but as a righteous revolutionary fighting against oppression.
For concerned citizens: Many in the general public may feel fear, anger, and anxiety. The attack on a high-profile target is designed to create a sense of insecurity and demonstrate that even powerful institutions are vulnerable. It may lead to increased calls for stronger security measures.
For opponents of the attacker’s ideology: Those on the other side of the political spectrum may express outrage, condemnation, and disgust. They may dismiss the attacker as mentally ill or a “lone wolf” to avoid validating the political message behind the violence. There may also be concern about the rise of political violence and domestic terrorism.
For law enforcement: Law enforcement and federal officials will feel that the act is a targeted threat against their personnel and institutions, requiring an immediate and decisive response. This can result in increased vigilance and security protocols.
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Gemini
The Act of Defiance: Ramming Cars into FBI and CIA Gates as a Symbol of Public Fury

Washington D.C. – The act of an individual ramming a vehicle into the fortified gates of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a potent and visceral display of defiance that transcends a simple criminal act. It is a symbolic clash between the individual and the immense, often opaque, power of the state, resonating with a segment of the public that harbors deep-seated distrust and anger towards these institutions. While overwhelmingly condemned, these desperate acts tap into a complex well of emotions and symbolism within the American psyche, reflecting a potent undercurrent of anti-government sentiment.

Recent incidents, such as the ramming of vehicles into the gates of FBI field offices in Pittsburgh and Atlanta, highlight the raw and often desperate nature of these acts.1 Investigations into the motives frequently point to individuals grappling with significant mental health challenges, yet their choice of target is rarely arbitrary. The FBI and CIA, for many, are not merely federal buildings but potent symbols of a government perceived as overreaching, secretive, and at times, oppressive.

For some, these agencies represent the “deep state,” an unaccountable shadow government pulling the strings of power. This narrative, fueled by political rhetoric and online conspiracy theories, paints the FBI and CIA as antagonists in a struggle for American freedom. From this perspective, an attack on their physical infrastructure is seen as a blow against tyranny, a desperate attempt to strike at an otherwise untouchable entity. The vehicle, in this context, becomes a makeshift battering ram against the fortress of perceived injustice.

The emotional response from the vox populi to such events is deeply fractured. A significant majority of the public unequivocally condemns these acts as senseless violence and domestic terrorism. They view the perpetrators as criminals who endanger lives and undermine the rule of law. For this segment, the FBI and CIA are essential institutions staffed by dedicated public servants working to protect national security. The attack is seen as an assault on the very fabric of American society and the dedicated individuals who serve within these agencies.

However, a vocal and often digitally amplified minority expresses a different sentiment. In online forums and social media echo chambers, these acts can be met with a degree of tacit approval or even outright celebration. The perpetrators are sometimes lauded as “patriots” or “martyrs” who dared to confront a corrupt system. The emotions expressed in these corners of the internet range from righteous anger and frustration to a sense of vicarious empowerment. The act of ramming the gate, in their eyes, is a physical manifestation of their own feelings of helplessness and rage against a system they believe has abandoned them.

The symbolism of the act is multifaceted. The gate itself represents a barrier, both literal and metaphorical, between the citizen and the inner workings of power. To breach that gate, even partially and ineffectually, is to symbolically penetrate the veil of secrecy and challenge the authority of the state. It is a desperate, public performance of dissent, intended to shock and draw attention to a grievance, however incoherent or misguided it may be.

Historically, attacks on federal buildings have served as potent symbols of anti-government sentiment.2 The choice of the FBI and CIA as targets is particularly significant given their complex and often controversial portrayal in popular culture. From heroic “G-Men” fighting organized crime to rogue agencies engaging in covert and morally ambiguous operations, their public image is a tapestry of conflicting narratives. This ambiguity allows individuals to project their own fears and frustrations onto these institutions, making them convenient and powerful symbols of a government that is either a protector or a persecutor, depending on one’s worldview.

In conclusion, while the act of ramming a car into the gates of the FBI or CIA is a criminal act with potentially tragic consequences, its significance extends beyond the immediate legal ramifications. It is a potent symbol of a deep and growing chasm in American society, a physical manifestation of the anger, distrust, and alienation felt by a segment of the population. The varied and often polarized emotional responses to these events serve as a stark reminder of the contested nature of truth, authority, and patriotism in the contemporary United States.
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Rep. Waltz suggests Crooks didn’t act alone in assassination attempt – Post Link

Thomas Matthew Crooks may not have been acting alone when he tried to assassinate Donald Trump, one of the members of Congress investigating the shooting told Dailymail.com.

Republican Rep. Mike Waltz said the gunman’s motivation is still unknown and he is worried a foreign entity or other third-party could have been involved in the attack.

Waltz questioned how federal law enforcement can confidently say Crooks was a lone wolf if they can’t answer other questions like why he had multiple foreign encrypted messaging accounts. 

His comments came after it was revealed that Iran was also plotting an attempt on the former president’s life around the same time that Crooks carried out his attack.  

The 20-year-old was also able to create multiple explosives with remote detonators, another thing that raised Waltz’s eyebrows and makes him question whether Crooks had help.

As the FBI, U.S. Secret Service (USSS) and Department of Homeland Security conduct their investigations into the massive security failure, Waltz and 12 other lawmakers on a House task force are also looking into the attempted assassination of Trump.

‘I don’t understand, and I don’t have any answers yet to help me understand how the [Secret] Service and DHS came out so quickly and said – and I think the FBI as well, but I’ll have to check that – and said, he operated alone,’ Waltz said when speaking with DailyMail.com at Trump Tower in Chicago on Wednesday. ‘How do you know that mere days into your investigation?’

The Florida congressman added: ‘You can’t tell us his motive, but you could tell us he operated alone? You can’t get into these encrypted overseas accounts, but you can tell us he acted alone? So, I don’t buy that yet.’

Crooks was shot and killed by the Secret Service after he launched an attack at Trump’s rally in Butler, Pennsylvania on July 13.

A bullet fired from his AR-style weapon, bought legally by his father, grazed the former president’s right ear.

Crooks killed one rally-goer and critically injured two others before he was taken out.

The FBI also found explosives in Crooks’ car, which was parked near the rally site. And upon raiding his parents’ house, where he lived, they found more bombs.

‘I don’t know of many 19-year-old kids who could make multiple IEDs with a remote detonator on their own,’ Waltz told DailyMail.com. ‘Why didn’t that get picked up if he’s searching that online or buying literature on how to do that?’

Waltz said ‘the more we get into it, the more questions I have.’

He also said that he was joining later on Wednesday a briefing by the FBI, where he was hoping more questions would be answered – but he didn’t seem optimistic.

Rep. Waltz says while federal agencies and congressional committees are scrutinizing the USSS over the attempted assassination, there are more concerning details emerging that make the attack even more ominous.

That includes the revelation of an Iranian plot to assassinate Trump around the same time as the Crooks attempt.

‘It’s really what’s coming out around it that is so disturbing,’ Waltz said.

‘And for me, the thing that’s most disturbing is that we have ongoing plots from Iran to take out a former president, leading candidate, and that a Pakistani national was just arrested after making a down payment for hitmen, and it’s barely even being covered in the news.’

Crooks had encrypted messaging accounts on platforms based in Germany, Belgium, and New Zealand.

Waltz said: ‘We still haven’t learned a lot, we haven’t learned that much about those overseas accounts.

‘Why does a 19-year-old kid who is a healthcare aide need encrypted platforms not even based in the United States, but based abroad where most terrorist organizations know it is harder for our law enforcement to get into? That’s a question I’ve had since day one.’

He added: ‘They need to be releasing information as they come across it because this wasn’t an isolated incident. The threats are continually Iran’s threats.’

“It is a disaster”, says Bruno Kahl, Head of the German Intelligence Service (BND), about one of these cases, where a much-trusted BND officer now stands accused of having handed information to the Russians.

The conflict between Russia and the west, gaining in intensity after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and even more so after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, has only increased the Russian demand for everything intelligence. The appetite in Moscow for insights into the political thinking and decision-making in the west as this relates, for instance, to sanctions against Russia and military support for Ukraine, is now much greater than before 2014. The same is true for the need to mobilise and recruit various assets. And it is also true for the need to think creatively and cynically about how to achieve a rapidly increasing catalogue of desired effects.

The term “intelligence” is traditionally viewed as a type of knowledge, organisation, and activity. At its core, the Russian intelligence community produces knowledge, through cyber espionage targeting the communications systems of state institutions or the recruitment of individuals to supply classified information on military affairs or advanced technologies. The purpose is to reduce the level of uncertainty relating to the future, thereby preparing decision-makers to respond or to allow Russian industries to achieve breakthroughs by illegally copying the work of others.

However, it is usually not so much the knowledge production as the character of the wider Russian intelligence organisation and the activities pursued by it that demands our attention. To counteract, we need to understand the unconventional nature of both, which inevitably entails confronting dilemmas relating to our interests and the set-up of our free and open societies.

A Seamless Intelligence Web

The Russian intelligence community is usually associated with its main organisations such as the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Military Intelligence Service (GU, previously the GRU), and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) — listed here in order of importance. However, the approach of the Russian intelligence community is very comprehensive, meaning that it is much wider than institutional designations and organigrams would otherwise suggest. The approach may, in fact, be so comprehensive and the contours of the Russian intelligence organisations, therefore, so blurred as to make it highly problematic to focus too one-sidedly on the main organisations. Centres of gravity do exist within the wider intelligence community, exercising both formal and real leadership and setting directions with little or no consultation and external involvement, but it is instructive to view it as a seamless web of actors. These actors, found at the levels of both organisations and individuals, are all employed in support of the overall goals identified in the Kremlin.

Rossotrudnichestvo provides an example at the level of organisations. Self-defined as an agency with the mission “to strengthen Russia’s humanitarian influence in the world,” its internationally deployed staff act simultaneously as organisers of literature readings and piano concerts and recruiters and influence agents. “Never let an intelligence opportunity go to waste” seems to be the undeclared motto behind the comprehensive thinking, which has led Rossotrudnichestvo staff to reach out to attendees, when hosting events at a local Russia House, and to students, when visiting universities. The European Union in 2022 placed Rossotrudnichestvo on the sanctions list for doing exactly that — intelligence work under the much more innocuous cover of promoting culture. It operates under the instruction of and in close liaison with intelligence officers posing as diplomatic staff at the local Russian embassies.

The level of individuals is represented by Russian citizens, current or former, living in the west. Hugely controversial, the issue is very real and needs to be addressed. One should understand just how problematic it is to cast such a large and diverse group as a monolith and that the overwhelming majority of these Russian citizens do not in any way represent nodes in a seamless intelligence web. However, many western states have had recent experiences of espionage conducted by Russian citizens, residing there on a (semi-) permanent basis, on behalf of the main Russian intelligence organisations.

An individual’s rationale for engaging in such illegal activities will vary, and it will be somewhere on a continuum ranging from the purely ideological to the purely material. Most of the cases known remain somewhat shrouded in mystery, making it difficult to assess what has really happened. To illustrate, in 2020, the Danish Security Service (PET) arrested a Russian citizen, Alexey Nikiforov, living and working in Denmark. He was later convicted of espionage, sentenced to a prison term, and deported. Nikiforov operated under the instructions of an intelligence officer and handler at the Russian embassy in Copenhagen. It was to this individual that Nikiforov handed over sensitive information from the Green Tech company, which had offered him a position after his doctoral studies at the Technical University of Denmark. For his efforts, Nikiforov was paid in cash by his handler, but he was also active at the Russia House, playing the balalaika in a small band with other Russians, and socialised with openly pro-Kremlin individuals in the Russian expat community in Denmark. It is unknown to which extent he was driven by ideology and/or by material interests.

A material interest includes avoiding harm, to oneself or to close ones. One of the most remarkable aspects of the community of Russian citizens living in the west is the near-total absence within this community of any kind of opposition to the war in Ukraine. This silence stands in stark contrast to the loud condemnation of the war — a genocidal war of aggression filled with atrocities — often expressed by the surrounding society as a whole and by other sub-segments across this society. The community of Russian citizens living in the west has generally remained passive. This fact, undoubtedly, is explained partly by the approval of the war (including its nature) and partly by fear of the consequences of expressing opposition to the war (for oneself or relatives in Russia). Both are reasons for concern from a counter-intelligence perspective as they may relatively easily lead to increased recruitment, either on a voluntary basis or through the use of threats. The continued radicalisation of the Putinist regime suggests that the authorities will be willing to go even further to force Russian citizens living in the west to support Russian intelligence interests.

Pigeons walking in front of the Russian Foreign Ministry in April 2024. EPA/Scanpix

Three Domains

This wider Russian intelligence community conducts activities across three domains: physical, cyber, and cognitive. Starting with the latter, (dis-) information operations against western societies have become routine and are executed on a large scale every single day. All three main agencies engage in this, but so do supposedly “independent” organisations and individuals. It is an aggressive form of manipulation directed at various target populations. This is not new — Soviet intelligence also tried to manipulate public opinion in the west. Yet, the scale, speed, and, potentially, the level of penetration and effect have changed dramatically. Russian officials now brazenly announce that Russia interferes in elections in western states.

Next is the cyber domain where, again, all three main agencies are active. Their activities range from cyber espionage to highly destructive cyber operations designed to create data havoc and systems breakdowns. Russian cyber actors are routinely called out by western authorities — while individuals are put on sanctions lists and indicted — but their cyber activities continue unabated. The west has largely failed to deter the Russian agencies, which take full advantage of the attribution problem and outsource operations so that they are said to be unconnected to the Russian state.

Finally, the physical domain. The threat is well-known — as it explains why we have been guarding the perimeters of certain facilities for decades — but has gained a new urgency. From railway cables over to antennas and seabed pipelines, the list of critical infrastructure is almost endless in light of the increase in tensions between Russia and the west, as well as the Russian interest in causing disruptions. The new urgency stems from the fact that the cyber domain — a relatively new and rapidly growing one — also has a physical component. In April 2024, the German authorities arrested two Russian-German men, who have reportedly identified, in coordination with a Russian intelligence officer, military and industrial targets for sabotage. Our focus on the cognitive and cyber domains has probably led us to neglect, to some extent, the physical domain, where disruptions may be achieved at a relatively low cost and a catalogue of Russian intelligence’s targets is easy to compile.

Dilemmas

The development is fraught with dilemmas, which threaten to become more acute and of which I will just mention three. The first and very immediate dilemma relates to the expulsion of Russian spies disguised as diplomatic staff. A conservative estimate would hold that two-thirds of Russian embassy staff in western states are members of the Russian intelligence community. Given the comprehensive thinking within the Russian system, all diplomatic staff operating outside the gates of the embassy compounds may, in fact, be performing intelligence activities. The costs of their expulsion are felt at the western diplomatic missions in Russia. These states wish to maintain a presence there — at least to be able to support their own citizens. The relatively uncompromising expulsion of Russian intelligence staff from the west, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has led many western embassies in Moscow to reduce their work to a bare minimum as personnel have been forced to leave. This obviously harms their interests.

The second dilemma relates to the Russian citizens living in western states. The 2017 Intelligence Law of China famously required its citizens to support their country’s intelligence efforts — a stipulation that raised concerns about “everyday espionage” conducted by Chinese citizens both in China and abroad. The Russian authorities have not (yet) passed a similar law, but there is good reason to believe that they have moved quite close to it. The continued radicalisation of the regime — with its aggressive talk of “patriots” and “traitors” — will easily lead to a situation where Russian citizens in the west will find themselves under pressure from the authorities to support the state’s intelligence efforts. This is likely to encourage western governments to introduce a more scrupulous vetting of Russian nationals before allowing them into critical sectors in, for instance, academia or industry.

The final dilemma concerns prioritisation. What to prioritise given the scope and nature of Russian intelligence activities across the three domains? We are far beyond intelligence as a type of knowledge, produced by traditional spies, in our dealings with the wider Russian intelligence community. A keyword for a very diverse range of intelligence activities is “destruction” — in the cognitive, cyber, and physical domains. And it is carried out by a very diverse range of actors in a seamless web. It is a monumental challenge, which will require dedicated work and careful prioritisation on the part of western counterintelligence as long as the current conflict between Russia and the west continues.

This article was written for the Lennart Meri Conference special issue of ICDS Diplomaatia magazine. Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).

Big Intel: How the CIA and FBI Went from Cold War Heroes to Deep State Villains, by J. Michael Waller, Regnery, 256 pages

Your perspective on the FBI depends a lot on when you grew up. If you are a reader of The American Conservative today and old enough to remember the classic television series The FBI starring the memorable actor Efrem Zimbalist Jr., you almost certainly still hold, somewhere hidden deep inside, a positive image of J. Edgar Hoover and the bureau.

The 1965–74 TV series was one of Hoover’s most brilliant PR successes. It burnished the FBI’s reputation in turbulent times, putting the bureau squarely on the side of millions of law-and-order Americans (many of us kids), who believed, rightly, that many radicals of that era were at war with our country.

As violent political insurgency and thousands of random bombings rocked the nation, we were reassured that a professional and patriotic FBI, personified by Zimbalist, was out there working the cases. It was always only a question of time, we believed, before Hoover’s G-men nailed dangerous radicals like the notorious Weather Underground, who planted bombs in public buildings, and the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), who could ruthlessly kidnap prominent citizens like Patty Hearst. 

We had no way of anticipating that the FBI’s failure to close down these violent radicals shrouded an even greater weakness: the bureau’s inability to protect American institutions from the Fabian revolutionaries who were subverting them from inside.

In an open society, it is a classically difficult mission for any undercover police or counter-intelligence service to counter a dedicated, home-grown enemy. The Weimar republic famously failed to prevent a repackaged Hitler from emerging as a “democrat.” In The Open Society and Its Enemies, Karl Popper should have added a chapter on the deviousness of Weathermen Bill Ayers and Bernardine Dohrn, who papered over their Marxist–Leninist past to reappear as counselors to a young politician named Barack Obama.

In his ambitious new book Big Intel, J. Michael Waller takes on these large questions, examining the historic performance of U.S. federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, most significantly the FBI and CIA, in battling the subtle forces that have for decades eaten away at the country’s institutions and traditional values.  

Waller’s central thesis—no surprise—is that the subversives won out. The book argues that the revolutionary left not only outlasted the FBI and CIA, but ultimately unleashed the same destructive ideology inside the federal security agencies themselves. Big Intel is the disturbing story of how Marxist-inspired “critical theory” turned Zimbalist’s noble G-man into the infamous Peter Strzok. 

Waller knows his stuff. He is not only an academic with more than 40 years examining intelligence matters, but he also dabbled in espionage tradecraft himself back in the early 1980s Central America wars. The author argues that today’s problems inside the FBI and CIA are more fundamental than these agencies have become highly politicized. He believes the left has succeeded in remaking the core professional values that motivate today’s career FBI agents, CIA case officers, and the analysts who support their work. 

Waller argues that critical theory priorities, such as embracing identity politics and social justice activism, have remade the “institutional culture” in the national security agencies. Reshaped by their university experiences and today’s prevailing norms, today’s young FBI agent and CIA officer are self-absorbed and disinclined to sacrifice for their country. Their idea of patriotism is to think globally and fight climate change. Their sworn oath to the Constitution is about protecting the government from conservatives who challenge a woke agenda.  

A skeptic might accuse Waller of having interviewed too many grumpy old federal agents with nostalgia for the higher standards of a bygone era. But the argument of Big Intel is that America’s enemies intentionally sowed, a century ago, the seeds of Marxist-inspired critical theory radicalism in universities and influential intellectual circles in America and Europe. It was a long-term strategy of subversion. Waller writes: 

Marxism’s permanent warfare would ravage the [West’s] culture, starting with education and family and spreading through the arts, deeply held religious beliefs and values, ethnicity, sexuality, patriotism, and law. We can trace the rise of cultural Marxism from its beginnings in early Soviet Russia, through interwar Germany, during World War II when it first penetrated American foreign intelligence, through the Cold War when the FBI led the country against such subversion, right up to the present when the CIA and then the FBI embraced it, wrapped it in lovely packaging called diversity, equity, and inclusion, and placed it at the core of their missions. The term “cultural Marxism” was too inflammatory to use in government and always denied. But the agencies internalized the train of thought to induce people to think and behave as cultural Marxists, usually without even realizing it. That intellectual construct or thought process is called critical theory.

Waller makes his case by examining the history of the FBI and the CIA, starting with Langley’s Second World War predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). These compelling historical narratives alone make the book worth the read.

Before the 20th century, Washington had no significant federal law enforcement or civilian intelligence service. As foreign threats emerged, presidents turned to the Department of Justice, which responded with a hybrid of federal police and proto-intelligence activities. One early milestone was the 1919–20 Palmer Raids, carried out against revolutionary foreign radicals who were a genuine peril. Washington’s handling of the raids would set a pattern: federal authorities overreaching in a necessary crackdown, while rounding up many innocents. 

The key DOJ official to emerge in this early period is, of course, a young John Edgar Hoover, who would stay on to run the FBI an incredible 48 years. The fact that, in such an ad hoc manner, a security service developed and would keep the same man in charge for almost half a century indicated the difficulty for Washington policymakers of finding the formula for running a professional and non-political federal police. That challenge is still largely unmet today.

Nevertheless, Big Intel provides an even-handed assessment of the controversial Hoover, who today is routinely vilified by liberal historians and rarely defended by modern conservatives. No apologist for the FBI director, the author still makes a convincing case that, on balance over his (too) long career, Hoover undertook a professional approach that realistically perceived the sub rosa dangers America faced. Today, it is hard to assert that Hoover did more good than harm, but there is a case to be made. 

The author writes,

[Hoover] was right in identifying the institutional, individual, and ideological drivers of destructive change in America. He fairly predicted the social trends at work to fundamentally transform the country. History may have reviled him. So has the FBI itself. But the twenty-first-century FBI, as with the CIA, became a greater threat to the constitutional system and American society than the surprisingly restrained Hoover ever could have been.

Waller contrasts the record of the FBI and Hoover with that of the OSS, the CIA’s forerunner, and its director “Wild Bill” Donovan. For the author, Donovan represents the dominant liberal forces in the American establishment that crucially overlooked or downplayed the cultural Marxist threat. 

Waller argues that the OSS, and later the CIA, would never fully comprehend the subtle, termite-like ideological dangers loose in American society. While Langley would go on to play an important role, perhaps even a crucial one, in countering Soviet political power and conventional espionage, the CIA never grappled, according to the author, with the forces of cultural Marxism, the more subtle enemies of open American society. 

The book devotes considerable space to the Institute for Social Research, examining its role in nurturing and spreading cultural Marxism in Europe and America. Launched in 1923 by the Comintern in Frankfurt, Germany, the institute was, as Dr. Waller clearly documents, a Soviet-funded influence project. Today, commonly remembered as the Frankfurt School, the institute’s Marxist academics would escape Nazi Germany and establish themselves in the United States, several ending up in Donovan’s OSS.

The Frankfurt School became a phenomenally successful Soviet intelligence operation with much more long-term significance than, say, Moscow’s espionage networks in Western countries. The Frankfurt School’s academic Marxists, like Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, and Herbert Marcuse, not only served in the OSS, but more importantly were crucial in advancing critical theory into the modern university mainstream.  

Particularly influential, Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979) motivated a generation of university students who went revolutionary en masse in the 1960s, giving us everything from Tom Hayden’s New Left to terrorists like the Weather Underground and Germany’s Baader–Meinhof fanatics. Marcuse and his colleagues were so successful that the tens of thousands of intellectual Marxists on American and European universities became, decades ago, the dominant intellectual force in Western social sciences. The FBI could root out deep-cover Soviet agents like Alger Hiss, but proved useless against Marcuse and his Marxist academics. 

Big Intel is not just about how things went wrong. The author does suggest ways to fight back, starting by disbanding today’s FBI. Waller argues that a domestic intelligence service like the FBI that also exercises federal police powers is “incompatible with our constitutional form of government.” In point of fact, the bureau was never established in U.S. law by an act of Congress. It was created by bureaucratic legerdemain: a one-page DOJ memo from the year 1908. 

“Since the FBI,” Waller writes, “was founded with a short memo by an attorney general, it can be dissolved with a short memo from a future attorney general.” The author recommends as a first step transferring and dividing the FBI’s functions to other, already existing, national security and law enforcement federal agencies. Waller writes: “[The FBI] has serially abused its authority and the public trust. It has become too politicized to function legally. It is a rogue organization that resists congressional oversight. And it is populating itself with a new, politicized cadre who will make tomorrow’s FBI far worse.”

Indeed, conservatives of all stripes must admit our memory of the patriotic and professional FBI agent is never coming back; some may even argue that he never even existed, but I would join Waller in demurring on that. In any event, our national challenge today is to keep the very real, flesh and blood, Peter Strzok and his ilk out of federal service. It is time for the FBI to go the way of the OSS.  

Hamas monitored political activity, online posts, and apparently even love lives. Palestinians were stuck between an Israeli blockade and a repressive security force.

The Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar has for years overseen a secret police force in Gaza that conducted surveillance on everyday Palestinians and built files on young people, journalists and those who questioned the government, according to intelligence officials and a trove of internal documents reviewed by The New York Times.

The unit, known as the General Security Service, relied on a network of Gaza informants, some of whom reported their own neighbors to the police. People landed in security files for attending protests or publicly criticizing Hamas. In some cases, the records suggest that the authorities followed people to determine if they were carrying on romantic relationships outside marriage.

Hamas has long run an oppressive system of governance in Gaza, and many Palestinians there know that security officials watch them closely. But a 62-slide presentation on the activities of the General Security Service, delivered only weeks before the Oct. 7 attack on Israel, reveals the degree to which the largely unknown unit penetrated the lives of Palestinians.

The documents show that Hamas leaders, despite claiming to represent the people of Gaza, would not tolerate even a whiff of dissent. Security officials trailed journalists and people they suspected of immoral behavior. Agents got criticism removed from social media and discussed ways to defame political adversaries. Political protests were viewed as threats to be undermined.

Everyday Gazans were stuck — behind the wall of Israel’s crippling blockade and under the thumb and constant watch of a security force. That dilemma continues today, with the added threat of Israeli ground troops and airstrikes.

“We’re facing bombardment by the occupation and thuggery by the local authorities,” Ehab Fasfous, a journalist in the Gaza Strip who appeared in the files of the General Security Service, said in a phone interview from Gaza.

Mr. Fasfous, 51, is labeled in one report as among “the major haters of the Hamas movement.”

The documents were provided to The Times by officials in Israel’s military intelligence directorate, who said they had been seized in raids in Gaza.

Reporters then interviewed people who were named in the files. Those people recounted key events, confirmed biographical information and, in Mr. Fasfous’s case, described interactions with the authorities that aligned with the secret files. The documents reviewed by The Times include seven intelligence files ranging from October 2016 to August 2023. The military intelligence directorate said it was aware of files containing information on at least 10,000 Palestinians in Gaza.

The General Security Service is formally part of the Hamas political party but functions like part of the government. One Palestinian individual familiar with the inner workings of Hamas, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter, confirmed that the service was one of three powerful internal security bodies in Gaza. The others were Military Intelligence, which typically focuses on Israel, and the Internal Security Service, an arm of the Interior Ministry.

Basem Naim, a spokesman for Hamas, said the people responsible for the General Security Service were unreachable during the war.

With monthly expenses of $120,000 before the war with Israel, the unit comprised 856 people, records show. Of those, more than 160 were paid to spread Hamas propaganda and launch online attacks against opponents at home and abroad. The status of the unit today is unknown because Israel has dealt a significant blow to Hamas’s military and governing abilities.

The Israeli intelligence authorities believe that Mr. Sinwar directly oversaw the General Security Service, according to three Israeli intelligence officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the matter publicly. They said the slide show was prepared for Mr. Sinwar personally, though they did not say how they knew that.

The presentation said that the General Security Service works to protect Hamas’s people, property and information, and to support its leadership’s decision-making.

Some slides focused on the personal security of Hamas leaders. Others discussed ways to stamp out protests, including the “We Want to Live” demonstrations last year that criticized power shortages and the cost of living. Security officials also tracked operatives from Palestinian Islamic Jihad, an ideologically aligned militant group that often partners with Hamas.

Some tactics, like amplifying Hamas’s own message, appeared to be routine politicking. In other instances, officials suggested using intelligence to undermine opponents and distort their reputations, though the files were vague about how that was to be done.

“Undertaking a number of offensive and defensive media campaigns to confuse and influence adversaries by using private and exclusive information,” the document read.

Security officers stopped Mr. Fasfous on his way to a protest last August, seized his phone and ordered him to leave, a report says. Mr. Fasfous confirmed that two plainclothes officers had approached him. The authorities searched his recent calls, and wrote that he was communicating with “suspicious people” in Israel.

“We advise that closing in on him is necessary because he’s a negative person who is full of hatred, and only brings forth the Strip’s shortcomings,” the document said.

The most frustrating thing, Mr. Fasfous said, was that the officers used his phone to send flirtatious messages to a colleague. “They wanted to pin a moral violation on me,” he said.

The report does not include that detail but does describe ways to “deal with” Mr. Fasfous. “Defame him,” the report said.

“If you’re not with them, you become an atheist, an infidel and a sinner,” Mr. Fasfous said. He acknowledged supporting protests and criticizing Hamas online, but said the people he was in touch with in Israel were Palestinians who owned food and clothing companies. He said he helped run their social media accounts.

The General Security Service’s goals are similar to those of security services in countries like Syria that have used secret units to quell dissent. The files of the General Security Service, though, mention tactics like censorship, intimidation and surveillance rather than physical violence.

“This General Security Service is just like the Stasi of East Germany,” said Michael Milshtein, a former Israeli military intelligence officer specializing in Palestinian affairs. “You always have an eye on the street.”

Palestinians in Gaza live in fear and hesitate to express dissent, analysts said.

“There are a lot of people practicing self-censorship,” said Mkhaimar Abusada, a professor of political science from Gaza City. “They just don’t want problems with the Hamas government.”

That view clashes with the most strident comments of Israel’s leaders, like President Isaac Herzog, who blamed Gazans for not toppling Hamas before the Oct. 7 attacks.

“There’s an entire nation that is responsible,” he said. “This rhetoric about civilians were not aware, not involved, it’s absolutely not true. They could have risen up.”

The General Security Service, the files show, also tried to enforce a conservative social order.

In December 2017, for example, the authorities investigated a tip that a woman was acting immorally with a man who owned a clothing shop. A security report noted that she visited the shop for an hour on one day, then more than two hours the next. The report presented no evidence of wrongdoing, but proposed that “relevant parties” address the matter.

An October 2016 report described young men and women performing unspecified “immoral acts” at a Palestine Liberation Organization office in Khan Younis at night. Hamas sees the Palestine Liberation Organization as a compromised entity, whose leader too often favors Israeli interests. The report offered no evidence of misdeeds but recommended summoning a man who claimed to be in possession of videos and pictures.

The files also show that Hamas was suspicious of foreign organizations and journalists.

When Monique van Hoogstraten, a Dutch reporter, visited a protest encampment along the border with Israel in April 2018, the authorities noted the most banal of details. They noted the make and model of her car and her license plate number. They said she took pictures of children and tried to interview an elderly woman Ms. van Hoogstraten confirmed the reporting trip in an interview with The Times.

The file recommended further “reconnaissance” on journalists.

None of the files reviewed by The Times were dated after the start of the war. But Mr. Fasfous said the government remained interested in him.

Early in the war, he said he took images of security forces hitting people who fought over spots in line outside a bakery. The authorities confiscated his camera.

Mr. Fasfous complained to a government official in Khan Younis, who told him to stop reporting and “destabilizing the internal front,” Mr. Fasfous recalled.

“I told him I was reporting on the truth and that the truth won’t hurt him, but that fell on deaf ears,” he said. “We can’t have a life here as long as these criminals remain in control.”

A number of Republican and MAGA figures have reacted angrily after The Houston Chronicle, one of the biggest newspapers in Texas, endorsed President Joe Biden.

The Houston Chronicle‘s editorial board said they would be backing Biden in the Democratic primary and for re-election so he can “make life better” for the American people as well as prevent the “chaos, corruption and danger to the nation” that would accompany his presumed 2024 Republican challenger Donald Trump returning to the White House.

The Houston Chronicle‘s praise for Biden will be a boost for the Democrat as he seeks re-election in November. It remains to be seen how much of a difference the endorsement will make, seeing as Texas has not voted for a Democratic presidential candidate for nearly 50 years, with Trump beating Biden in 2020 by six points in the red state.

In their editorial, the paper’s board admit that Biden “has his shortcomings,” but what his administration has achieved during his time in office is a “potent reminder to his fellow Democrats, to independents and to those Republicans who have somehow resisted Trump’s cultish appeal that the nation has a viable alternative.”

President Joe Biden delivers remarks on the reported death of Alexei Navalny from the Roosevelt Room of the White House on February 16, 2024 in Washington, D.C. The Houston Chronicle, one of the largest newspapers…
President Joe Biden delivers remarks on the reported death of Alexei Navalny from the Roosevelt Room of the White House on February 16, 2024 in Washington, D.C. The Houston Chronicle, one of the largest newspapers in Texas, has endorsed Biden for re-election.Anna Moneymaker

The editorial notes how the U.S. economy is now “healthier” than any other advanced nation having recovered from the pandemic, unemployment is approaching a 50-year low and that inflation is falling.

The board cites other achievements from Biden’s presidency, such as seeking a “modest effort” to address gun safety, introducing a price cap on insulin, leading an allied response to Russian President Vladimir Putin‘s “brutish” invasion of Ukraine as well as seeking a “path to peace and stability in the post-October 7 conflagration involving Gaza, Iran and Israel and the desperate Palestinian people.”

“We are well aware that the Biden administration has not been successful on every front,” the board wrote.

“The calamitous withdrawal from Afghanistan was the most obvious failure. The administration’s inability to quell chaos at the border is another, although blame primarily belongs to caviling and cynical MAGA Republicans in the House.

“In servility to Trump, they torpedoed a bipartisan border-security plan painstakingly crafted in the Senate. Biden can’t solve the crisis by executive order; he needs Congress to act.”

In response, a number of Trump supporters lashed out at the paper for their endorsement of Biden on social media.

Steve Guest, a former spokesperson for Texas Senator Ted Cruz, posted on X, formerly Twitter: “Untethered from reality. REMINDER: the economy is a mess, our country is being invaded and the border is wide open, and the world is on fire from the Middle East to a ground war in Europe due to Joe Biden’s policies.”

Talk show host Joe Pagliarulo wrote: “O M G—I just LOVE this parody account for the Houston Chronicle. Kudos!!”

Comedian and political commentator Tim Young posted: “Fill the Houston Chronicle office with illegal immigrants. They endorse it, they can house it.”

Robert Bowlin, who frequently supports Trump on social media, added: “So, do you just not care about the fact that he can barely speak and he appears to be on the verge of tears in every press hearing?”

The Houston Chronicle board did note the concerns about the age and cognitive ability of Biden, who will be 82 by the start of his potential second term in office, and said that he may not be the “energetic, garrulous, occasionally even eloquent” public speaker of previous years.

However, the board suggested the president has “forgotten more than his presumed Republican rival will ever know. That’s not saying much, and at the same time, it says it all.”

Trump’s office has been contacted for comment via email.

IT IS UNUSUAL for spymasters to taunt their rivals openly. But last month Bill Burns, the director of the CIA, could not resist observing that the war in Ukraine had been a boon for his agency. “The undercurrent of disaffection [among Russians] is creating a once-in-a-generation recruiting opportunity for the CIA,” he wrote in Foreign Affairs. “We’re not letting it go to waste.” The remark might well have touched a nerve in Russia’s “special services”, as the country describes its intelligence agencies. Russian spies botched preparations for the war and were then expelled from Europe en masse. But evidence gathered by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a think-tank in London, and published exclusively by The Economist today, shows that they are learning from their errors, adjusting their tradecraft and embarking on a new phase of political warfare against the West.

The past few years were torrid for Russian spies. In 2020 operatives from the FSB, Russia’s security service, botched the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, the recently deceased opposition activist. He mocked them for spreading Novichok on his underwear. Then the FSB gave the Kremlin a rosy view of how the war would go, exaggerating Ukraine’s internal weaknesses. It failed to prevent Western agencies from stealing and publicising Russia’s plans to invade Ukraine. And it was unwilling or unable to halt a brief mutiny by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner mercenary group, last year. The SVR, Russia’s foreign intelligence agency, saw its presence in Europe eviscerated, with some 600 officers expelled from embassies across the continent. At least eight “illegals”—intelligence officers operating without diplomatic cover, often posing as non-Russians—were exposed.

The study by RUSI, written by Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, a pair of the organisation’s analysts, and Oleksandr Danylyuk, a former adviser to both Ukraine’s defence minister and foreign intelligence chief, draws on documents “obtained from the Russian special services” and on interviews with “relevant official bodies”—presumably intelligence agencies—in Ukraine and Europe. In late 2022, the study says, Russia realised that it needed more honest reporting from its agencies. It put Sergei Kiriyenko, the Kremlin’s deputy chief of staff, in charge of “committees of special influence”. These co-ordinate operations against the West and then measure their effect.

That personnel change appears to have produced more coherent propaganda campaigns. In Moldova, for instance, a once-scattershot disinformation effort against the country’s bid for European Union membership grew more consistent and focused last year. It tied the accession bid to the president personally, all the while blaming her for Moldova’s economic woes. Campaigns aimed at undermining European support for Ukraine have also picked up. In January German experts published details of bots spreading hundreds of thousands of German-language posts a day from a network of 50,000 accounts over a single month on X (Twitter as was). On February 12th France exposed a large network of Russian sites spreading disinformation in France, Germany and Poland.

Meanwhile the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency, has also been re-evaluating its tradecraft. In recent years its Unit 29155—which had attempted to assassinate Sergei Skripal, a former GRU officer, in Salisbury, Britain in 2018—saw many of its personnel, activities and facilities exposed by Bellingcat. The investigative group draws on publicly available information and leaked Russian databases for its exposés.

The GRU concluded that its personnel were leaving too many digital breadcrumbs, in particular by carrying their mobile phones to and from sensitive sites associated with Russian intelligence. It also realised that the expulsion of Russian intelligence officers in Europe had made it harder to mount operations and control agents abroad—one reason why the invasion of Ukraine went awry.

The result was wholesale reform, which began in 2020 but sped up after the war began. General Andrei Averyanov, the head of Unit 29155, was, despite his litany of cock-ups, promoted to deputy head of the GRU and established a new “Service for Special Activities”. Unit 29155’s personnel—once exemplified by Alexander Mishkin and Anatoly Chepiga, Mr Skripal’s hapless poisoners, who insisted that they had travelled to Salisbury to see its cathedral’s famous spire—no longer carry their personal or work phones to its facility, using landlines instead. Training is done in a variety of safe houses rather than onsite. Whereas half of personnel once came from the Spetsnaz, Russia’s special forces, most new recruits no longer have military experience, making it harder for Western security services to identify them through old photographs or leaked databases.

A separate branch of the Service for Special Activities, Unit 54654, is designed to build a network of illegals operating under what Russia calls “full legalisation”—the ability to pass muster even under close scrutiny from a foreign spy agency. It recruits contractors through front companies, keeping their names and details out of government  records, and embeds its officers in ministries unrelated to defence or in private companies. The GRU has also targeted foreign students studying at Russian universities, paying stipends to students from the Balkans, Africa and elsewhere in the developing world.

For another example of how Russian spies have turned disaster into opportunity, consider the case of the Wagner Group, a series of front companies overseen by Mr Prigozhin. Wagner initially served as a deniable arm of Russian influence, providing muscle and firepower to local autocrats in Syria, Libya and other African countries. In June 2023 Mr Prigozhin, angered by the mismanagement of the war by Russia’s defence minister and army chief, marched on Moscow. The mutiny was halted; two months later Mr Prigozhin was killed when his plane exploded midair.

Russia’s special services quickly divided Mr Prigozhin’s sprawling military-criminal enterprise among themselves. The FSB would keep domestic businesses, and the SVR the media arms, such as the troll farms which interfered in America’s presidential election in 2016. The GRU got the foreign military bits, split into a Volunteer Corps for Ukraine and an Expeditionary Corps, managed by General Averyanov, for the rest of the world. The latter missed its target of recruiting 20,000 troops by the end of last year, says RUSI, though its strength is “steadily rising”. There have been hiccups: Mr Prigozhin’s son, who mystifyingly remains alive and at liberty, offered Wagner troops to the Rosgvardia, Russia’s national guard, prompting a bidding war between the guard and the GRU, according to the authors.

The net result of this consolidation is a revitalised Russian threat in Africa. Shortly after Mr Prigozhin’s death General Averyanov visited various African capitals to offer what RUSI describes as a “regime survival package”. In theory the proposals involve the GRU providing local elites with military muscle and propaganda against local rivals. In Mali, they observe, the GRU-created Lengo Songo radio station is one of the most popular in the country. In return Russia would get economic concessions, such as lithium mines and gold refineries, and so leverage over enemies, perhaps including the ability to sever France from uranium mines in Niger (France needs uranium for its nuclear power stations). Mr Prigozhin is dead; his malevolent influence lives on.

Mission possible 

Russian intelligence, though bruised, is firmly back on its feet after its recent humiliations. In recent weeks the Insider, a Riga-based investigative website, has published a series of stories documenting Russian espionage and influence across Europe. They include details of how a GRU officer in Brussels continues to provide European equipment to Russian arms-makers, and the revelation that a top aide in the Bundestag and a Latvian member of the European Parliament were both Russian agents, the latter for perhaps more than 20 years.

“It’s not as bad for them as we think it is,” says Andrei Soldatov, an investigative journalist, who reckons that the Russian services are “back with a vengeance” and increasingly inventive. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, and once a (mediocre) KGB officer, is “trying to restore the glory of Stalin’s formidable secret service”, explains Mr Soldatov. He points to a case in April 2023 when Artem Uss, a Russian businessman arrested in Milan on suspicion of smuggling American military technology to Russia, was spirited back to Russia with the help of a Serbian criminal gang—a common intermediary for the Russian services.

In the past, says Mr Soldatov, the FSB, SVR and GRU had a clearer division of labour. No longer. All three agencies have been particularly active in recruiting among the flood of exiles who left Russia after the war. It is easy to hide agents in a large group and simple to threaten those with family still in Russia. Germany is of particular concern, given that the many Russians who have moved there could make up a recruiting pool for Russian spy bodies. The flood of new arrivals is thanks in part to Baltic countries having grown more hostile to Russian emigres.

Moreover, Russian cyber-activity goes from strength to strength. In December America and Britain issued public warnings over “Star Blizzard”, an elite FSB hacking group which has been targeting NATO countries for years. The following month Microsoft said that “Cosy Bear”, a group linked to the SVR, had penetrated email accounts belonging to some of the company’s most senior executives. That came on top of a sophisticated GRU cyber-attack against Ukraine’s power grid, causing a power outage apparently co-ordinated with Russian missile strikes in the same city.

The renewal of Russia’s intelligence apparatus comes at a crucial moment in east-west competition. An annual report by Norway’s intelligence service, published on February 12th, warned that, in Ukraine, Russia was “seizing the initiative and gaining the upper hand militarily”. Estonia’s equivalent report, released a day later, said that the Kremlin was “anticipating a possible conflict with NATO within the next decade”.

The priority for Russian spies is to prepare for that conflict not just by stealing secrets, but by widening cracks within NATO, undermining support for Ukraine in America and Europe and eroding Western influence in the global south. By contrast there has been precious little Russian sabotage against Ukraine-bound supplies in Europe. One reason for that is the Kremlin’s fear of escalation. Another is that the Russians cannot do everything, everywhere all at once.

In the meantime, spies will continue to battle against their peers. In their report, Estonia’s foreign intelligence services published the identities of Russians working on behalf of the country’s intelligence services. “For those who prefer not to find their names and images alongside those of FSB or other Russian intelligence officers in our publications, potentially affecting their associations with the West, we extend an invitation to get in touch,” noted the Estonian spooks. “We are confident that mutually advantageous arrangements can be negotiated!”■

Source: 

https://www.economist.com/international/2024/02/20/russian-spies-are-back-and-more-dangerous-than-ever

Skepticism remains high about the Russian leader’s intentions after he told Tucker Carlson that the war in Ukraine could be settled with a peace deal. 

The Biden administration dismissed on Friday a call by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia for negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, showing no sign that flagging political support for American military aid to Kyiv had made President Biden more inclined to make concessions to Moscow.

During his two-hour interview at the Kremlin with the former Fox News host Tucker Carlson, who now broadcasts independently online, Mr. Putin offered long defenses of his invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 but said he was prepared to settle the conflict diplomatically.

“We are willing to negotiate,” Mr. Putin told Mr. Carlson in the interview, which was released on Thursday. “You should tell the current Ukrainian leadership to stop and come to the negotiating table,” he added, referring to the U.S. government.

The Russian leader spoke at a moment of apparent leverage, following the failure of a vaunted Ukrainian summer counteroffensive to achieve substantial gains and as the Biden administration is struggling to win congressional approval for desperately needed additional military aid for Kyiv.

It is not the first time Mr. Putin has expressed willingness to negotiate over the fate of Ukraine, and Western officials have long been skeptical of his intentions. But because it was his first interview with an American media figure since the invasion, his call for talks has extra resonance, analysts said.

U.S. and Ukrainian officials say that the best Ukraine’s military can hope for in the coming year, especially without more American aid, is to defend its current positions. Even so, Biden officials say they are not entertaining the idea of pressing Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, to negotiate with Mr. Putin.

“Both we and President Zelensky have said numerous times that we believe this war will end through negotiations,” a National Security Council spokesman said in a statement. “Despite Mr. Putin’s words, we have seen no actions to indicate he is interested in ending this war. If he was, he would pull back his forces and stop his ceaseless attacks on Ukraine.”

U.S. officials had previously assessed that Mr. Putin had no intention of negotiating seriously until after the U.S. presidential election in November. Mr. Putin, they say, wants to wait to see whether former President Donald J. Trump might return to the White House and offer him more favorable terms.

In an interview last spring, Mr. Trump said the “horrible” conflict in Ukraine must come to an immediate end and that if re-elected, he would broker a deal to “end that war in one day.”

The Biden administration has supported Ukraine’s stated desire to reclaim territory that Russia has occupied since its invasion. Russia now occupies around 18 percent of Ukrainian land.

U.S. officials have also long insisted that, despite the more than $75 billion in aid the United States has supplied to Ukraine, it is not for Washington to dictate whether Kyiv engages in peace talks and what on terms. “Ultimately, it’s up to Ukraine to decide its path on negotiations,” the National Security Council statement said.

Many analysts were also skeptical of Mr. Putin’s intentions. Sergey Radchenko, a Russia historian at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, said Mr. Putin should not be trusted.

Mr. Radchenko said Mr. Putin might be engaging in what during Soviet times was known as a “peace offensive” — an insincere tactical feint whose goal, he said, was “to present a reasonable face to the outside world: ‘Oh yeah, of course we want peace — it’s just the other side that doesn’t want to talk.’”

Some Western officials believe Mr. Putin may also have his domestic audience in mind when he talks about a negotiated end to the war. Polls in Russia have shown that Russian citizens would welcome a settlement to end the conflict that has shaken their economy and produced tens of thousands of casualties.

Talk of peace could also win Mr. Putin favor among nations in the so-called global south — nations in South America, Asia and Africa, including India and South Africa, that are unaligned in the Ukraine conflict. Most of those countries have suffered from higher energy and food prices caused by the war.

Mr. Putin seemed to be exploiting Republican opposition to Mr. Biden’s funding request for Ukraine, echoing critiques made in recent weeks by some conservative members of Congress. “You have issues on the border, issues with migration, issues with the national debt — more than $33 trillion. You have nothing better to do, so you should fight in Ukraine?” Mr. Putin asked.

Alternatively, Mr. Radchenko said, Mr. Putin might be willing to make some unexpected concessions for a peace deal that leaves Russia with a foothold in eastern Ukraine, “and then use that as a basis for either further aggression against Ukraine, or as leverage to force a preferred government on Ukraine.”

Samuel Charap, a Russia analyst at the RAND Corporation, said it was possible that Mr. Putin had been bluffing all along about talks. But he said it was worth engaging the Kremlin in private to determine Mr. Putin’s actual demands.

“Nobody knows for sure — and nobody can know for sure unless they try,” Mr. Charap said. He added that it was notable that Mr. Putin had not told Mr. Carlson that he had preconditions for talks, such as the removal of Mr. Zelensky’s government.

Mr. Charap also noted that Russia and Ukraine were already negotiating on a number of matters, including prisoner-of-war swaps and Ukrainian exports from its Black Sea ports.

Regardless of Mr. Putin’s intentions, analysts and Western officials say that a major obstacle to potential talks is the unwillingness of Ukraine’s public to compromise with an invader that has committed atrocities in their country.

“Zelensky is worried about the domestic political consequences of pursuing a different tactic,” Mr. Charap said.

“Barring a Ukrainian demand signal” for peace talks, “there’s unlikely to be a push from Washington,” he said.

As the war in Gaza continues to unfold, essential questions about Russian and Iranian support for Hamas remain. They include whether Russia played any role in providing support to Hamas ahead of its Oct. 7 attack on Israel. Evidence available from foreign-language publications in Russian, Persian, Arabic, and Hebrew, as well as those in English, provides provocative leads, which, if accurate, have serious potential implications. 

A long courtship

Russia has maintained a relationship with Hamas for more than 17 years, since the group’s leaders visited Moscow in March 2006, just weeks after taking power in the Gaza Strip. 

In the ensuing years, President Vladimir Putin repeatedly invited Hamas’ political and military leadership back to the Russian capital. Hamas officials and commanders secured high-level meetings with then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and Russia’s special envoy for the Middle East, Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, among others. 

Bogdanov’s role in the link between Russia-Hamas is central. He has been in charge of the relationship on a day-to-day basis for many years, regularly meeting its leaders in Moscow and Qatar. Bogdanov has also been entrusted by Putin to undertake sensitive diplomatic missions with China, among other major actors, to support Russia’s Mideast policies.

Russian talks with terrorists and Hamas political leaders

Hamas officials who have met regularly with Bogdanov over the years include its political leaders, such as former longtime head Khaled Meshaal; his successor, Ismail Haniyeh, a U.S. Specially Designated Global Terrorist; and Moussa Mohammed Abu Marzouk, a senior member of Hamas’ political bureau who previously served as its deputy chair under Meshaal. They also include senior members of Hamas’ military leadership, such as Husam Badran and Saleh al-Arouri. Badran formerly led Hamas’ military wing in the West Bank, where he planned suicide bombings during the Second Intifada, including the infamous 2001 Dolphinarium discotheque massacre in Tel Aviv, which killed 21 young Israelis. Al-Arouri, characterized by the Israeli government’s public intelligence center as number two in Hamas overall, founded its military wing and directs the group’s military and terrorist activities. He also notably has close, long-standing ties with Iran.

The U.S. Treasury Department first listed al-Arouri as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in September 2015, after he took responsibility for a June 12, 2014, terrorist attack that kidnapped and killed three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank, including dual U.S.-Israeli citizen Naftali Fraenkel. In 2018, the U.S. State Department offered to pay a $5 million reward to anyone who brought him to justice to face trial for his crimes, including several terrorist attacks, hijackings, and kidnappings.

Thus Russia has not limited itself to building a relationship with Hamas’ political leaders. Its lengthy diplomatic courtship of Hamas has included regular contacts with military leaders who have long histories directing terrorist attacks that have killed civilians.

Tighter Russian-Iranian operational relations

Russia has simultaneously built a close working relationship with Iran and its military and terrorist arm, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with increasingly tight financial, military, as well as political ties. Since the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, Iran and Russia have responded to U.S. sanctions with a program to “dump the dollar” and to connect bank-to-bank using SPRS, the Russian counterpart of the financial messaging system SWIFT, utilized by the rest of the world, with the goal of sanctions busting and intensifying their mutual economic ties. By January 2023, Russia had become the largest foreign investor in Iran, putting $2.7 billion into Iranian manufacturing, mining, and transport sectors, according to Ehsan Khandouzi, the country’s finance minister.

On the military side, two weeks before Hamas carried out its brutal Oct. 7 terrorist attack on Israel, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu traveled to Tehran to meet with Iran’s top security official, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, as well as the head of the IRGC air force, Amirali Hajizadeh, to inspect Iranian-built drones and missile- and air-defense systems. During his visit, Shoigu stated that Tehran and Moscow had worked for months on long-term military cooperation, with “serious military and defense dimensions” and “an entire range of planned activities, despite opposition from the United States and its Western allies.” 

Iran’s pre-attack meeting with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Just as conspicuously, on Sept. 1, 2023, five weeks before Hamas’ Oct. 7 terrorist attack, the group’s military leader, al-Arouri, traveled to Beirut to meet with Iranian Foreign Minister Hussein Amirabdollahian and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary-General Ziyad al-Nakhalah, another long-time Specially Designated Global Terrorist. The PIJ’s longtime openly stated goal is the destruction of Israel.

Since its inception, the PIJ has carried out numerous terrorist attacks, including large-scale suicide bombings against Israeli civilian and military targets. According to the website maintained by the Iranian foreign ministry, at the Beirut meeting, the Iranian foreign minister and the two terrorist leaders agreed to work together on joint action to carry out what they called “the complete defeat of the Zionist regime” with “the formation of a single Palestinian state in all of historical Palestine.”

Critical Hamas-Russian meetings in Moscow

Against this backdrop, it becomes easier to decode the possible substance of important meetings that took place between Russian and Hamas leaders on March 16, 2023, in Moscow, held just days after Hamas received an invitation from Russia. The timing of those meetings is significant, coming one year after the re-invasion of Ukraine and the burgeoning imposition of Western sanctions on Russia and six and a half months before Hamas’ attack on Israel. So why did Russia decide to convene it there and then?

At those meetings, first Lavrov and then Bogdanov met with two of Hamas’ most significant leaders, political head Marzouk and military commander al-Arouri. Coming out of the talks, the top Hamas officials made statements consistent with Russia promising to support Hamas in changing the status quo with Israel. Al-Arouri was quoted stating the Moscow trip “was an important visit [for Hamas] that highlights the role of the movement with many global actors,” in which the Hamas “delegation affirmed its legitimate right to armed resistance [emphasis added] in order to confront the Israeli occupation and continued Israeli violence and oppression of Palestinians.” In response, Bogdanov reportedly emphasized Russia’s “unwavering support” for the rights of the Palestinian people.

After the meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Bogdanov, Marzouk described the visit on Hamas’ website as “different from its predecessors” since the “[special] military operation in Ukraine [the Russian regime’s term for the war] caused special confusion in the world and in the international system.” 

One possible explanation: this time was different because, in the context of its stalled invasion of Ukraine, Russia had agreed to help Hamas, with the strategic purpose of opening up a costly second front for Western states supporting Ukraine. Now, the West would simultaneously have to support Israel at both military and political cost, especially vis-à-vis the Western countries’ relations with the Global South.

The evidence not only documents Russia’s long-term political support of Hamas, which it does not recognize as a terrorist group, but the meetings with Hamas and Iran also offer circumstantial evidence of engagement on the military side, as reflected by the suggestive timing of the March 16 Moscow meetings with Hamas convened by the Kremlin, and Shoigu’s meeting with Iran just ahead of the Hamas attack. 

The possible use of Russian proxies to assist Hamas

Did the Russian government directly, or indirectly, through proxies — Iran, Syria, or others — provide weapons, military training, financial support, terrorist finance facilitation, or the provision of intelligence and/or strategic or tactical advice to Hamas ahead of its brutal Oct. 7 terrorist attack on Israel? Could the Russian government even have provided Hamas implicit or explicit approval for the attack before it occurred?

Below is some of what is known to date. Taken together, the datapoints command attention.

Evidence of Hamas’ access to Russian-origin weapons and technology

For years, Hamas fighters have relied on Russian weapons, for example Kornet anti-tank missiles, to attack Israeli targets such as buses carrying Israeli soldiers. Hamas has contended the weapons are made locally — that is, inside Gaza — but the laser-targeting technology used to precisely guide them is not likely to be readily manufactured there. Iran has long been believed to be the supplier. But there is growing evidence that more of Hamas’ weapons originated from Russia as well. 

On July 1, Hamas’ military arm undertook an open-to-the-Palestinian-public, Soviet-style show of its military inventory. Among the Hamas weapons on display were locally made missiles and launchers, Shihab drones, grenade launchers, and Russian-built Kornet anti-tank missiles. One Palestinian publication described the weapons displayed at the show as “Made in Gaza” and “Made in Russia.”

On March 14, just ahead of the Hamas visit to Moscow, CNN cited four unspecified sources who stated that Russia had been sending to Iran weapons and equipment lost on the battlefield in Ukraine that the United States and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states had provided to the Ukrainian military. These reportedly included Javelin anti-tank and Stinger anti-aircraft systems, which could then be reverse-engineered and used by Hamas. In June, a senior Israeli official stated directly that he was concerned the weapons Moscow sent to Tehran would go straight from Iran to Hamas and Hezbollah.

On Sept. 10, Mossad chief David Barnea declared that the Israeli government was concerned Russia was seeking to sell advanced weapons to Iran in a barter arrangement. Barnea expressed worry that Iran would provide Russia with short- and long-range missiles in addition to the drones it was already selling to Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, and in turn, Russia would transfer advanced weapons to Iran that could threaten Israeli security “and maybe even our existence.”

Allegations of training by Russian “private” military companies

Using proxies to provide weapons to Hamas and, when possible, to have those weapons manufactured originally in other countries, such as China, or North Korea, fits the Kremlin’s usual modus operandi. Using proxies would enable President Putin to stir up conflict in the Middle East at lower risk than having its forces directly involved in a military action killing civilians. It would also be unsurprising for Russia to use “non-governmental” outfits, such as the so-called private military companies (PMCs), to train foreign fighters or to supply them with weapons, to provide some deniability if outsiders found out. 

The day after the Oct. 7 attack, an official Ukrainian source claimed, “Some of the fighters of the Wagner [Group] PMC, who left Belarus in the direction of African countries, were involved in the training and transfer of combat experience to Hamas militants.” According to the Ukrainian Center for National Resistance, a Ukrainian government news and information agency formed after the Russian re-invasion of Ukraine, Hamas fighters had been training to use small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to drop explosive material as part of their attack. The center stated, “Only the Russians, among the allies of Hamas, have experience using drones with reset mechanisms on enemy equipment.” The center further asserted that Wagner provided Hamas fighters this training in an unspecified African country and that its information had come from “the Belarusian underground,” another country where the Wagner Group had carried out activities in 2023. On Oct. 10, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated, without providing further specifics, “We are certain that Russia is supporting, in one way or another, Hamas operations”; Zelensky reiterated the charge, again without specifics, on Nov. 20.

To date, there has been no non-Ukrainian confirmation of the allegations that the Wagner Group offered training to Hamas. Some have suggested this support was provided in whole or in part by other lesser-known Russian “private” military companies, such as Vegacy Strategic Services or the “Vega Network” with offices in Moscow and complex links to one another, previously alleged to have carried out such training for Palestinian fighters in Syria; another possibility floated was PMC Redut, also active in Syria. 

Whatever the case, someone trained the Hamas fighters to undertake their sophisticated attack on Israel, as well as to behave as they did. In contrast with previous attacks by Hamas, the verified atrocities documented on Oct. 7, seen in footage recorded by body cameras worn by Hamas fighters, resemble the tactics used by Russian PMCs to intimidate and terrify local populations. Gunmen shooting the dead bodies of civilians in cars, beheading a body with a hoe, throwing burnt corpses in a dumpster, and committing heinous acts on the living — these are tactics used by Russian PMC fighters, not only in Ukraine but in the Central African Republic, Mali, Syria, and Libya. 

The Ukrainian account provides one theory of who trained Hamas. Further independent reporting is needed to determine the truth. Of potential relevance is the release of declassified intelligence by U.S. officials on Nov. 21 that the Wagner Group has been recently preparing to provide an air-defense system “to either Hezbollah or Iran” at the direction of the Russian government.

The cryptocurrency connection

At the same time, there is separate evidence of Russian support for terrorist financing for Hamas. The Russian cryptocurrency exchange Garantex, currently under investigation by the U.S. Justice Department, has reportedly served not only wealthy Russians, various criminal groups, and Iran but also provided a means to help Hamas — and the PIJ — fund their terrorist operations prior to Oct. 7.

Major intelligence questions

Taken as a whole, the circumstantial evidence raises serious questions about what Russia and Iran knew and how much they may have helped Hamas to carry out its Oct. 7 attack on Israel. U.S., Israeli, and other Western intelligence agencies must work intensively to reach assessments on an array of key questions. With its invasion of Ukraine stalling out, did Russia decide to work to open up a second front in the Middle East as a means of dividing and distracting its adversaries? Did Russia promise Hamas assistance in its meetings with the group’s political and military leadership last March? If so, what did such pledges include: arms and technology, military training, financial support, assistance in money laundering, information warfare, and which types of assistance were provided in practice? Did Russia and Iran agree together to help Hamas, PIJ, Hezbollah or others in the region take on Israel as a means of weakening their respective enemies in the West as well as Israel itself? Did Russia and Iran know that the attack was going to take place? Did they agree on its timing? 

The information that is public does not provide definitive answers to these questions. But there is one more data point that is especially relevant. It is one that took place soon after the Oct. 7 attack and the start of Israel’s retaliatory military campaign in Gaza.

The post-Oct. 7 Moscow meetings with Iran and Hamas and Russia’s current disinformation campaign

On Oct. 26, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Bagheri Kani met with Russia’s Bogdanov and Hamas’ Marzouk for a trilateral meeting in Moscow. Officially, the three gathered to discuss dual-national Russians who were being held hostage by Hamas. Little more than that was said publicly, besides Marzouk praising Moscow’s position on the conflict and the active efforts of Russian diplomacy. The New York Times presented the meeting as a belated effort at diplomatic catch-up by Russia to demonstrate its diplomatic engagement in the crisis, after initially seeking to “keep its distance” from the conflict.

If one draws a straight line from the Oct. 26 meeting back to the successive series of Russian-Iranian, Russian-Hamas, and Iranian-Hamas meetings that occurred in the months prior to Oct. 7, it is plausible to suggest there was more on the agenda than diplomacy. The growing evidence of the ongoing systematic Russian effort to disseminate pro-Hamas disinformation, including the retention of Moldovan agents by a Russian national to carry out destabilization efforts in France, provides a further clue of Russia’s continuing efforts to help Hamas and stoke conflict over the Israeli-Hamas conflict in the West.

There is a pressing need for Western intelligence agencies to gather enough information to reach solid conclusions about the extent of Russian involvement in the Hamas attack, and to make those conclusions public. The findings will be an essential element of managing as well as containing the conflict going forward. Any such findings could also have legal implications. Under U.S. law, countries designated as state-sponsors of terrorism have no immunity to civil suits by their U.S. victims. It is thus squarely in the public interest for the truth to come out.

Jonathan M. Winer, a Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute, was the U.S. Special Envoy and Special Coordinator for Libya from 2014 to 2016 as well as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Law Enforcement.

Photo by YURI KADOBNOV/AFP via Getty Images

Two Russian courts have meted out the first convictions in connection with what the government calls the “international LGBT social movement” and which was designated as extremist last year.

On Thursday, a court in the southern region of Volgograd found a man guilty of “displaying the symbols of an extremist organization” after he posted a photograph of an LGBTQ flag online, according to the court’s press service.

Artyom P., who was ordered to pay a fine of 1,000 rubles, admitted guilt and repented, saying he had posted the image “out of stupidity,” the court said.

On Monday, a court in Nizhny Novgorod, east of Moscow, sentenced to five days in administrative detention a woman who had been in a cafe when a man approached her and demanded she remove her frog-shaped earrings displaying an image of a rainbow, said Aegis, an LGBTQ rights group.

The woman was called to the police station after the man, who filmed the encounter, posted it online.

A trial is set to resume next week in Saratov in southwestern Russian against a photographer who posted images of rainbow flags on Instagram, independent Russian news outlet Mediazona reported.

The rainbow flag represents the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer community. Russian law prohibits anyone in the country “displaying the symbols” of organizations it considers extremist, a list that includes social network Meta.

Russia’s Supreme Court banned the “LGBT movement” last November, continuing a pattern of increasing restrictions in Russia on expressions of sexual orientation and gender identity.

A law passed last July outlawed legal or medical changes of gender for transgender Russians, and a law banning the promotion of “nontraditional” sexual relations has been on the books for over a decade. 

nbcnews.com3h

Russia makes first convictions for ‘LGBT extremism’ following ban

Igor Salikov was a Russian GRU officer and former Wagner PMC fighter who defected after witnessing war crimes in Ukraine. Since 2014, he participated in Russia’s covert takeover of eastern Ukraine under the direction of Vladislav Surkov.

In a bombshell interview with Russian human rights activist, Gulagu.net founder Vladimir Osechkin, Salikov described how Surkov carefully crafted the narrative of a separatist uprising led by locals.

Russian proxies like Salikov were restricted to Soviet-era equipment to mask their involvement. Salikov even witnessed how forces under Aleksandr Zakharchenko deliberately shelled Russian-held areas like Donetsk cemetery, blaming Ukraine to manufacture pretexts for escalation.

Salikov realized no true “liberation” was underway – residents were pawns in a larger geopolitical scheme. Through propaganda, isolated incidents were exaggerated into fables of Ukrainian brutality used to justify further bloodshed. But on the ground, most citizens prioritized stability over external manipulation sold as “liberation.”

Salikov’s insider perspectives expose the lies and hybrid warfare tactics that enabled Russia’s long-term campaign. The interview will likely be used within the framework of an international investigation, and in the work of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, which has issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin.

We found this interview so important that, after writing its short overview, we created the English subtitles for the entire 2 hours of the video. Below is their shortened text version, adapted for clarity.

How Russian army officer Igor Salikov ended up in private military companies

Vladimir Osechkin: I present to you for the first time on our channel Igor Salikov, an officer of the Russian armed forces and Russian special forces. We have been in touch behind the scenes for almost a year. I welcome you and thank you for agreeing to speak on video for the channel. Please tell us about yourself, your service record, your experience.

Igor Salikov: I enrolled in military school, then was expelled and later went to serve in the army. I took part in military operations in the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Turkestan Military District. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, I finished my service already on the territory of the Russian Federation. And then, I went rogue, became a mercenary. I also went through the criminal structures. Because at that time, the beginning of the mid-90s, where could a poor peasant go.

Vladimir Osechkin: When did you take part in military operations in Ukraine, what was your relationship with the so-called Wagner PMC, and when did you personally meet Dmitry Utkin, what brigade did you serve in, what brigade did he serve in, and when did you find out that there is such a person?

Igor Salikov: I met Dmitry Utkin somewhere around in 2010 or 2011. He was interested specifically in working in such private military structures, and we were already doing this, we were working in Iraq at the time. Dmitry Utkin was from the second brigade, and I was from the 15^th. After I had already gone on to officer positions, after compulsory service when I served then in an airborne assault brigade, I ended up in the 15th brigade, which was based in the Turkestan Military District, not far from Tashkent.

I met Dmitry Utkin from the second brigade through our mutual acquaintance, with whom they served in Chechnya together. So we started communicating with him, and then we had one joint operation there related to returning property to a businessman… I think he was a foreign citizen, bandits in the Moscow Oblast took away his plane, and some other assets, and the man needed help with this issue. The difference here is working for money, and Utkin was recommended to me. He he conflicted with my colleagues from Alpha, and our mutual work ended.

How Russian special services created PMC Wagner to fight in Ukraine

Vladimir Osechkin: When you mentioned Alpha, are you referring to the Alpha Group, the FSB spetsnaz unit?

Igor Salikov: Yes, that’s how Group A of the FSB of Russia is called now. So that was our first meeting, then our paths diverged. In 2013, Utikin signed up for detachments to guard towers in Syria a project led by Gusev and Evgeny Sidorov from the airborne special designation regiment of the 45^th brigade. It was a scandalous project, they were deceived and after two combat encounters were evacuated and flown into St. Petersburg by charter.

Gusev and Sidorov were arrested and the others went through a filtration process, their passports were taken away, the FSB interrogated them, compiled all the data, assigned personal numbers to the cases. Gusev and Sidorov were convicted, initially charged with Article 358, 359 and served three years each, and then everyone went and started fighting in Ukraine.

Vladimir Osechkin: what was the name of this group deployed in Syria and which returned and was arrested?

Igor Salikov: It was the Slavic Corps, it was a legal entity registered in Singapore. They operated, according to our scheme, because Gusev was there, an experienced guy.

The precursor was the Moran group, a structure working for several years before. Moran, then the Slavic Corps, then detention by FSB officers upon returning to Russia, filtration and then formation under control.

In February 2014, the Revolution of Dignity was happening in Kyiv. [Russian media] presented it as a witch’s sabbath. I contacted my long-time friend in the field, a public figure appearing on TV who was invited to give interviews everywhere, because private military companies were discussed in media since 2007 when there was a Kremlin order to study them.

We were still working in Northern Iraq, correspondents came to interview us about private military work. And there was a certain Sladkov who was a pro-government person with his own program on Rossiya-2. He had a list of questions that interested the official structures. This surprised me because we essentially worked for Russia but were at risk of being considered a mercenary. We worked legally under state structures like Northern Iraq government, Kurdistan, in Afghanistan escorting convoys for ISAF. Internationally legal but in Russia we were illegal as mercenaries so people kept away from media.

Wagner defector exposes Russia’s Donbas ruse, false-flag ops in bombshell interview

Prigozhin liked Utkin’s excessive cruelty; Wagner captures Luhansk and Donetsk airports

From him, I learned that a meeting in St. Petersburg addressed forming units according to a similar plan and who would be in charge. I first heard the surname of Prigozhin and his nickname “cook.” I learned that Dmitry Utkin was offered to form a group and show himself in some real action, and then decisions will be made from there.

Based on 50% of my own analytics and 50% of data I have from various sources, meetings took place during April-May when the powers of the future [Wagner] PMC were transferred to a certain person who financed them, then the question arose of who will head it from the military standpoint, and of course, the [FSB] agency reviewed all these lists, called people in and told them that Prigozhin himself will not go to capture the airport in Luhansk.

Utkin was called in given an offer. Knowing him, he didn’t need to be blackmailed, he agreed: this was his line of work. But some were indeed blackmailed and had second thoughts but ended up there in such a spectrum on the edge. A group was formed, there were about 30-40 people who entered Luhansk, and their main task was to crush the units that were defending the airport.

At that time, both in Donetsk and Luhansk, the [Ukrainian] special forces remained in these key [airfields], which provided air logistics. Capturing them was significant in every respect, in military and political terms. And Utkin successfully coped with this, especially while decisions on who would be the military commander of this structure had not been made.

And I have such insider information from a person who communicated with Prigozhin. He said that what Prigozhin especially liked about Dmitry Utkin was excessive cruelty, the execution of all these things without sentimentality. That is, practically no one was taken prisoner, everything was destroyed, and Utkin himself gave the order.

Core of Wagner made from GRU officers; criminals involved

Vladimir Osechkin: Summarizing what you talked about, it turns out that the very creation of this Wagner group, the tactical battalion group, was de facto under the control of the special services, who had dossiers on former GRU officers, and whom the state itself, the FSB, assembled, formed, and connected with the person who was entrusted, through whom the financing of this activity and the execution of such geopolitical and military special tasks, assignments on the territory of Ukraine.

Igor Salikov: In general, as you put it, yes, absolutely correct. The core of the entire unit consisted of GRU officers, but there were also paratrooper guys. The core, which was part of the Slavic corps, fell into this dossier conducted by FSB upon the arrival of the charter flight. Tt was then analyzed, there were special instructions, these people were selected, and everyone was made an offer. Someone accepted with joy, someone, probably, had second thoughts but could no longer refuse.

Vladimir Osechkin: I will just make a small factual insertion here. That is, on the well-known photograph, which can be easily found on the internet, where Vladimir Putin stands with a whole row of people, who have Heroes of Russia on their chests, on the left hand from Vladimir Putin.

Russian president Vladimir Putin (C) pictured with head of PMC “Wagner” Dmitry Utkin (L). This image is believed to date from December 2016.

This is none other than Kuznetsov Alexander Sergeevich, now known under the call sign Rotibor, commander of the first assault unit, respectively, personal number M-0271. In 2008, Alexander Kuznetsov, as a major, served in the special forces, later he was arrested on suspicion of kidnapping and robbery. In 2010, he was convicted and served a sentence in the correctional colony in the Nizhny Novgorod Oblast. By the decision of the Borsky City Court, his sentence was reduced, and in April 2013, he was released on parole. Shortly after, he took command of the first reconnaissance-assault company in Dmitry Utkin’s group, known as the Wagner PMC.

This is one of the small sketches to what we talked about. The person was in the special forces, then was arrested and convicted for committed crimes, then the authorities released him in 2013. And already in 2014, we see that this person who should have still been in a penal colony becomes a commander of the Wagner group. I just mention this so that those who will watch and analyze us understand how the military machine, which gained worldwide notoriety as the Wagner PMC, was formed.

Let’s then turn to the question of how you ended up in Ukraine in 2014. Under what circumstances did this happen? Who controlled it? Whose orders or instructions were you following?

Salikov supports Russia’s sham “referendum” as part of Borodai’s group

Igor Salikov: Despite living and working abroad, I belong to the Soviet generation of people. The spirit of passionarity — compassion for your own and others, international assistance, no matter what kind – was instilled in me from family relations and school. While much proved false, it remained with my generation.

Witnessing events unfold in Russia from 2000-2010, over time it became clear the state leaders and authorities had failed and betrayed the people, as too many villains and corrupt figures had risen up the ranks. However, I believed the core institutions that prevent total villainous rule were still intact. I naively hoped that eventually some hero will stand up and say “enough,” call the warriors into his army and say, come on, comrades, let’s bring order, after all, this is our home there. I also fell for this bait.

[So when the Ukrainian crisis first erupted, I will admit I retained some of that inherent sympathetic mindset. During the Euromaidan revolution, the idea spread that] “our Ukrainian brothers are heading the wrong way.” In particular, the city of Donetsk ]holds a personal connection because] a cousin of mine who had fought all the way to Berlin in WW2 is buried there. All the propaganda portrayed the shocking events, such as the 2 May 2014 clashes in Odesa, in a negative light.

Then, the Crimean Spring [occupation of Crimea, 2014] influenced me in a historical sense; my memories of childhood days joyfully spent with grandparents in Crimea by the seaside still lingered.

And so I ended up in a unit that entered [Ukraine] under the leadership of Aleksandr Borodai [Russian national appointed as the first “Prime Minister of the “Donetsk People’s Republic -ed]. We initially went to Sloviansk to assist a friend from Iraq, who ended up surrounded there as part of Strelkov’s unit.

“Donetsk People’s Republic” ex-PM inadvertently admits he carried out Kremlin plans

But after that, I was assigned to lead a reconnaissance squad in a unit under Borodai who had a task from Strelkov and Russian special services.

Throughout this period, the FSB and counterintelligence were managing numerous operational aspects on the Donetsk side, while the GRU conducted similar functions on the Luhansk side. Putin’s aide Surkov supervised through the FSB line, with the orthodox oligarch Malofeev, who funded Borodai.

Our first major operation was providing armed support for the “referendum,” followed by the founding of the so-called DNR.

My first entry into Donetsk was to support the referendum by force. The second time I entered as the commander of a reconnaissance unit to prevent the Ukrainian-Russian border along the Mius river from being cut off.

Vladimir Osechkin: To talk in chronological order, let’s devote time to the “referendum” and this special operation and then move on to the military part, where you were the commander of reconnaissance. You mentioned the word “curator.” Am I right in understanding that for such professional fighters, special forces officers, having experience in the GRU, other special units, participating in many combat operations in many countries of the world, an institution of curatorship existed in Russia, when the FSB controlled, supervised and formed them for some specific state task?

Igor Salikov: Of course. How else could we move armed around Russia, with ammunition, grenade launchers, in combat vehicles, escorted by police?

In Moscow I saw the rotten side of officers, unlike the honorable ones in Soviet movies. Defending someone legally, they framed me with planted bullets and grenades, even tried to pin two corpses on me. The city police ruined my life and career. But for this operation, such charges disappeared and ammunition appeared.

Vladimir Osechkin: Let’s discuss the formation of the initial group in chronological order, starting with the referendum operation. Which service formed this group? How and where did the physical grouping and arming take place? Can you provide dates or timeframes for your first entry into Ukraine?

Igor Salikov: So, a complex composite question.

The FSB’s second counterintelligence service supervised. They operated through the FSB border service’s reconnaissance office. I don’t recall if it was during the border troops or border services. These details aren’t important. Like the GRU, the specifics aren’t significant. It was through the border service’s intelligence and counterintelligence formations, training, and arming. Weapons came from warehouses, the newest models. In the FSB, the storage facilities were more or less from the army. The machine guns were in good condition, greased, boxes and all. The grenade launchers fired properly. Everything was managed well, with documentation and signatures. But still, it was for for free, nobody really cared about the paperwork. So even machine guns disappeared. Nobody really bothered about it.

The military structure handled operations, while the special services remained curators. In training camps, officer groups resolved all issues – equipment, ammunition, supplies, communication procedures, primary and secondary tasks. We had contact agents and avoided others. There was a lepton, a laptop with secret communication, which connected directly to the operational department that supervised our tasks.

Surkov’s role in creating the “DNR” and “LNR”

Vladimir Osechkin: So, in essence, there was direct management of these special operations?

Igor Salikov: Absolutely correct. Surkov supervised all of Borodai’s group.

At that time, he headed the presidential administration and Putin’s personal aide. He decided all issues, who lives, who doesn’t, what to do. Even in these training camps, everything was coordinated with him. Even all the operational officers were coordinated by Surkov.

He supervised Russian affairs in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the “DNR,” “LNR.” Surkov remained Putin’s assistant until February 2020. He had constant contact with Putin, the administration head, FSB Director, overseeing Putin’s geopolitical projects.

Vladimir Osechkin: Please elaborate on the role of Putin’s administration, about Vladislav Surkov, and about the structure they built to control what was happening in the occupied territories that later began to be called the so-called “DNR” and “LNR.” Did you have any official status in those events? If yes, what was your position called and within which structure? And what can you tell about the interrelation of these structures with the administration of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, who is subject to arrest based on the warrant of the International Criminal Court?

Igor Salikov: Initially I had no official status. Parallel units were being formed from soldiers discharged retroactively from their previous units. This was to avoid directly involving personnel from army or special services at that time.

In April-May 2014, groups were recruited this way. After units were pre-formed, they were then “legitimized” by the May 11 referendum. Structures were then established based on the newly declared republics, including law enforcement agencies modeled after Russia.

I entered the Special Operations Management under the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Donetsk People’s Republic. Previously this unit worked directly with Borodai under Surkov’s direct leadership. Officials who directly entered the territory of Ukraine starting in May were appointed to head these new structures, including the Attorney General, the military prosecutor, and all the authorities. In June, they started creating some additional structures.

Our unit re-entered in early June after these events, when combat participation was needed to prevent border isolation and the “Voentorg” [military trade] from being cut off. At this stage we were directly managed by the Russian FSB. I have described how units were pre-formed under Surkov and the entry process – people appointed to leadership knew their positions in advance.

How Russia maintained plausible deniability in occupied Donbas

Vladimir Osechkin: What was your role, position, how much was it connected to the presidential administration? What was the relationship, if any, with Surkov, with those who work in the presidential administration, with those who were in the occupied territories?

Igor Salikov: I already told that Donbas was taken into Russian “embraces” directly under the presidential administration, or Surkov. At least I myself heard, it was all secret, but [there were] people who managed the units who already knew they would be appointed to some positions. A unit was formed in Russia’s Rostov Oblast, then it split: a part went to Sloviansk and another to Donetsk.

Some entered Luhansk, others Donetsk. These appointed people received operational commands and clarifications directly from Surkov by phone. Before entering, Surkov worked directly with Borodai and Sergey, a young man with a Georgian surname, to coordinate actions and formations.

Surkov then managed the administration of all appointed officials. For example, he appointed the Attorney General position. Surkov approved the Vostok battalion and communicated directly with [its leader] Khodakovsky in my presence. I heard Khodakovsky speaking to Surkov on the phone.

Borodai as well – he was appointed Prime Minister, holding the role until July/August 2014. This is what I know from personal experience of the structured coordination. Complete consistency was impossible because Donbas was a living organism with many independent currents.

Orders came directly from Moscow to Borodai’s team, who were responsible for coordination. Some like [current “DNR” head] Pushilin got involved, others resisted or served [Ukrainian oligarch] Akhmetov’s interests – many complex dynamics.

Moscow orders to capture Donetsk airport

By 26 May 2014, when the Ukrainian presidential [post-Euromaidan] elections were confirmed, the decision came to capture Donetsk airport, staged for victims and evidence of rebellion.

Then, clashes were taking place on the outskirts, mainly in Sloviansk and Donetsk. The Ukrainian side was building up there, military planes were landing at the airport, it was operational, civilian planes flew from there.

By the end of May, Moscow decided to put an end to all this, signaled to “come on guys, earn your money” as nothing was progressing. It was decided to stage a battle at the Donetsk airport involving Vostok, Oplot and Borodai’s unit and an “Interbrigade number one” created as fodder. Victims were needed, evidence that people were fighting for their freedom, to show that protest sentiments grew to such a degree that fights began. All this was disguised as internal problems of Donbas, with no supposed Russian intervention. Everything was disguised. Weaponry and personnel were meant to appear Ukrainian. The group that entered there should not have been distinguishable from Ukrainians. That was being monitored at the time. Because it was ordered from above.

Everything had to appear organic. Surkov is such a pragmatist, a man of forms. He demanded precision – old Ukrainian weapons and equipment, no visible Russian intervention. The ammunition and rifles had to be from within Ukraine.

Only Ukrainian equipment was used to disguise Russian intervention

Vladimir Osechkin: What kind of equipment was supposed to be used? What kind of ammunition was needed? What was all this for, how was it organized?

Igor Salikov: I don’t know specifics, only that Surkov organized purchases in Russia using financing from Malofeev. They chose groups knowledgeably, as in Chechnya. Surkov still supported Strelkov in Sloviansk then, sending vehicles and ammunition.

When units were being formed at bases in Russia’s Rostov Oblast like at Kazachyi Lageri based on the 22^nd brigade, a roster was made and weapons selected. Everything had to be old Soviet models common in Ukraine, like machine guns. Newer weapons unavailable in Ukraine at the time were not used.

Vladimir Osechkin: In your understanding, why was this done? And possibly any instructions that were given from Surkov and subordinates. In what moments did you hear this being discussed?

Igor Salikov: So that this particular regulation was followed – at first, to use a limited amount of weapons that are also available to the Ukrainian side. But I was not privy to insider information during the formation of units that entered. One could only guess and then analyze.

During the “people’s referendum,” last minute issues nearly disrupted the orchestrated plans. Roman Lyalin, the savings bank director, demanded higher pay for his role. Failure loomed without urgent coordination. I witnessed a phone call to the boss while sitting in a car. From the tones and phrases, I realized it was Surkov, though he was not named explicitly. With a good connection and in sufficient silence, you can hear what is being said on the phone.

But nobody introduced me to Surkov, I didn’t have the authority, it’s not done that way there. Everyone was in their place: Borodai received tasks, assigned them to us, if something didn’t work out, reported it below and up.

Credit must be given to Borodai, and his assistants. They adhered to all these laws of theater. Apparently, that was the directive from Surkov, and the presidential administration, to play by the rules, down the smallest details. They really were meticulous in following them.

The initial attempt was to simulate acting forces as supposedly Ukrainian with Ukrainian weapons, without direct Russian invasion from the Russian special services, soldiers, officers, mercenaries. Everything was disguised as rebel patriot self-defense groups opposing Euromaidan who expressed their civil position, took up arms found locally in response to Ukrainian government pressure and the ATO [anti-terrorist operation] declaration. It was like that the people, having the right to revolt, took up arms which they scavenged in warehouses, in mines, etc. But this obscured the real supply line (“Voentorg”) opened from Russia transporting equipment unavailable in Ukraine.

Voentorg: flow of Russian weapons to its proxies over the Ukrainian border

Vladimir Osechkin: What do you mean by the term Voentorg?

Igor Salikov: Briefly, “Voentorg” referred to the covert military assistance in weapons and materiel established between Russia and the groups in southeast Ukraine. It’s slang invented as convenient shorthand in conversations for cross-border arms transfers, like call signs for units. Local people who lived there were used for Voentorg, with FSB and GRU. Some eventually received assignments. Particularly, Bezler [Lieutenant Colonel of the FSB of the Russian Federation who headed a “self defense” group in the “DNR” accused of war crimes]. He was pumped up with weapons. Voentorg went to Girkin and to him, to Horlivka. And they were told to do whatever they want. There was no accountability for them. They were like bandits. The groups were independent. That’s why later there were killings, showdowns. Petty criminal elements.

A new system to pocket Russian money after Minsk-2, “Russian world” enthusiasts discarded

Vladimir Osechkin: Were any special operations carried out under a false flag — terrorist acts, sabotage, attacks while pretending to be representatives of the Ukrainian Armed Forces? Or

Igor Salikov: Yes, but in 2015, not 2014. It was after the battles for Debaltseve ended and the formation of the Debaltseve pocket [of Ukrainian troops surrounded in 2015 during the signing of the Minsk-2 agreement].

An era of economic uncertainty and confusion began at this time. Many volunteers from units that had entered from Russia started being expelled, even those who had endured the entire conflict up to this point and through whose resources much of the campaign was resourced.

After 2012-2013, a large number of former military personnel who were left without purpose or excluded from service made up a sizable part of the fighting forces in Donbas. These included many patriotic individuals who were no longer needed by the Russian armed forces since the conflict in Chechnya ended in an unclear manner under the leadership of Ramzan Kadyrov. Additionally, many were pushed out of the military due to the reforms instituted by Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, which dismantled many existing structures. As a result, a significant population of marginalized and dissatisfied former soldiers remained.

Events like the [2014 Sochi] Olympics also played a role, everyone saw how they were stealing the Olympics. All of these marginalized groups urgently needed direction, which is part of what made the events in Crimea and Donbas so appealing to them. And all this marginal crowd which I belonged to turned out to be in demand. There was a patriotic boom at last. The boss began to put things in order. The cookies that were distributed by America and the West [referring to the alleged American backing of the Euromaidan revolution, epitomized by snacks distributed by Victoria Nuland in Kyiv] played a role. And we finally rose up to recreate [the Russian world] anew.

After the massive “northern wind” Russian troop offensives, when they again led [Russian] troops to break frontline Ukrainian army units during the Debaltseve cauldron [in 2015], downsizing and removal of resistors began. Some committed suicide. Units started being renamed as corps.

Zakharchenko had been appointed prime minister before this, returning as hero of all cauldrons. A combative officer with experience and saber at his side, he began establishing order by dispersing volunteers who led the “revolution.”

Killings, disappearances and departures occurred, leaving those who could serve the formed system. The new system relied on large cash flows from Russia. Zakharchenko in particular was said to pocket $2-3 millions of dollars each week from some undisclosed funding source. This generated conflicts as figures like Khodakovsky challenged how the spoils were divided up locally.

Conflicts arose over dividing it, like Khodakovsky and him. Money goes where there is ongoing low-level war with results, needing victims and shelling. When Minsk-2 was concluded, everyone was withdrawn for some reason, and now they want to use the same scheme. At the time, we were already in Novoazovsk near Mariupol, and at that moment it was possible to reach Odesa. Realistically in Ukrainian cities at the time, no one knew where the situation was heading. In Mariupol, Ukrainian forces were no longer present – we could have entered the city unimpeded and continued on to Kherson. But political and economic motives prevented this.

The authorities thought about their [bank] accounts, they thought [the West’s anger] would pass quickly, the West would wipe itself again and that the frog had to be boiled slowly. Therefore, they decided: now we will not anger the elder brother [the West], look, we’re conceding, so don’t block anything please; they portrayed the separatist movement as a local uprising by residents rebelling against the new Kyiv government. Foreign Minister Lavrov [skillfully framed Russia’s role as non-involvement in the conflict]. And then Minsk-2 appeared, such a harmful thing.

After over a year fighting to purportedly “liberate” the Donbas region, I came to realize that there [is nothing] to liberate and it is unclear who we were liberating. The local population was being used as pawns by outside forces. The situation on the ground grew increasingly tragic, though the crisis had not yet escalated to a global scale.

Russian proxies shelled their own to keep money flowing for a protracted war

Vladimir Osechkin: In your role in 2014-2015, did you directly witness any examples of foreign proxies, sabotage or other covert activities? Because many people write that [the Ukrainians] for 8 years “bombed Donbas,” and when the war started, one of the main slogans of those who justify the full-scale war was that for eight years before that [Ukrainians] allegedly arranged genocide in Donbas and tortured the local population. Russian propaganda then concealed, covered, hid, kept secret the reasons behind Russia’s involvement, Russian special services, Russian soldiers, officers, mercenaries, security forces in what happened there. If you can, at least one, two, three specific examples, about which you are ready to testify.

Igor Salikov: Well, the “foreign flags” are conditional, at the time there was no need to change uniforms, Then I was called to one committee, where they asked whether I know a comrade with the callsign “Spear.” I was reluctant to disclose information as a rule, though in this case I couldn’t deny knowing the person from the photos shown since we served together in 2014.

By this point, I held the position of head of the special operations department. They disclosed that mortars shelling areas of Donetsk like Petrovsky and Kyiv districts were connected to military forces shifting under Zakharchenko’s control through various designations like Guard, Army Corps, and National Guard.

During this time, even our own units found themselves accidentally shelled near the Trudovska mine, believing the fire originated from Ukrainians on the opposite riverbank. However, analysis of munition evidence and blast trajectories indicated the mortars actually emerged from within our territory practically in Donetsk, launched from Petrovsky cemetery and striking buildings housing mine workers – five-story apartments and rooftops.

Vehicles departed openly from the launch site, with an obligatory observation post also stationed near the road as required, though an undetected disguised post in the area covertly monitored and provided my colleagues information that vehicles from the site proceeded to a location housing one battalion under the command of “Spear.” Further intelligence work confirmed these incidents entailed internal affairs conducted according to Zakharchenko’s directives.

Why? I’ll explain. First, it’s money. Maintaining the war generates constant financing flows needed for social welfare and military expenditures. Here, you didn’t need to shoot by yourself. You could just place a mortar, say, in such, in neutral zones and such unclear areas that nobody controlled, or were ostensibly under the control of the “DNR,” but neither Ukrainians nor our people went there.

Related: 

A framed flag signed by front-line Ukrainian fighters in Bakhmut and presented to the U.S. Congress in 2022, sits at one end of the table where Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy will meet privately with U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) and other congressional leaders on a visit to the U.S. Capitol in Washington,… Acquire Licensing Rights Read more

WASHINGTON, Dec 10 (Reuters) – The White House will step up its engagement with U.S. lawmakers trying to strike a bipartisan deal that would provide military aid for Ukraine and Israel while tightening U.S. border security, a Democratic senator said on Sunday.

Republicans have insisted that additional funding for Ukraine must be paired with major U.S. border security changes but a bipartisan group of senators trying to broker a compromise have made little progress with less than a week before the U.S. Congress leaves for a Christmas break.

“The White House is going to get more engaged this week,” Senator Chris Murphy, the lead Democratic negotiator, said on NBC News’ “Meet the Press.”

Murphy said it was important to know if Democratic President Joe Biden would sign any prospective deal.

The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Biden, who is seeking reelection in 2024, has struggled with record numbers of migrants attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border illegally. Republicans have criticized Biden for rolling back some restrictive policies of former President Donald Trump, currently the leading candidate for his party’s nomination.

Reuters reported last week that the Biden administration was open to new limits on U.S. asylum as part of a deal to secure funding for allies Ukraine and Israel.

Murphy said the current border security demands by Republicans were “unreasonable” and that they were “playing games with the security of the world” by linking the military aid to U.S. border security measures.

Some Republicans have pushed for border provisions that would allow migrants crossing the border illegally to be quickly deported without the chance to seek U.S. asylum. They have also called for greatly scaling back Biden programs that have allowed hundreds of thousands of migrants to enter lawfully.

Senator James Lankford, a Republican member of the group working on a border compromise, said the U.S. border was “literally spiraling out of control” with 12,000 migrants crossing illegally in a single day last week.

Speaking on CBS News’ “Face the Nation,” Lankford declined to detail what policy changes he had proposed but said Congress needed to take steps “to actually begin to control the border.”

Republican Senator J.D. Vance told CNN’s “State of the Union” program that he opposes aid to Ukraine, saying it is “functionally destroyed as a country” that needs to end the war through negotiations with Russia.

“What’s in America’s best interest is to accept Ukraine is going to have to cede some territory to the Russians, and we need to bring this war to a close,” Vance said.

Shalanda Young, director of the White House budget office, said on CBS News that failing to aid Ukraine could encourage Russia to expand the conflict to other U.S. allies in Europe.

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Ted Hesson is an immigration reporter for Reuters, based in Washington, D.C. His work focuses on the policy and politics of immigration, asylum and border security. Prior to joining Reuters in 2019, Ted worked for the news outlet POLITICO, where he also covered immigration. His articles have appeared in POLITICO Magazine, The Atlantic and VICE News, among other publications. Ted holds a master’s degree from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and bachelor’s degree from Boston College.