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Mohammed Atef | Afghanistan | The Guardian  theguardian.com/news/2001/no…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

The post Mohammed Atef | Afghanistan first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

RT  @MusicaTrails: A little bird in a man’s hands. A moment of closeness in which strength turns into tenderness, and touch becomes an expre…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

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#CIA CIA  #FBI FBI  #Mossad Mossad

Mohammed Atef and his Russian Connections  share.gemini.google/hRM2z1lF…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

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Mohammed Atef and Russian Connections  share.gemini.google/hRM2z1lF…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

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Mohammed Atef | Counter Extremism Project  counterextremism.com/extremi…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

The post Mohammed Atef first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

#CIA CIA  #FBI FBI  #Mossad Mossad
Mohammed Atef of Al Qaeda and his Russian connections – Google Search  google.com/search?q=Mohammed…
Mohammed Atef (also known as Abu Hafs al-Masri), al-Qaeda’s longtime military commander until his death in a U.S. airstrike in November 2001, had no verified operational alliance or formal ties with the Russian government. Rather, his documented connections to Russia and the former Soviet Union were adversarial, involving direct military conflict, proxy support for anti-Russian insurgencies, and illicit attempts to acquire post-Soviet weaponry. [1]

Key Points of Intersection

The Soviet–Afghan War. Atef, a former Egyptian police officer and member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight against the Soviet military occupation. Operating alongside Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden, Atef helped recruit, train, and organize Arab mujahideen fighters against Soviet forces, laying the groundwork for the founding of al-Qaeda in 1988. [1, 2]
The Chechen Conflicts and the Hamburg Cell. As al-Qaeda’s military chief in the 1990s, Atef oversaw training camps in Afghanistan that hosted militants from across the globe, including fighters heading to or returning from the wars against Russian forces in Chechnya. Notably, the core members of the 9/11 “Hamburg cell”—including Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh—initially traveled to Afghanistan in late 1999 with the intention of fighting Russian troops in the Second Chechen War. Atef personally vetted them at the camps and redirected them from the Chechen front to carry out the September 11 attacks in the United States. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Post-Soviet Weapons Procurement. Intelligence assessments and counterterrorism profiles—including research from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point—note that Atef actively pushed for al-Qaeda to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and advanced conventional arms. Throughout the 1990s, al-Qaeda leadership sought to exploit black-market networks emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union to obtain radiological materials, chemical agents, and handheld surface-to-air missiles. [1, 2, 3]
Confusion with Other Militants. Discussions of “Russian connections” occasionally stem from mistaken identity involving Atef’s nom de guerre, Abu Hafs al-Masri. Following Atef’s death in 2001, other militants used similar aliases—most notably Abu Hafs al-Urdani, a Jordanian commander who led foreign mujahideen fighters against Russian forces in Chechnya in the mid-2000s, and the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, a shadowy group that issued propaganda claims for various international attacks. [1, 2, 3, 4]

Context on Intelligence Claims

Following Atef’s death, counterterrorism investigations revealed that several detainees—such as Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi—fabricated stories about Atef’s foreign state connections (most famously claiming he sent emissaries to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq for chemical weapons training) to mislead interrogators. Similarly, unverified conspiracy theories alleging KGB or FSB ties to al-Qaeda’s senior leadership have been widely dismissed by mainstream intelligence analysts and historians. [1]

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

The post #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Mohammed Atef of Al Qaeda and his Russian connections Mohammed Atef (also known as Abu Hafs al-Masri), al-Qaeda’s longtime military commander until his death in a U.S. airstrike in November 2001, had no verified operational alliance or formal ties with the Russian government. Rather, his documented connections to Russia and the former Soviet Union were adversarial, invo first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Russia’s ambassador to the United States, Alexander Darchiev, has died at 66, the Russian Foreign Ministry says.  cnn.it/3WGys8S

— @CNN Nov 11, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: Russia’s ambassador to the United States, Alexander Darchiev, has died at 66, the Russian Foreign Ministry says. first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

#CIA CIA  #FBI FBI  #Mossad Mossad

Mohammed Atef of Al Qaeda and his Russian connections – Google Search  google.com/search?q=Mohammed…
Mohammed Atef (also known as Abu Hafs al-Masri), al-Qaeda’s longtime military commander until his death in a U.S. airstrike in November 2001, had no verified operational alliance or formal ties with the Russian government. Rather, his documented connections to Russia and the former Soviet Union were adversarial, involving direct military conflict, proxy support for anti-Russian insurgencies, and illicit attempts to acquire post-Soviet weaponry. [1]

Key Points of Intersection

The Soviet–Afghan War. Atef, a former Egyptian police officer and member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight against the Soviet military occupation. Operating alongside Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden, Atef helped recruit, train, and organize Arab mujahideen fighters against Soviet forces, laying the groundwork for the founding of al-Qaeda in 1988. [1, 2]
The Chechen Conflicts and the Hamburg Cell. As al-Qaeda’s military chief in the 1990s, Atef oversaw training camps in Afghanistan that hosted militants from across the globe, including fighters heading to or returning from the wars against Russian forces in Chechnya. Notably, the core members of the 9/11 “Hamburg cell”—including Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh—initially traveled to Afghanistan in late 1999 with the intention of fighting Russian troops in the Second Chechen War. Atef personally vetted them at the camps and redirected them from the Chechen front to carry out the September 11 attacks in the United States. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Post-Soviet Weapons Procurement. Intelligence assessments and counterterrorism profiles—including research from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point—note that Atef actively pushed for al-Qaeda to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and advanced conventional arms. Throughout the 1990s, al-Qaeda leadership sought to exploit black-market networks emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union to obtain radiological materials, chemical agents, and handheld surface-to-air missiles. [1, 2, 3]
Confusion with Other Militants. Discussions of “Russian connections” occasionally stem from mistaken identity involving Atef’s nom de guerre, Abu Hafs al-Masri. Following Atef’s death in 2001, other militants used similar aliases—most notably Abu Hafs al-Urdani, a Jordanian commander who led foreign mujahideen fighters against Russian forces in Chechnya in the mid-2000s, and the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, a shadowy group that issued propaganda claims for various international attacks. [1, 2, 3, 4]

Context on Intelligence Claims

Following Atef’s death, counterterrorism investigations revealed that several detainees—such as Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi—fabricated stories about Atef’s foreign state connections (most famously claiming he sent emissaries to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq for chemical weapons training) to mislead interrogators. Similarly, unverified conspiracy theories alleging KGB or FSB ties to al-Qaeda’s senior leadership have been widely dismissed by mainstream intelligence analysts and historians. [1]

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

The post #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Mohammed Atef of Al Qaeda and his Russian connections Mohammed Atef (also known as Abu Hafs al-Masri), al-Qaeda’s longtime military commander until his death in a U.S. airstrike in November 2001, had no verified operational alliance or formal ties with the Russian government. Rather, his documented connections to Russia and the former Soviet Union were adversarial, invo first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

BREAKING: Darchiev, Russia’s ambassador to the U.S., has died.

– Russian Foreign Ministry

— @Osint613 Nov 11, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: BREAKING: Darchiev, Russia’s ambassador to the U.S., has died. first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

A little bird in a man’s hands. A moment of closeness in which strength turns into tenderness, and touch becomes an expression of care and trust.

Sergey Sovkov

— @MusicaTrails Nov 11, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: A little bird in a man’s hands. A moment of closeness in which strength turns into tenderness, and touch becomes an expression of care and trust. Sergey Sovkov first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

BIGSAVE-ONLINE TIMELESS STYLE. BETTER EVERYDAY. THE PERFECT TRAVEL COMPANION Travel Better. Travel in Style. Some bags carry your belongings. Others become part of your journey. A Classic Worth Taking Everywhere Meet your new favorite travel companion. Crafted with genuine Crazy Horse leather, this vintage-inspired duffel bag brings timeless character and practical convenience to every journey. 01 Authentic Leather Character Enjoy the distinctive vintage-inspired look of Crazy Horse leather. 02 Made for Every Getaway A versatile companion for weekend trips, vacations, and business travel. 03 Comfortable Carrying Carry it your way with the convenient shoulder strap. Your Next Journey Awaits Make every trip a little more memorable. EXPLORE THE BAG BIGSAVE-ONLINE Discover great finds. Enjoy everyday style. You are receiving this email because you subscribed to our updates. Unsubscribe

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Bin Laden denied role in 9/11 at first – Google Search  google.com/search?q=Bin+Lade…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

The post Bin Laden denied role in 9/11 at first first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Mohammed Atef, Al Qaeda military chief – Google Search  google.com/search?q=Mohammed…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

The post Mohammed Atef, Al Qaeda military chief first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Al Qaeda military chief Mohammed Atef – Google Search  google.com/search?q=Al+Qaeda…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

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 All Feeds Review – The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks

thenewsandtimes.blog…22h

9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED

Articles, Blog, and TweetsArticles, Blog, and Tweets47 min ago@mikenov: 9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED, e.g.: OPSEC, COMMUNICATIONS. By whom? Not by Bin Laden & Co. #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google SearchArticles, Blog, and Tweets56 min ago@mikenov: Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google SearchArticles, Blog, and Tweets1 hrs ago@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor” The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticatedThe News And Times Information Network – Blogs By Michael Novakhov – thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com

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@mikenov: 9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED, e.g.: OPSEC, COMMUNICATIONS. By whom? Not by Bin Laden & Co. #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks

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@mikenov: Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks

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@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor” The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticated

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@mikenov: Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks In the fields of intelligence studies, national security, and military history, “alternative counterintelligence analyses” of the 9/11 attacks refer to rigorous, unconv

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The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Michael_Novakhov shared this story. Abstract The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. were undoubtedly the most brazen and shocking terrorist attacks conducted by a sub-state group in history. Al Qaeda’s capacity to achieve this outcome depended in large part on its meticulous intelligence and counterintelligence preparations. These activities allowed Al Qaeda to exert a strong measure of control over its operating environment, leading to a confidence that events would unfold as planned. Moreover, intelligence and counterintelligence allowed Al Qaeda to form highly accurate and realistic assessments of its environment, an outcome that helps to dispel notions of an organization consumed by a level of fanaticism that distorts its perception of reality, or else frustrates its capacity to engage in rational decision making. This article examines Al Qaeda’s use of intelligence and counterintelligence using the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. on 11 September 2001 (hereinafter, “the 9/11 attacks”) as a case study. It will trace Al Qaeda’s collection and use of operational intelligence, with particular emphasis on how this intelligence may have influenced a range of operational decisions and how it may provide evidence of Al Qaeda’s rational approach to decision making. The use of intelligence influenced critical elements of the operation, so that various key decisions were directly determined by operational intelligence accumulated over a lengthy period. This article will analyze how those involved in the operation, including both the operatives and the leadership that directed and coordinated it, craved high levels of certainty and operational control. It will examine the idea that this search for certainty was largely satiated by the organization’s extensive use of intelligence. Aligning decisions to accommodate the conditions most likely to be encountered on the day of the operation served to maximize Al Qaeda’s chance of achieving operational success. Similarly, counterintelligence allowed for the creation of a security umbrella that shielded the operation from exposure throughout all its stages. The nature of the operation dictated the need for the hijackers to engage in behavior that exposed them to constant risk. From communications between the various levels involved in the planning and execution of the operation, to the extensive travel and preparation undertaken by the hijackers, each activity was fraught with danger. This article will critically investigate the proposition that counterintelligence allowed the hijackers to function with confidence during each of these activities, secure in the knowledge that the operation had not been compromised and that they maintained the crucial element of surprise. This case study will, therefore, seek to examine the extent to which intelligence and counterintelligence allowed Al Qaeda to engage in decision making based on accurate representations of reality rather than false illusions influenced by strong ideological or dogmatic perceptions of the world. Moreover, it will examine the argument that Al Qaeda’s intelligence and counterintelligence preparations for the operation may be suggestive of a rationality more sophisticated than the means–ends logic that exemplify most explanations of terrorist rationality.Footnote 1 For example, attempts to manipulate the terrorists’ operating environment for the purpose of acquiring detailed and very specific intelligence suggests a desire to base decisions on near-complete information, not just that which was immediately presented to the group. Intelligence collection on this level was intended to allow Al Qaeda to carry out operations without encountering the type of unanticipated outcomes that could lead to operational failure or blunt the impact of its political or ideological message. Just because events would demonstrate that Al Qaeda was unable to achieve an outcome as resounding as this does not diminish the rationality of its decision making or the role intelligence was expected to discharge in this process. In this way, this study will fill a significant gap in the understanding of the events leading up to the 9/11 attacks. Although some effort has previously been made to examine the counterintelligence protocols of Al Qaeda during the operation,Footnote 2 no attempt has been made to assess the role of intelligence in these events. In neither case, however, has there been a serious attempt to contextualize the function of intelligence and counterintelligence as key activities within Al Qaeda’s decision-making process. Although descriptions of intelligence and counterintelligence in the lead-up to the 9/11 attacks routinely stress their operational importance, analyses linking these activities to decision making and the organization’s capacity to engage in rational behavior appear non-existent. Operational Intelligence An analysis of the role of intelligence in the 9/11 operation demonstrates that the strength of its contribution resided in two areas, namely that of assisting in the preparation of a detailed plan, and to a lesser extent, target identification. It will be demonstrated that Al Qaeda’s preparations for the operation were designed to uncover as much detail as possible about their targets and operating environment to optimize the likelihood of operational success. An examination of the role of intelligence in the 9/11 operation will be served best by examining two distinct phases to the operation, those of conceptualization and planning.Footnote 3 These phases clearly delineate the impact of intelligence on Al Qaeda decision making at critical junctures of the operation’s evolution, while also demonstrating the considered, deliberate, and methodical approach that characterized a decision-making process that spanned years. Revealing a clear capacity to calculate costs and benefits, frequently with the assistance of detailed intelligence, Al Qaeda during these phases displayed the hallmarks of a rational organization that engaged in reflective rather than impulsive decision making designed to achieve an act of violence of tremendous strategic and symbolic importance.Footnote 4 Conceptualization To understand the role of intelligence in facilitating the 9/11 operation, it is first necessary to analyze its genesis as an idea. Such an examination will demonstrate that intelligence fulfilled a limited role during the earliest phases of the operation when discussion focused on the method of attack and preferred targets. It will be contended, however, that the operation’s conception at the apex of the Al Qaeda hierarchy, along with the formulation of a tentative strategy, precluded a need for the type of detailed intelligence that normally determines these fundamental questions. It will be demonstrated that by the time the Al Qaeda leadership approved the operation, the method of attack, along with at least some of the targets, had, for years, formed part of the thinking of those central to the operation. As the following discussion will show, the historical development of the 9/11 operation facilitated a refining process that transformed it from an ambitious idea into reality. The driving force behind the 9/11 operation was Kuwaiti-born Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (hereafter “Khalid”). By the time Khalid presented his ideas to the Al Qaeda leadership for what would ultimately become the 9/11 operation (known within Al Qaeda as the “planes operation”), and prior to his membership of the organization, he had already demonstrated a keen interest in the use of aircraft for terrorist attacks. In the most well-known and ambitious of these plans, the “Bojinka” plot, Khalid and others planned to bomb twelve U.S. commercial aircraft over the Pacific during a two-day period.Footnote 5 Working with his nephew and principal plotter behind the 1993 attacks on the World Trade Center, Ramzi Yousef, Khalid played an active role in this, his first terrorist operation.Footnote 6 This multifaceted plot also involved a plan to assassinate Pope John Paul II during his planned visit to the Philippines in January 1995. It seems to have been Yousef’s idea to use co-conspirator Abdul Hakim Murad, a trained pilot, to fly a light aircraft over the route to be taken by the Pope and drop bombs over the side.Footnote 7 At this time, Murad also contemplated flying a light aircraft loaded with chemical weapons into CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.Footnote 8 This idea emerged in casual conversation between Murad and Yousef, and no specific plan for its execution was devised.Footnote 9 At about this time, Khalid and Yousef also developed a plan to bomb U.S.-bound cargo flights by placing jackets containing nitrocellulose on board.Footnote 10 Thus, Khalid demonstrated a consistent pattern of behavior and interest, at the center of which lay the use of aircraft to attack U.S. interests. Significantly, Jack Roche informed this author that when he met Khalid for the first time in early 2000, the latter asked Roche whether the United States and Israel operated commercial aircraft out of Australia. Although this was not taken any further, Roche believes that Khalid was scouting for targets within Australia.Footnote 11 The idea of using hijacked aircraft as weapons also extended to senior members of Al Qaeda, even before Khalid put forward his proposal for the planes operation. It is believed that Mohammed Atef, at that time Al Qaeda’s operational commander, conducted a study in 1996 that concluded that traditional hijackings failed to meet the organization’s goal of inflicting mass casualties.Footnote 12 The study reportedly considered the feasibility of hijacking aircraft and blowing them up in flight. Thus, the idea of using aircraft had some precedence within Al Qaeda, and among others on the periphery of the organization, that would ultimately perform a central role in the 9/11 operation. Furthermore, it was apparent that the use of aircraft, especially in an unconventional sense, was seen as a vulnerability to existing security arrangements. Indeed, Khalid considered the use of aircraft a more effective and less problematic form of attack compared to conventional bombing methods, a lesson he claims to have learnt from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. With this in mind, he and Yousef considered using aircraft as weapons in attacks on targets that included the World Trade Center, and, as discussed earlier, CIA headquarters.Footnote 13 Unable to realize his ambitions of carrying out an operation involving the use of aircraft on his own, Khalid was given an opportunity in mid-1996 to present his ideas to the Al Qaeda leadership.Footnote 14 During the course of this meeting, Khalid proposed an operation involving trained pilots who would crash planes into buildings in the United States.Footnote 15 Although bin Laden remained non-committal, he agreed, two years later, to support Khalid’s proposal. Over a series of meetings involving bin Laden, Khalid, and Mohammed Atef in early 1999, it was decided that the initial list of targets would include the White House, the U.S. Capitol Building, the Pentagon, and the World Trade Center.Footnote 16 It is not known how detailed and involved these discussions were, and whether this list included other targets that were subsequently rejected for unknown reasons. Furthermore, it is not clear if intelligence was consulted in any comprehensive way during this initial period. It is plausible, however, that the suggested method of the attack precluded the need for intelligence at this stage because the use of aircraft as “flying bombs” exposed virtually every potential U.S. target to attack. In other words, the difficulties associated with conventional bombing methods in terms of ground security could be overcome through the use of aircraft. The Al Qaeda leadership was thus free to choose the targets it wanted, being guided almost entirely by the “statement” it wished to make through the attacks. Indeed, this appears to have been the sole consideration at this time, with the World Trade Center seen as symbolic of U.S. economic power, the Pentagon, a symbol of its military power, the U.S. Capitol as emblematic of U.S. policy on Israel, and the White House, a symbol of general U.S. political power.Footnote 17 In time, however, intelligence would reveal problems specific to this method of attack. It would appear that these problems were identified only after the hijackers engaged in reconnaissance flights. In this regard, intelligence fulfilled its intended function by identifying circumstances that could be expected to impact on the likelihood of operational success. By replicating conditions most likely to be encountered on the day of the operation, the hijackers’ intelligence collection efforts were successful in identifying impediments not anticipated by the Al Qaeda leadership at the time of target selection. The indecision over whether to strike at the White House or the Capitol Building emerged only after the hijackers’ intelligence activities made it apparent that attacking the White House would be more problematic than initially anticipated. Indeed, it seems likely that Mohammed Atta was given some latitude over target selection, because the number of targets that formed the initial list (the World Trade Center Towers, the Pentagon, the Capitol, and the White House) exceeded the number of aircraft to be hijacked.Footnote 18 It may, therefore, be presumed that Atta was to prioritize these targets.Footnote 19 Although it is not clear on what basis they were to be prioritized, there are strong indications that intelligence played some role in this process. From the outset of the “planes operation,” bin Laden was determined to attack the White House, emphasizing his preference on a number of occasions.Footnote 20 In May 2001, for example, bin Laden met with operations coordinator Ramzi Binalshibh, instructing him to confirm that Atta understood that bin Laden’s preference was for the White House over the Capitol. Atta, however, clearly had problems with bin Laden’s continued preference for the White House. Atta informed Binalshibh on at least two separate occasions that he considered the White House too difficult a target.Footnote 21 It is not clear why Atta considered the White House a difficult target, although Khalid’s 2002 comment to journalist Yosri Fouda that reconnaissance teams dismissed it for “navigation reasons,” may be close to the truth. According to Khalid, the small size of the White House made it difficult to see from the air, while the strong defenses surrounding the building made it a less attractive target than the Capitol.Footnote 22 Despite these difficulties, Atta informed Binalshibh that he had tasked Hazmi and Hanjour to conduct reconnaissance on the White House to evaluate the feasibility of an attack, and was apparently awaiting their answer at the time of Atta’s meeting with Binalshibh. Atta also indicated at this time that these two operatives had rented small aircraft and flown reconnaissance flights in the vicinity of the Pentagon.Footnote 23 It therefore seems clear from events that a process was in place to conduct intelligence activities designed to refine the target list with a view to maximizing the likelihood of operational success. Although it is true that the role of intelligence in this process was minor compared to operations such as that of the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kenya in 1998, it is nevertheless indicative of a deliberate and considered approach to decision making in which the weighing of the possibilities and likely outcomes was determined by intelligence. It is also plausible that other intelligence was consulted in deciding on the preferred targets. Dhiren Barot and his associates were actively engaged in reconnaissance in the United States some time after the Al Qaeda leadership approved the “planes operation.” It is known that Barot entered the United States in August 2000 and again in March 2001, and that during these visits travelled to New York and Washington, D.C.Footnote 24 Barot may have scouted potential targets for the “planes operation,” in addition to those that became the subject of his casing reports. Indeed, Khalid confirmed that during the planning for the “planes operation,” he had direct contact with Barot, sending him on at least two missions during this period.Footnote 25 Other reporting also indicates possible surveillance activity in New York before 9/11 that was considered of sufficient concern that it was included in a Presidential Daily Brief in August 2001 addressing bin Laden’s intention to attack the United States.Footnote 26 Planning By the time Khalid approached bin Laden with his idea that would become the 9/11 operation, the hijacking of aircraft was a method looking for an operation. The method of attack thus formed the essence of the operation, providing a unique mode of attack capable of circumventing existing defensive measures while also facilitating Al Qaeda’s aim of inflicting mass casualties. Intelligence during the planning phase, therefore, sought to identify vulnerabilities that would facilitate the preferred method of attack. Although the planned use of hijacked aircraft also influenced target selection by identifying vulnerabilities consistent with the method of attack (e.g., the need for buildings to be clearly visible from the air), it was during the planning phase of the operation that intelligence made its most significant contribution. Intelligence would be used to determine those details of the plan capable of facilitating the preferred method of attack in such a way as to maximize the likelihood of success. Moreover, the hijackers’ intelligence preparations were intended to achieve a high level of calculability of results by identifying security arrangements they could expect to encounter on the day of the operation. This knowledge could then be used to facilitate planning capable of negating or circumventing these security arrangements. Binalshibh would subsequently convey the thoroughness of these intelligence activities when he commented that the hijackers studied, “the security arrangements that [were] adopted at all the airports and establish[ed] a comprehensive picture about the procedures at all the airports and also unravel[ed] the security loopholes that exist at these airports … [and found] out the trips that depart and arrive at these airports … [as well as] the level of security at these airports.”Footnote 27 Within months of receiving permission to proceed with the attack, Khalid took the first steps in assembling the body of intelligence that would make the attacks possible. Relying on open source intelligence, Khalid compiled data from Western aviation magazines, telephone directories for U.S. cities, airline timetables, and conducted Internet searches on U.S. flight schools. This intelligence was supplemented by flight simulator software and information gleaned from movies depicting hijackings.Footnote 28 Some of these early intelligence efforts may have been an attempt to generate ideas and identify possible vulnerabilities. Familiarity with the enemy’s methods and culture was also deemed important at this early stage, as was the need to provide the suicide operatives the basic skills and knowledge to function in an unfamiliar and hostile environment. Khalid, therefore, organized a short course for the operatives in Karachi, which included techniques on how to conduct reconnaissance on flights. Although rudimentary in nature, these instructions proved critical in bringing the attack to fruition by encouraging the operatives to probe for vulnerabilities in the routine behavior of the flight crew. These instructions included the need to observe cabin doors during take-off and landing, whether the captain exited the cockpit during the flight, and at what stage, and using what methods, flight attendants brought food into the cockpit.Footnote 29 It was not long after that actual casing flights took place with the purpose of probing for weaknesses in airport security arrangements, and ascertaining the feasibility of elements of the plan as they stood at that point in time. One of the suicide operatives in particular, Khallad, engaged in intelligence activity with these ends in mind. For example, he flew from Bangkok to Hong Kong in early January 2000 on board a U.S. airliner, seating himself in first class. This casing flight would prove instructive because it identified problems perhaps not anticipated by the operation’s planners. For instance, Khallad was unable to view the cockpit from his seat. He also probed airport security by carrying a box cutter onto the aircraft in his toiletries bag. He subsequently removed this bag from his carry-on luggage, observing that flight staff paid no attention.Footnote 30 The hijackers conducted further intelligence activity after their arrival in the United States, again with the intention of identifying vulnerabilities capable of advancing the plan. This reconnaissance was typified by a hands-on approach designed to identify conditions most likely to be encountered on the day of the attack. In this way, the plan would enjoy a greater likelihood of success because decisions would not be based on false assumptions that could mean the difference between success and failure. Realism, not distorted notions of reality determined by powerful ideological views, served to shape operational planning. For example, it is suspected that the hijackers conducted numerous surveillance flights in an attempt to proximate as near as possible the circumstances likely to be encountered on the day of the attack. Seeking to replicate these conditions, the pilots conducted their surveillance flights while seated in first class, enabling them to monitor the cockpit and also observe firsthand the activities in first class on a transcontinental flight similar to the one that they would take on 11 September. Each also conducted their surveillance flight on the same type of aircraft he would pilot on the day of the hijackings, thereby injecting further realism into the surveillance process.Footnote 31 On the basis of the surveillance flights, Atta informed Binalshibh in July 2001 that the best time to storm the cockpit was 10 to 15 minutes after take-off when the cockpit was normally opened for the first time.Footnote 32 It is also plausible that the hijackers compared the results of their surveillance activity for the purpose of identifying behavior common to their flights, thus permitting the identification of routines susceptible to exploitation. In keeping with the hijackers’ desire to engage in activity closely replicating the conditions expected during the day of the operation, some pilots also took practice flights near some of their targets. For instance, Hani Hanjour and Nawaf al Hazmi (American Airlines Flight 77, which was flown into the Pentagon) rented a plane and traveled a route close to Washington, D.C.Footnote 33 It is significant that Jarrah and Hanjour also took separate training flights along the Hudson Corridor, a low-altitude route along the Hudson River that passed by landmarks such as the World Trade Center. In fact, the Hudson Corridor would have provided the pilots an excellent view of the World Trade Center towers, and at the time was open to uncontrolled aircraft flying below 1,200 feet.Footnote 34 Atta also informed Binalshibh that he, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah carried box cutters onto their surveillance flights, encountering no problems. These surveillance flights were so successful that Atta informed Binalshibh that he would not need other weapons, and that he was so confident the cockpit doors would be opened that he did not consider contingency plans.Footnote 35 This represents an important example of the ability of intelligence to elevate terrorist confidence levels by helping to establish operational certainty. In an attempt to explore alternate means of gaining access to the cockpit, the hijackers’ intelligence probes went beyond that of passive observation. For instance, it was reported that on 1 August 2001, Abdulaziz Alomari boarded a flight from Las Vegas to New York. Before taking off, Alomari made an attempt to secure a ride in the cockpit’s jump seat all the way to New York, on the pretext that he was on the verge of flying for Egypt Air. After being shown to the cockpit, it became apparent to the crew that Alomari was not what he claimed to be and was asked to leave the cockpit prior to take-off. During the course of the flight, he told a flight attendant that he left his pen in the cockpit and, therefore, needed to return to the flight deck. He was told that he would not be able to return to the cockpit, especially while the aircraft was in flight.Footnote 36 These highly developed intelligence collection methods were suggestive of a rationality more sophisticated than the simple means–ends logic that characterizes most explanations of terrorist rationality. Attempts to manipulate the hijackers’ operating environment for the purpose of acquiring detailed and accurate intelligence suggest a desire to attain near-perfect intelligence in which chance would play a negligible role. To those within the law enforcement and intelligence community with even a rudimentary knowledge of Al Qaeda and the global Salafi jihad, the attacks on 9/11 could hardly have been a strategic surprise.Footnote 37 Al Qaeda’s enmity toward the United States and its desire to carry out an attack on U.S. soil was well known prior to 9/11.Footnote 38 Al Qaeda had already declared, in 1998, that it was in a state of war with the United States. Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa in which he urges jihad against Americans is unambiguous, declaring that the killing of, “… the Americans and their allies—civilian and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it…”Footnote 39 This was, in turn, followed by attacks on the U.S. embassies in East Africa (August 1998)Footnote 40 and the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen (October 2000). Furthermore, the arrest of Ahmed Ressam on the U.S.–Canadian border in December 1999 was a clear indication of Al Qaeda’s intention of bringing its war to the United States. This pattern of behavior was preceded by the 1993 World Trade Center attack and the planned attacks on prominent New York landmarks, including the Holland Tunnel, which, although not Al Qaeda inspired or organized, were certainly indicative of the dawning of a brand of Islamic militancy intent on striking directly at the United States. This strategic warning was supplemented by tactical intelligence revealing the possibility of a terrorist strike in the period leading up to 9/11.Footnote 41 Indeed, the perceived threat from Al Qaeda was such that the collection of intelligence on Al Qaeda became a high priority for U.S. intelligence and the White House in the two years leading up to the 9/11 attacks. Although arguments persist about whether the U.S. intelligence community pursued Al Qaeda with sufficient vigor in this period, it is clear that Al Qaeda was an important target whose capabilities and intentions were well known.Footnote 42 The Director of Central Intelligence at the time of the attacks, George Tenet, acknowledged this state of war, observing, “ … even before September 2001, we knew we faced a foe that is committed, resilient and has operational depth. The Intelligence Community was already at war with al-Qaida.”Footnote 43 Despite these indicators, the 9/11 hijackers were able to avoid detection, even though the first hijackers arrived in the United States 20 months before the attacks. The effectiveness of their counterintelligence tradecraft was such that Tenet informed the Joint Inquiry investigating the 9/11 attacks that, “[b]ased on what we know today, the investigation of the 9/11 attacks has revealed no major slip in the conspirators’ operational security.”Footnote 44 This statement is significant not only because it concedes that the hijackers did not reveal their intentions, but also because the subsequent investigation, even with the benefit of hindsight, was unable to detect significant lapses in the conspirators’ counterintelligence tradecraft.Footnote 45 This, of course, was not the result of luck or circumstances beyond the control of the conspirators. On the contrary, it was the result of carefully planned activity, imbued with the hijackers’ adherence to Al Qaeda’s counterintelligence tradecraft. The protection afforded by these measures allowed the hijackers to conduct their activity secure in the knowledge that their intentions, indeed, their very existence, was unknown to the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement community. By ensuring that their defensive measures were in place, the hijackers were free to pursue their operational objectives with confidence, and as it turned out, impunity. Counterintelligence, therefore, fulfilled a function similar to that of operational intelligence through its ability to reduce the level of perceived and actual risk and by providing the organization a significant degree of control over the direction and outcome of the operation. Ultimately, the effect of counterintelligence was to facilitate Al Qaeda’s attempts to construct and execute a specific and very deliberate act of violence by removing or minimising the uncertainties normally associated with terrorist activity. Moreover, Al Qaeda’s counterintelligence practices demonstrated a level of practicality and an appreciation for the operational realities that defy notions of irrationality based on fanaticism or an inability to form accurate representations of reality. As noted earlier, it was realized very early that the success of the operation depended on an ability to construct a highly detailed and pragmatic understanding of the enemy and its methods. This intent and capability demonstrated a side to Al Qaeda at odds with theories based on terrorists’ distortion of reality for reasons stemming from internal pressures to conform,Footnote 46 the need for clandestiny,Footnote 47 or ideological zeal.Footnote 48 These theories suggest that many aspects of terrorist decision making can in turn be affected, including perceptions of the enemy, the ability to adapt to changing circumstances, and the capacity to calculate the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action.Footnote 49 Al Qaeda’s counterintelligence protocols in preparation for the 9/11 attacks, however, revealed a detached objectivity that allowed it to form and respond to accurate and highly detailed assessments of its operating environment. The hijackers’ effective use of cover demonstrated a capacity to suspend their strong ideological beliefs in the interests of the operational needs and realities at the time. Contrary to notions of irrationality based on a level of fanaticism that distorts reality, the hijackers’ preparedness to “abandon” their beliefs suggests a capacity to think tactically and rationally to achieve immediate and attainable ends. Indeed, this behavior tends to negate theories that terrorists’ intense ideological views, especially those with a religious orientation, inhibit their capacity to think tactically and beyond the metaphysical.Footnote 50 On the contrary, the hijackers’ preparedness to suspend these beliefs and their hostility to Western culture in the interests of maintaining a credible cover, revealed a grasp on reality, including a tactical awareness, which transcended the distorting effects of ideology. Deception, based on a detailed knowledge of the methods and mindsets of its adversaries, was thus a key counterintelligence strategy employed by Al Qaeda in its preparations for the 9/11 attacks. In fact, this deception proved so effective precisely because it was based on the hijackers’ keen knowledge of their adversaries’ own perceptions and preconceived ideas. From the utilization of operatives likely to arouse the least suspicion, to the methods used by the hijackers to enter and operate within the United States, the effectiveness of Al Qaeda’s deception and denial stemmed directly from their plausibility. Familiarity with the West was, therefore, one of the characteristics most sought after by the Al Qaeda leadership in their selection of the pilots and cell leaders.Footnote 51 This familiarity enabled the hijackers to integrate more easily into U.S. society, thereby fulfilling the crucial requirement of remaining anonymous and indistinct. These integration efforts were aided through the hijackers’ manipulation of Western stereotypical views of Islamic militants. The adoption of Western habits, including the shaving of beards and the wearing of Western clothing, were all intended to deceive and conceal. Demonstrating an ability to adapt and suspend intense ideological views in the interests of operational reality, Binalshibh described the process involved in adopting a suitable cover: Every brother would look at what suited him best in terms of cover, according to his age and educational standard, his physiognomy and the like, and he would consult with his brothers and exchange views with them, and the operation of adopting a security cover is in essence a process aimed at deceiving the security services generally and mystifying the people around him.Footnote 52 The strength of the security measures injected the operation with a level of resilience that stemmed from confidence in the robustness of these precautions. Without these measures, the ability to move forward would be under constant risk, so that uncertainty would overshadow every action, each telephone call made, and every trip undertaken. Binalshibh would subsequently explain that his role of co-ordinator for the operation was to solve the, “problems that might face the brothers in [the] cells and devising an appropriate security umbrella under which the brothers can move around.”Footnote 53 Almost every aspect of the 9/11 operation required confidence in the hijackers’ security arrangements. Confidence in these arrangements allowed the hijackers to engage in each of those activities fundamental to any operation, but each of which had the potential to expose the operatives and their intentions. The creation of a security umbrella during the various phases of the hijackers’ activities enabled them to move onto the next phase, reasonably secure in the knowledge that it was safe to do so. The hijackers’ method of entry into the United States serves as a useful example. The ability to function and make the necessary preparations in the United States during a period stretching over many months was dependent on them being able to enter the country without arousing the slightest suspicion. The security arrangements undertaken prior to their entry into the United States, therefore, proved crucial and formed a major part of Al Qaeda’s preparations for the operation. These measures included the selection of hijackers with little connection with Al Qaeda.Footnote 54 Similarly, the hijackers’ confidence in the integrity of their security arrangements provided the cell leaders the self-assurance to engage in extensive travel. Travel, especially that which traverses international boundaries, is a risky activity for those engaged in illicit behavior because it brings one into contact with government officials particularly alert to the possibility of unlawful activity. The hijackers, especially the pilots, however, seemed to engage in international and domestic travel at will. Atta, for example, undertook extensive international and domestic travel in preparation for the attacks.Footnote 55 The fact that all the hijackers traveled under their real names indicates the level of confidence each had in their security arrangements and the thoroughness of preparations designed to conceal their links to Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda’s security arrangements also protected the operation when, as a matter of necessity, it was required to engage in behavior more risky than that undertaken on a day to day basis. Communications between the hijackers and the Al Qaeda leadership is a conspicuous example. Due to the scale and importance of the 9/11 operation, the Al Qaeda leadership took an active role in directing it, insisting on regular progress reports, which included some of the results from the hijackers’ own surveillance activities.Footnote 56 This, of course, entailed significant risk because the lines of communication required to achieve this (between leadership, coordinator, cell leaders, and operatives) had the potential to expose almost all elements involved in the operation.Footnote 57 Al Qaeda’s counterintelligence tradecraft, however, meant that this communication could proceed confident that it would not be exposed. Indeed, Binalshibh explained that he considered communications as, “the dangerous security gap through which the enemy could infiltrate and attempt to foil any operation. Therefore, it was imperative that the network establish the most secure means of communication. …  it was imperative to have, “simplicity in the language of communication and sophistication in the method of communication.”Footnote 58 The confidence inspired by Al Qaeda’s security arrangements manifested itself in other ways, encouraging activity that might have been avoided in the absence of thorough counterintelligence measures. These measures, for example, allowed the hijackers to undertake flight training in the United States, despite the risks involved. For instance, conducting training in the United States exposed the hijackers to additional risk for a number of reasons. First, this training extended significantly the amount of time the hijackers were required to spend in the United States, all the while exposing them to the risk of detection. Second, a group of Middle Eastern males conducting flight training was more likely to attract unwanted attention in the United States than if this training was conducted elsewhere, for example some place in the Arab world or in a country less sensitive to the threat of Islamic-based terrorism. Third, conducting flight training within the target country increased the likelihood of the security services identifying the group’s intentions and methods. This became a matter for concern to bin Laden as the date for the attacks neared and anxiety levels increased. Bin Laden’s unease was such that he pressed for the attacks to occur as soon as possible, concerned by the large number of operatives in the United States at the time.Footnote 59 In reality, this training could have been undertaken almost anywhere else in the world. Binalshibh claimed that the reasons for conducting this training in the United States were financial and weather related.Footnote 60 These reasons appear insignificant, however, given the scale and importance of the planned operation. The preparedness of the Al Qaeda leadership to allow flight training to occur in the United States merely for the reasons mentioned by Binalshibh is suggestive of strong confidence in those security arrangements already in place and those that would follow. The confidence engendered by Al Qaeda’s security measures also contributed to the operation’s resilience. The strength of these measures meant that when unanticipated problems arose, especially those that risked exposing the operation, the organizers and cell leaders felt confident enough to proceed with the plot. The robustness of the plot was such that George Tenet considered the operation’s resilience one of its defining features.Footnote 61 This was evident in a number of areas. For example, in the days leading up to the attacks, three of the hijackers received speeding tickets from local law enforcement. Remaining calm, they did not arouse any suspicion, presumably because they were sufficiently confident in the integrity of the security arrangements put into place up to that time.Footnote 62 The police officer who intercepted Ziad Jarrah later reflected that Jarrah’s demeanor did not warrant further investigation, commenting that he, “was extremely calm and cooperative throughout the entire traffic stop.”Footnote 63 In fact, some of the hijackers’ level of confidence was such that they initiated contact with law enforcement. Atta’s second-in-command, Nawaf al-Hazmi, for instance, reported an attempted street robbery to Virginia Police on 1 May 2001, just four and a half months before the attacks.Footnote 64 Aftermath Kepel, in his study of political Islam, described the 9/11 attacks as, “ … a seismic event with incalculable consequences.”Footnote 65 This observation, and others like it,Footnote 66 captures the dramatic and far-reaching implications of the attacks. For Al Qaeda, the impact was no less dramatic. These carefully constructed and choreographed attacks, with their tremendous symbolic significance, revealed to multiple audiences Al Qaeda’s worldview centered on the existence of a struggle between the forces of good and evil. Moreover, the attacks were planned to convey the power and righteousness of Al Qaeda’s cause, while demonstrating the vulnerability of the U.S. government and all that it represents. By discrediting U.S. power in this way, Al Qaeda sought to establish the supremacy of its ideology in what it considers to be a world at war.Footnote 67 Indeed, the Al Qaeda leadership in the post-9/11 period emphasized the capacity for the mujahidin to achieve victory despite the strength of those forces massed against them. In the aftermath of the attacks, the United States, despite its “great power” status, was presented as a country particularly susceptible to military defeat.Footnote 68 In fact, Al Qaeda’s successful use of intelligence and counterintelligence represented an impressive display of power in its own right. These activities, especially counterintelligence, exemplified the capacity of the organization to challenge the authority of the United States by overcoming its intelligence services, one of the most recognizable symbols of American power. By demonstrating such vulnerability, Al Qaeda further weakened perceptions of U.S. power while strengthening images of its own omnipotence and the righteousness of its cause. Moreover, this fulfilled a more practical role insofar as it provided evidence that the United States and its intelligence services could be defeated. For instance, Binalshibh, in reference to the 9/11 attacks, would comment that, “[p]eople are often morally defeated. … They have a complex towards the CIA and Mossad but why should they when Allah has instilled this nation with the duty of jihad, as we see [from the example] of these rare heroic and courageous operations?”Footnote 69 Similarly, al-Hakaymah’s Myth of Delusion observed that the 9/11 attacks, “… exposed to the world the myth of delusion called ‘NSA-CIA-FBI.’ They used to say that ‘if a mouse entered America or came out of it, you should be able to find a report about it in the archives of the American intelligence services.’ The American intelligence lost this round against al-Qaeda intelligence.”Footnote 70 In fact, presenting images of a David and Goliath struggle that can be won is central not only to Al Qaeda’s attempt to demonstrate the power of its ideology, the heroism of its operatives, and the reach of the organization, but also to inspire others who might be discouraged by the apparent omnipotence of the United States and those countries aligned with it. Presenting images of almost insurmountable odds has a solid basis in Islamic history, a fact that Al Qaeda routinely exploits to arouse and mobilize its supporters.Footnote 71 The effects of the 9/11 attacks, however, were meant to be more than just symbolic. Although emphasizing the existence of a global struggle based on a dichotomous worldview was central to Al Qaeda’s planning and objectives, the tangible and worldly goals it hoped to achieve through this symbolism were no less important. For instance, the attacks served to propel the organization onto the world stage, drawing global attention to its grievances,Footnote 72 at least some of which are rooted in reality and have political solutions.Footnote 73 Moreover, the images of power and war generated by the attacks were intended to radicalize and mobilize supporters by offering an example of a successful operation achieved through methodical planning, personal sacrifice, and submission to the will of God.Footnote 74 Conclusion The 9/11 attacks provide strong evidence of the capacity of intelligence and counterintelligence to lead to outcomes consistent with Al Qaeda’s strategic and symbolic objectives. These critical operational tools allowed Al Qaeda to accurately evaluate its operating environment and construct plans that could lead to a carefully crafted and choreographed act of violence. These plans were firmly rooted in an understanding of the target and its milieu acquired through methodical intelligence collection. In particular, intelligence provided a level of familiarity with the target that ensured surprise or unanticipated circumstances would be kept to an absolute minimum. By attempting to replicate the conditions likely to be encountered on the day of the operation, the hijackers’ dry-runs and intelligence probes established in great detail and precision aircraft and airport security procedures and the likely reactions by airline staff to specific events, while also creating a strong sense of environmental familiarity. The planners’ and hijackers’ predicative capabilities were, therefore, enhanced significantly by the operation’s intelligence preparations. In assembling their plans for the take-over of the aircraft, the operational leaders could construct specific responses and assign roles in anticipation that events would unfold as the intelligence indicated they would. For instance, knowledge that the cockpit doors would be opened shortly after take-off precluded the need to smuggle on board weapons other than box cutters. The need to resort to weapons more sophisticated or deadly was deemed unnecessary because access to the cockpit was unlikely to meet with the type of resistance that would require weapons other than box cutters. Furthermore, knowledge that these doors were routinely opened during the very early stages of each of the flights formed the basis of the hijackers’ intention to crash all aircraft in a coordinated, almost simultaneous series of attacks. Knowing that these doors would be opened 10 to 15 minutes into each flight provided a window of opportunity in which access could be gained to cockpits at approximately the same time. Indeed, this was considered so important that Binalshibh claimed that if the hijackers could not gain control of the cockpit during this critical period, then they would abandon their attempt to seize the aircraft.Footnote 75 Moreover, the hijackers’ extensive use of intelligence and counterintelligence lends substantial support to theories of terrorist rationality, including those that employ suicide as a tactic and strategy.Footnote 76 Despite their preparedness to die, the hijackers’ use of intelligence and counterintelligence demonstrated a desire to avoid death until the planned moment. The hijackers’ extensive use of intelligence, despite their intention to die and their intense ideological views, demonstrated a desire to maintain their grasp on reality and to be guided by the operational realities on which a successful outcome depended. This goal-oriented behavior, and the postponing of death to coincide with utility maximization, demonstrates a rationality in which suicide is employed to achieve identifiable and achievable goals. This reinforces notions that suicide terrorism is not indicative of irrationality stemming from fanaticism or an indifference to risk. Instead, the use of intelligence to maximize the benefits to be derived through suicide demonstrates deliberate and calculated…

The post All Feeds Review – The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

IS KSM THE “MASTERMIND”?
#CIA CIA  #FBI FBI  #Mossad Mossad

Unreliable Confessions. Much of the detailed narrative regarding KSM’s “A-to-Z” role comes from his own admissions while in U.S. custody.

While Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (often called KSM) is officially designated by the U.S. government and the 9/11 Commission Report as the principal architect of the September 11 attacks, historians, legal analysts, and counterterrorism investigators have raised several arguments that challenge or nuance his exclusive title as the “mastermind.”

The arguments against viewing Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the 9/11 “Mastermind” – Google Search  google.com/search?q=The+argu…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

The post IS KSM THE “MASTERMIND”? #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Unreliable Confessions. Much of the detailed narrative regarding KSM’s “A-to-Z” role comes from his own admissions while in U.S. custody. While Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (often called KSM) is officially designated by the U.S. government and the 9/11 Commission Report as the principal architect of the September 11 attacks, historians, legal analysts, and counterterrorism investigators have raised several arguments that challenge or nuance his exclusive title as the “mastermind.” The arguments against viewing Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the 9/11 “Mastermind” first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

IS KSM THE “MASTERMIND”?
#CIA CIA  #FBI FBI  #Mossad Mossad

While Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (often called KSM) is officially designated by the U.S. government and the 9/11 Commission Report as the principal architect of the September 11 attacks, historians, legal analysts, and counterterrorism investigators have raised several arguments that challenge or nuance his exclusive title as the “mastermind.”

The arguments against viewing Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the 9/11 “Mastermind” – Google Search  google.com/search?q=The+argu…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

The post IS KSM THE “MASTERMIND”? #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad While Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (often called KSM) is officially designated by the U.S. government and the 9/11 Commission Report as the principal architect of the September 11 attacks, historians, legal analysts, and counterterrorism investigators have raised several arguments that challenge or nuance his exclusive title as the “mastermind.” The arguments against viewing Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the 9/11 “Mastermind” first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

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#CIA CIA  #FBI FBI  #Mossad Mossad
Who trained the 9/11 hijackers?
Usually, the double agents do not declare this on every street corner.
“No evidence” – does not mean that it did not happen.
the 9/11 hijackers were trained (in OPSec, etc.) by the military and security officers from the EIJ – Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who could be the agents of Russia, Germany, or Israel – Google Search  google.com/search?q=the9%2F1…

Or all three together.
Search:
double agents

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

The post #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Who trained the 9/11 hijackers? Usually, the double agents do not declare this on every street corner. “No evidence” – does not mean that it did not happen. the 9/11 hijackers were trained (in OPSec, etc.) by the military and security officers from the EIJ – Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who could be the agents of Russia, Germany, or Israel (in+OPSec%2C+etc.)+by+the+military+and+security+officers+from+the+EIJ+-+Egyptian+Islamic+Jihad%2C+who+could+be+the+agents+of+Russia%2C+Germany%2C+or+Israel&rlz=1C1ONGR_enUS1133US1133&oq=the9%2F11+hijackers+were+trained+(in+OPSec%2C+etc.)+by+the+mili first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Who trained the 9/11 hijackers?
#CIA CIA  #FBI FBI  #Mossad Mossad
Usually, the double agents do not declare this on every street corner.
“No evidence” – does not mean that it did not happen.

the 9/11 hijackers were trained (in OPSec, etc.) by the military and security officers from the EIJ – Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who could be the agents of Russia, Germany, or Israel – Google Search  google.com/search?q=the9%2F1…

Search:
double agents

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

The post Who trained the 9/11 hijackers? #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Usually, the double agents do not declare this on every street corner. “No evidence” – does not mean that it did not happen. the 9/11 hijackers were trained (in OPSec, etc.) by the military and security officers from the EIJ – Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who could be the agents of Russia, Germany, or Israel (in+OPSec%2C+etc.)+by+the+military+and+security+officers+from+the+EIJ+-+Egyptian+Islamic+Jihad%2C+who+could+be+the+agents+of+Russia%2C+Germany%2C+or+Israel&rlz=1C1ONGR_enUS1133US1133&oq=the9%2F11+hijackers+were+trained+(in+OPSec%2C+etc.)+by+the+mili first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Who trained the 9/11 hijackers?

Usually, the double agents do not declare this on every street corner.
“No evidence” – does not mean that it did not happen.

the 9/11 hijackers were trained (in OPSec, etc.) by the military and security officers from the EIJ – Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who could be the agents of Russia, Germany, or Israel – Google Search  google.com/search?q=the9%2F1…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

The post Who trained the 9/11 hijackers? Usually, the double agents do not declare this on every street corner. “No evidence” – does not mean that it did not happen. the 9/11 hijackers were trained (in OPSec, etc.) by the military and security officers from the EIJ – Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who could be the agents of Russia, Germany, or Israel (in+OPSec%2C+etc.)+by+the+military+and+security+officers+from+the+EIJ+-+Egyptian+Islamic+Jihad%2C+who+could+be+the+agents+of+Russia%2C+Germany%2C+or+Israel&rlz=1C1ONGR_enUS1133US1133&oq=the9%2F11+hijackers+were+trained+(in+OPSec%2C+etc.)+by+the+military+and+security+officers+from+t first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

the9/11 hijackers were trained (in OPSec, etc.) by the military and security officers from the EIJ – Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who could be the agents of Russia, Germany, or Israel – Google Search  google.com/search?q=the9%2F1…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

The post the9/11 hijackers were trained (in OPSec, etc.) by the military and security officers from the EIJ – Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who could be the agents of Russia, Germany, or Israel (in+OPSec%2C+etc.)+by+the+military+and+security+officers+from+the+EIJ+-+Egyptian+Islamic+Jihad%2C+who+could+be+the+agents+of+Russia%2C+Germany%2C+or+Israel&rlz=1C1ONGR_enUS1133US1133&oq=the9%2F11+hijackers+were+trained+(in+OPSec%2C+etc.)+by+the+military+and+security+officers+from+the+EIJ+-+Egyptian+Islamic+Jihad%2C+who+could+be+the+agents+of+Russia%2C+Germany%2C+or+Israel&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIGCAEQRRg60gEKMTk2NjQ0ajBqN6gCALACA first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

The CIA’s transformation under Trump and Ratcliffe, part 2: In this episode, Intelligence Online looks at how the CIA’s approach has become more aggressive in human intelligence and covert action.
➡️  l.intelligenceonline.fr/RHO

— @Intel_Online Nov 11, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: The CIA’s transformation under Trump and Ratcliffe, part 2: In this episode, Intelligence Online looks at how the CIA’s approach has become more aggressive in human intelligence and covert action. ➡️ first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

🇺🇦 УКРАИНА ОТВЕРГЛА ПЛАН ТРАМПА ПО СДАЧЕ ТЕРРИТОРИЙ РОССИИ
Как сообщает The Telegraph, Украина отвергла новый план Трампа, предусматривающий территориальные уступки России. Американские посланники предложили очередной “компромисс”: фактически закрепить за Москвой контроль над оккупированными территориями Донецкой и Луганской областей Украины, оставив Киеву города, которые он продолжает удерживать. При этом Кремль требует передать ему еще около 5180 кв. км украинской территории, которую российская армия так и не смогла захватить.

Накануне переговоров в Абу-Даби Трамп заявил, что после войны Украина будет иметь “другую форму”, а американские чиновники намекнули, что Киев якобы готов проявить гибкость в территориальном вопросе.

Однако украинский источник, близкий к переговорам, категорически опроверг эти утверждения: “Украинская делегация никогда не обсуждала никаких уступок в отношении каких-либо территорий, оккупированных Россией. Украина никогда не признает эту оккупацию ни де-факто, ни де-юре. И именно такую позицию мы всегда занимали за столом переговоров”.

— @adagamov Nov 11, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: 🇺🇦 УКРАИНА ОТВЕРГЛА ПЛАН ТРАМПА ПО СДАЧЕ ТЕРРИТОРИЙ РОССИИ Как сообщает The Telegraph, Украина отвергла новый план Трампа, предусматривающий территориальные уступки России. Американские посланники предложили очередной “компромисс”: фактически закрепить за Москвой контроль над оккупированными территориями Донецкой и Луганской областей Украины, оставив Киеву города, которые он продолжает удерживать. При этом Кремль требует передать ему еще около 5180 кв. км украинской территории, которую российская армия так и не смогла захватить. Накануне переговоров в Абу-Даби Трамп заявил, что после войны Украина будет иметь “другую форму”, а американские чиновники намекнули, что Киев якоб first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Video
 

— @GayRiviera Nov 11, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: Video first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

唯一能打败斯大林的，也就铁托了！他底气在哪儿？

一是江山自己打。铁托手握80万游击队，一枪一弹从纳粹手里杀出天下，这给了他不跪莫斯科的底气。

二是特工出身，手段够硬。据称斯大林派了22波刺客，下毒、车祸、细菌战全用上了。铁托反手端掉苏联情报网，还给斯大林回信：别再派人来杀我了，如果你再派人来，我就派一个人去莫斯科，而且绝不需要派第二个。

这场暗杀较量，直到1953年斯大林去世才停止。铁托也是唯一硬刚斯大林而活着的东欧领导人！

— @Jia30094Zhang Nov 11, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: 唯一能打败斯大林的，也就铁托了！他底气在哪儿？ 一是江山自己打。铁托手握80万游击队，一枪一弹从纳粹手里杀出天下，这给了他不跪莫斯科的底气。 二是特工出身，手段够硬。据称斯大林派了22波刺客，下毒、车祸、细菌战全用上了。铁托反手端掉苏联情报网，还给斯大林回信：别再派人来杀我了，如果你再派人来，我就派一个人去莫斯科，而且绝不需要派第二个。 这场暗杀较量，直到1953年斯大林去世才停止。铁托也是唯一硬刚斯大林而活着的东欧领导人！ first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Paula Hitler (Paula Wolff), the younger and only surviving full sister of Adolf Hitler, photographed in May 1945 while in U.S. Army custody….

Paula Hitler (1896-1960) was the youngest child of Alois and Klara Hitler and Adolf Hitler’s only full-sibling to survive into adulthood. Orphaned at a young age after her father died when she was six and her mother when she was eleven, she and Adolf lived on a meager state pension. Personal documents and research later revealed a troubled home life; journals noted that Adolf was a strict and sometimes physical presence during their youth.

She worked as a secretary and clerical worker in Vienna, including for the Austrian State Insurance Company, from which she was fired in August 1930 once her relationship to Adolf became known. To protect her from public scrutiny, Adolf insisted she use the assumed surname “Wolff” (a childhood nickname of his). Adolf provided her with a regular monthly financial stipend throughout the 1930s and WWII. Her life wasn’t completely separate from the regime, though. In the early 1940s, she was briefly engaged to Erwin Jekelius, a Viennese psychiatrist and prominent Nazi euthanasia doctor, but Adolf intervened and forced the engagement to be called off. She never married or had children. She worked as a secretary in a military field hospital. She never officially joined the Nazi Party.

At the end of WWII, she was arrested and interrogated by U.S. counter-intelligence officers. She was released without charges after investigators found no evidence of war crimes or direct political complicity. She lived a quiet, reclusive life in Berchtesgaden, supported by former members of her brother’s inner circle.

In February 1959, she gave her only filmed television interview to British producer Peter Morley, where she spoke cautiously about their childhood and avoided political questions. She died on June 1, 1960, in Berchtesgaden, marking the end of Adolf Hitler’s immediate family line.

#archaeohistories

— @archeohistories Nov 11, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: Paula Hitler (Paula Wolff), the younger and only surviving full sister of Adolf Hitler, photographed in May 1945 while in U.S. Army custody…. Paula Hitler (1896-1960) was the youngest child of Alois and Klara Hitler and Adolf Hitler’s only full-sibling to survive into adulthood. Orphaned at a young age after her father died when she was six and her mother when she was eleven, she and Adolf lived on a meager state pension. Personal documents and research later revealed a troubled home life; journals noted that Adolf was a strict and sometimes physical presence during their youth. She worked as a secretary and clerical worker in Vienna, including for the Austrian State Insura first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

#CIA CIA  #FBI FBI  #Mossad Mossad
Al-Qaeda’s Clandestine Intelligence Apparatus
share.gemini.google/7jQO3QXh…
Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor”
Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google   x.com/mikenov/status/2120140…
x.com/mikenov/status/2120181…Michael Novakhov (@mikenov)Al-Qaeda’s Clandestine Intelligence Apparatus  share.gemini.google/PBhte8or…
al-Qaeda as a highly sophisticated intelligence and counterintelligence entity.

Viewing al-Qaeda solely as an ideological militia obscures the primary reason it survived decades of global counterterrorism pressure: from its formative years in the late 1980s and its 1991–1996 sanctuary in Khartoum, the organization was deliberately architected as a clandestine, non-state intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) service. By absorbing veterans of state military and security apparatuses—most notably through its merger with Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)—al-Qaeda institutionalized state-grade tradecraft across its reconnaissance, communications, vetting, and internal security operations.

1. Organizational Architecture: The Amniyat and State-Derived Tradecraft
Al-Qaeda’s central leadership (Majlis al-Shura) did not leave operational security to the discretion of local commanders. Instead, it established a dedicated Security and Intelligence Committee (Al-Jihaz al-Amni, often referred to as the Amniyat), which functioned simultaneously as an external reconnaissance directorate and an internal counterintelligence service.

The doctrinal foundation of this apparatus was built by operatives with formal training in state military and intelligence services:

Ali Mohamed: A former Egyptian Army special forces (Unit 777) intelligence officer who later enlisted in the U.S. Army and served at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. Mohamed synthesized Western special operations doctrine, CIA/FBI surveillance methodologies, and Soviet-bloc cellular compartmentalization into al-Qaeda’s multi-volume training encyclopedia and the Manchester Manual (Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants).

Saif al-Adel: A former Egyptian special forces colonel who became a central architect of al-Qaeda’s security committee, overseeing counter-espionage, high-value target casing, and stringent vetting protocols.

Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri & Mohammed Atef (Abu Hafs al-Masri): Former Egyptian police and security veterans who structured al-Qaeda’s early military and operational planning cells along rigid hierarchical and compartmentalized lines.

2. Core Intelligence and Counterintelligence Capabilities
Al-Qaeda adapted traditional state intelligence disciplines to the constraints of a stateless, transnational network across four primary domains:

Intelligence DisciplineAl-Qaeda Operational AdaptationHistorical Execution & Tradecraft ExamplesHUMINT & Pre-Operational ReconnaissanceMulti-year target casing separated from execution cells; reliance on clean-skin operatives (“white পাসপোর্ট” holders) and detailed analytical dossiers.Prior to the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings, Ali Mohamed and reconnaissance teams spent nearly five years conducting covert photography, mapping guard shifts, and submitting formal feasibility studies to leadership in Khartoum.Compartmentalization & CutoutsStrict horizontal isolation (siriya) between strategic planners, financial facilitators, and tactical operatives, bridged only by vetted cutouts.During the 9/11 plot, the Hamburg pilot cell had no direct contact with the “muscle” hijackers during training; coordination ran exclusively through Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh.Defensive Counterintelligence & VettingMulti-stage screening at transit guesthouses (madafat), confiscation of personal electronics, mandatory kunyas (noms de guerre), and internal mole-hunting units.Recruits arriving in Peshawar or Kandahar underwent weeks of isolated biographical cross-examination to catch inconsistencies in cover stories before gaining access to training camps or leadership.Offensive Counterintelligence (Double Agents)Running controlled dangles and triple-agent operations against adversary intelligence services to penetrate forward operating bases.The December 2009 Camp Chapman attack in Khost, Afghanistan, where Humam Khalil al-Balawi (a Jordanian doctor recruited by Jordanian GID and the CIA) was turned into a triple agent to eliminate an entire CIA forward base.
Pre-Operational Intelligence & OSINT Integration
Al-Qaeda’s external operations wing treated target selection as an intelligence collection cycle rather than a tactical raid. Operatives such as Dhiren Barot (Issa al-Hindi) produced exhaustive casing reports on Western financial and transit infrastructure that read like professional engineering and security audits—complete with structural vulnerability assessments, CCTV blind-spot diagrams, emergency response timelines, and open-source financial data integrated with physical surveillance.
Communications Security (COMSEC) Evolution
Recognizing early on that Western signals intelligence (SIGINT) could geolocate satellite phones—a vulnerability exposed after the 1998 U.S. cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan—al-Qaeda’s security committee enforces radical COMSEC discipline:
Human Courier Networks: High-level strategic communications were completely removed from the electromagnetic spectrum, relying instead on multi-layered human couriers (ibrid) who memorized routes and exchanged encrypted flash drives at physical dead drops (the exact system that shielded Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad for years).
Digital Dead Drops & Steganography: At the tactical level, cells pioneered the use of shared draft folders in webmail accounts—allowing two operatives to read and write messages using a single login without ever transmitting an email across network routers—alongside basic key-code ciphers and commercial encryption.

Offensive CI: The Camp Chapman Operation
The pinnacle of al-Qaeda’s offensive counterintelligence capability occurred in December 2009 at Forward Operating Base Chapman. Recognizing that the CIA and Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) were desperate for high-level HUMINT access inside the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to locate Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban (TTP) counterintelligence handlers fed genuine, verifiable “bait” intelligence (including proof-of-life videos) through Humam al-Balawi. By validating al-Balawi’s access in the eyes of CIA analysts, al-Qaeda induced a fatal breakdown in standard security protocols—allowing al-Balawi to enter the base unsearched and detonate a suicide vest during a debriefing with senior CIA counterterrorism officers.

3. Structural Vulnerabilities of a Non-State Intelligence Apparatus

Despite its operational sophistication, running a state-style intelligence agency without the legal, territorial, and infrastructural protections of a sovereign state introduced three fatal systemic vulnerabilities:

The Bureaucratic Paradox: Because al-Qaeda operated as a formal bureaucracy that demanded accountability from dispersed cells, it generated massive paper and digital trails. Captured archives—from the Harmony Database files seized in Afghanistan and Iraq to the Abbottabad compound hard drives—revealed personnel rosters, expense vouchers, disciplinary memos, and strategic debates. Whenever a single courier or safe house was compromised, the organization’s own archival rigor turned into an intelligence windfall for counterterrorism analysts.
COMSEC-Induced Command Paralysis: While abandoning electronic communications protected leadership from SIGINT and drone strikes, relying on physical couriers slowed the organization’s command-and-control (C2) cycle from minutes to months. Strategic directives often arrived long after tactical realities on the ground had shifted, gradually severing central leadership (al-Qaeda Core) from its regional affiliates.

Counterintelligence Paranoia and Internal Purges: Under relentless pressure from U.S. drone strikes in Waziristan—which relied on a combination of SIGINT, overhead ISR, and local HUMINT networks—al-Qaeda’s internal security wing (Amniyat) spiraled into acute paranoia. The organization diverted substantial resources into hunting for planted infrared beacons and GPS chips, detaining and executing suspected informants, and imposing travel bans that crippled its ability to recruit and deploy external operatives.
Want to examine how the Abbottabad documents exposed al-Qaeda’s internal counterintelligence failures?—  https://x.com/mikenov/status/2120181948614160453

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

The post #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Al-Qaeda’s Clandestine Intelligence Apparatus Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor” Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Ali Mohamed: A former Egyptian Army special forces (Unit 777) intelligence officer – Google Search  google.com/search?num=10&new…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 11, 2026

The post Ali Mohamed: A former Egyptian Army special forces (Unit 777) intelligence officer (Unit+777)+intelligence+officer&source=lnms&fbs=ACAhTvydUwDpVyoKAvW3rxM0ZciexG3snEiiGj_uwx9sm4NsoFPNjGUuTJkYkGNLF9ltq7pgOgvUXa_JP9eAg5i-wQDqgcUN0SjZs1s09IUL9SjuBGG9S8lK9aVPz7mefUBwBQ89zO82qkd0XKIzojzkcBoCOzc1GQNoCefrgHcNvFHDfK0_HGpSkVbsPnJAHNAg0gCyUfV8DAVAtZYUvxSNHgiZXRAm5X5nev93jiAB5uIQup4_T4U&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiYrY-B5P6XAxVbl4kEHcRcCBgQ0pQJegQIDRAB&biw=1536&bih=695&dpr=1.25&new… first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

1937年被美国《时代》周刊评为全球首富的印度海得拉巴末代王公奥斯曼·阿里·汗，王宫地窖里堆着价值超20亿美元的金砖和宝石，院子草坪上甚至常年停着几十辆装满纯金金币、因为轮胎压爆懒得卸货而直接生锈长草的破卡车。

可这位坐拥金山的世界首富在个人吃穿用度上，却是出了名的天下第一铁公鸡。他头上戴的那顶小毡帽整整戴了三十五年都不舍得买新的，平时在王宫卧室里嫌沙发贵只睡行军铁床，长袜破了洞自己拿针线缝补，招待英国总督时每次只抠抠搜搜地从廉价烟盒里抽出一根散烟递过去，怕客人多拿；

他父亲老王公生前曾花天价买下了一颗重达185克拉、个头足有鸡蛋那么大的世界第五大无色钻石雅各布巨钻，可在抠门的奥斯曼眼里，这颗巨钻一不能吃二不能生利息，跟路边的鹅卵石没啥区别。

老王公去世后，奥斯曼随手扯了一张看过的旧报纸把这颗大钻石裹起来塞在破书桌抽屉角落，后来翻出来干脆直接拿这颗价值上亿英镑的顶级巨钻放在办公桌上，专门用来压那些被电风扇吹得乱飞的公文纸当镇纸使。

— @chakmillion Nov 11, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: 1937年被美国《时代》周刊评为全球首富的印度海得拉巴末代王公奥斯曼·阿里·汗，王宫地窖里堆着价值超20亿美元的金砖和宝石，院子草坪上甚至常年停着几十辆装满纯金金币、因为轮胎压爆懒得卸货而直接生锈长草的破卡车。 可这位坐拥金山的世界首富在个人吃穿用度上，却是出了名的天下第一铁公鸡。他头上戴的那顶小毡帽整整戴了三十五年都不舍得买新的，平时在王宫卧室里嫌沙发贵只睡行军铁床，长袜破了洞自己拿针线缝补，招待英国总督时每次只抠抠搜搜地从廉价烟盒里抽出一根散烟递过去，怕客人多拿； 他父亲老王公生前曾花天价买下了一颗重达185克拉、个头足有鸡蛋那么大的世界第五大无色钻石雅各布巨钻，可在抠门的奥斯曼眼里，这颗巨钻一不能吃二不能生利息，跟路边的鹅卵石没啥区别。 老王公去世后，奥斯曼随手扯了一张看过的旧报纸把这颗大钻石裹起来塞在破书桌抽屉角落，后来翻出来干脆直接拿这颗价值上亿英镑的顶级巨钻放在办公桌上，专门用来压那些被电风扇吹得乱飞的公文纸当镇纸使。 first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

During negotiations in the United States, an incident reportedly took place that left the American delegation literally speechless.

When Ukrainian representatives learned that sanctions against Putin were being lifted and that Washington was demanding an end to strikes on Russian oil refineries, Kyrylo Budanov allegedly responded in extremely harsh terms.

As the meeting was drawing to a close and participants were heading toward the exit, Budanov reportedly threw these words straight in the Americans’ faces:

“Now we’re going to fucking burn every Russian oil refinery and port to the fucking ground. Every last one!”

According to the account, the Americans were so stunned that they couldn’t find anything to say in response.

No objections, no threats, no usual diplomatic language. Just silence.

Washington received an unmistakable message: Ukraine has no intention of asking anyone’s permission to defend itself against Russian aggression.

mykhailorohoza.substack.com

— @Oct7NeverForget Nov 11, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: During negotiations in the United States, an incident reportedly took place that left the American delegation literally speechless. When Ukrainian representatives learned that sanctions against Putin were being lifted and that Washington was demanding an end to strikes on Russian oil refineries, Kyrylo Budanov allegedly responded in extremely harsh terms. As the meeting was drawing to a close and participants were heading toward the exit, Budanov reportedly threw these words straight in the Americans’ faces: “Now we’re going to fucking burn every Russian oil refinery and port to the fucking ground. Every last one!” According to the account, the Americans were so stunned that first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

🚨🇮🇱🇮🇷 Israel’s top general is reportedly warning Netanyahu that his plans for Iran could start a war America doesn’t want

The split is between the prime minister and his army chief, Eyal Zamir, and it has opened while coalition talks decide whether Netanyahu even keeps his job.

Zamir and senior officials reportedly think the steps Netanyahu is weighing aren’t cautious enough and could set off a direct clash with Tehran.

Both men agree Iran still needs dealing with. They disagree on when, how big, and how risky.

Zamir’s case rests on Washington.

Trump just called the war “effectively over,” Rubio told the G7 there’s “no need” for more combat, and the $4 billion aid check ends in December.

A caretaker prime minister with 46 backers in parliament has no mandate to gamble on a strike his own military advises against.

If Netanyahu moves anyway, he’d be forcing Trump to choose between joining a war he just shelved and leaving Israel to fight it alone.

Source: N12 / Writer: Daniel

— @MarioNawfal Nov 10, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: 🚨🇮🇱🇮🇷 Israel’s top general is reportedly warning Netanyahu that his plans for Iran could start a war America doesn’t want The split is between the prime minister and his army chief, Eyal Zamir, and it has opened while coalition talks decide whether Netanyahu even keeps his job. Zamir and senior officials reportedly think the steps Netanyahu is weighing aren’t cautious enough and could set off a direct clash with Tehran. Both men agree Iran still needs dealing with. They disagree on when, how big, and how risky. Zamir’s case rests on Washington. Trump just called the war “effectively over,” Rubio told the G7 there’s “no need” for more combat, and the $4 billion aid check first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

EIJ – Egyptian Islamic Jihad and KGB – Google Search  google.com/search?q=EIJ+-+Eg…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 10, 2026

The post EIJ – Egyptian Islamic Jihad and KGB first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

ستالين وابنته سفيتلانا…
كانت (سفيتلانا) الابنة الوحيدة للزعيم السوفيتي جوزيف ستالين، ومن أكثر الشخصيات التي قدمت صورة مختلفة تماماً عن الأب (الزعيم) الذي روج له الإعلام السوفيتي…!!!!
سفيتلانا الأبنة التي أحبت والدها، والمرأة التي كرهت ظله الذي خيم على حياتها، حيث وصفت علاقتها بوالدها بأنها علاقة حب مشوبة بالخوف..!!
تقول عنه في مذكراتها:
كان أبي قوياً، عظيماً، لكنه لم يعرف كيف يحب..!!
لقد دمر حياة الملايين، ولم ينج أقرب الناس إليه من قسوته، وتقصد أمها (ناديا اليلويفا) التي أنتـ حـ رت، عام 1932م بعد مشادة عنيفة مع ستالين، وهو الحدث الذي ظل يطاردها طول حياتها…
حيث تعتبر وفاة والدتها كانت أول شرخ في أسطورة الأب العظيم..!!
بعد وفاة والدها عام 1953م بدأت سفيتلانا تدرك حجم الجرائم التي ارتكبها النظام السوفيتي خلال حكمه، وأصيبت بصدمة حين رأت كيف تغير الناس فجأة من تمجيد والدها إلى اتهامه…
وتقول: حين مات أبي، مات معه الخوف فقط… أما أنا، فبقيت ابنته، لا أستطيع أن أهرب من اسمه..!!
وفي عام 1967م أثناء زيارة رسمية للهند، لجأت سفيتلانا إلى السفارة الأمريكية في نيودلهي وطلبت اللجوء السياسي، وكان هذا الحدث بمثابة فضيحة كبرى للاتحاد السوفيتي..!!
تم نقلها إلى الولايات المتحدة، حيث أصبحت رمزًا للحرب الباردة في الصحافة الغربي
وهناك هاجمت النظام السوفيتي وتحدثت عن حياة أبيها المظلمة خلف الأسطورة
لكن حياتها في الغرب لم تكن مستقرة، حيث تزوجت أكثر من مرة، وعاشت سنوات طويلة من الوحدة والاضطراب النفسي.
وفي مقابلة عام 1990م قالت: هربت من ظل أبي، لكن ظله سبقني إلى كل مكان..!!!
توفيت سفيتلانا أليلويفا في ولاية ويسكونسن بالولايات المتحدة عام 2011م عن عمر ناهز 85 عام

— @abdulkarim_900 Nov 10, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: ستالين وابنته سفيتلانا… كانت (سفيتلانا) الابنة الوحيدة للزعيم السوفيتي جوزيف ستالين، ومن أكثر الشخصيات التي قدمت صورة مختلفة تماماً عن الأب (الزعيم) الذي روج له الإعلام السوفيتي…!!!! سفيتلانا الأبنة التي أحبت والدها، والمرأة التي كرهت ظله الذي خيم على حياتها، حيث وصفت علاقتها بوالدها بأنها علاقة حب مشوبة بالخوف..!! تقول عنه في مذكراتها: كان أبي قوياً، عظيماً، لكنه لم يعرف كيف يحب..!! لقد دمر حياة الملايين، ولم ينج أقرب الناس إليه من قسوته، وتقصد أمها (ناديا اليلويفا) التي أنتـ حـ رت، عام 1932م بعد مشادة عنيفة مع ستالين، وهو الحدث الذي ظل يطاردها طول حياتها… حيث تعتبر وفاة والدتها كانت أول شرخ في أسطورة الأب العظيم..!! بعد وفاة والدها عام 1953م بدأت سفيتلانا تدرك حجم الجرائم ا first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Araplar ve Yahudiler, Sami ırktır. İkisi de akraba kavimdir. Amca çocukları diyebiliriz.

Arapların kullandığı “Selamın Aleyküm” orjinal itibariyle Yahudice Şalom Alechem’den türemedir.

Arapların kullandığı “Amin” orjinal itibariyle Yahudice Amen’den gelmektedir.

Dünyadaki dillerin hemen hemen hepsi soldan sağa doğru yazılırken, Arapça ve Yahudice sağdan sola doğru yazılır.

Bazı İbranice(Yahudice) isimlere örnek verirsek;

Davut(David)
Mikail(Michael)
Cebrail(Gabriel)
Musa(Moussa)
Hüseyin(Usain)
İbrahim(Abraham)
İshak(İsaac)
Harun(Aaron)
Süleyman(Salamon)
İlyas(Elijah)
Yunus(Jonas)
Zekeriya(Zakari)
Bünyamin(Benjamin)
İsmail(Samuel)

Suriyeli Arap Colani / İsrail’in fikir babası Yahudi Thedor Herlz

— @harpintkam66 Nov 10, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: Araplar ve Yahudiler, Sami ırktır. İkisi de akraba kavimdir. Amca çocukları diyebiliriz. Arapların kullandığı “Selamın Aleyküm” orjinal itibariyle Yahudice Şalom Alechem’den türemedir. Arapların kullandığı “Amin” orjinal itibariyle Yahudice Amen’den gelmektedir. Dünyadaki dillerin hemen hemen hepsi soldan sağa doğru yazılırken, Arapça ve Yahudice sağdan sola doğru yazılır. Bazı İbranice(Yahudice) isimlere örnek verirsek; Davut(David) Mikail(Michael) Cebrail(Gabriel) Musa(Moussa) Hüseyin(Usain) İbrahim(Abraham) İshak(İsaac) Harun(Aaron) Süleyman(Salamon) İlyas(Elijah) Yunus(Jonas) Zekeriya(Zakari) Bünyamin(Benjamin) İsmail(Samuel) Suriyeli Arap Colani / İsrail’in fikir babası first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Araplar ve Yahudiler, Sami ırktır. İkisi de akraba kavimdir. Amca çocukları diyebiliriz.

Arapların kullandığı “Selamın Aleyküm” orjinal itibariyle Yahudice Şalom Alechem’den türemedir.

Arapların kullandığı “Amin” orjinal itibariyle Yahudice Amen’den gelmektedir.

Dünyadaki dillerin hemen hemen hepsi soldan sağa doğru yazılırken, Arapça ve Yahudice sağdan sola doğru yazılır.

Bazı İbranice(Yahudice) isimlere örnek verirsek;

Davut(David)
Mikail(Michael)
Cebrail(Gabriel)
Musa(Moussa)
Hüseyin(Usain)
İbrahim(Abraham)
İshak(İsaac)
Harun(Aaron)
Süleyman(Salamon)
İlyas(Elijah)
Yunus(Jonas)
Zekeriya(Zakari)
Bünyamin(Benjamin)
İsmail(Samuel)

Suriyeli Arap Colani / İsrail’in fikir babası Yahudi Thedor Herlz

— @Dysinhncebx6 Nov 10, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: Araplar ve Yahudiler, Sami ırktır. İkisi de akraba kavimdir. Amca çocukları diyebiliriz. Arapların kullandığı “Selamın Aleyküm” orjinal itibariyle Yahudice Şalom Alechem’den türemedir. Arapların kullandığı “Amin” orjinal itibariyle Yahudice Amen’den gelmektedir. Dünyadaki dillerin hemen hemen hepsi soldan sağa doğru yazılırken, Arapça ve Yahudice sağdan sola doğru yazılır. Bazı İbranice(Yahudice) isimlere örnek verirsek; Davut(David) Mikail(Michael) Cebrail(Gabriel) Musa(Moussa) Hüseyin(Usain) İbrahim(Abraham) İshak(İsaac) Harun(Aaron) Süleyman(Salamon) İlyas(Elijah) Yunus(Jonas) Zekeriya(Zakari) Bünyamin(Benjamin) İsmail(Samuel) Suriyeli Arap Colani / İsrail’in fikir babası first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Ali Mohamed: A former Egyptian Army special forces (Unit 777) intelligence officer – Google Search  google.com/search?q=Ali+Moha…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 10, 2026

The post Ali Mohamed: A former Egyptian Army special forces (Unit 777) intelligence officer (Unit+777)+intelligence+officer&rlz=1C1ONGR_enUS1133US1133&oq=Ali+Mohamed%3A+A+former+Egyptian+Army+special+forces+(Unit+777)+intelligence+officer&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIHCAEQIRiPAtIBCDE3MjJqMGo3qAIIsAIB8QXN7CR2Wgv9YA&sourceid=chrome&source=chrome.ob&ie=UTF-8 first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Al-Qaeda’s Clandestine Intelligence Apparatus  share.gemini.google/iV0bppqD…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 10, 2026

The post Al-Qaeda’s Clandestine Intelligence Apparatus first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Al-Qaeda’s Clandestine Intelligence Apparatus  share.gemini.google/PBhte8or…
al-Qaeda as a highly sophisticated intelligence and counterintelligence entity.

Viewing al-Qaeda solely as an ideological militia obscures the primary reason it survived decades of global counterterrorism pressure: from its formative years in the late 1980s and its 1991–1996 sanctuary in Khartoum, the organization was deliberately architected as a clandestine, non-state intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) service. By absorbing veterans of state military and security apparatuses—most notably through its merger with Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)—al-Qaeda institutionalized state-grade tradecraft across its reconnaissance, communications, vetting, and internal security operations.

1. Organizational Architecture: The Amniyat and State-Derived Tradecraft
Al-Qaeda’s central leadership (Majlis al-Shura) did not leave operational security to the discretion of local commanders. Instead, it established a dedicated Security and Intelligence Committee (Al-Jihaz al-Amni, often referred to as the Amniyat), which functioned simultaneously as an external reconnaissance directorate and an internal counterintelligence service.

The doctrinal foundation of this apparatus was built by operatives with formal training in state military and intelligence services:

Ali Mohamed: A former Egyptian Army special forces (Unit 777) intelligence officer who later enlisted in the U.S. Army and served at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. Mohamed synthesized Western special operations doctrine, CIA/FBI surveillance methodologies, and Soviet-bloc cellular compartmentalization into al-Qaeda’s multi-volume training encyclopedia and the Manchester Manual (Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants).

Saif al-Adel: A former Egyptian special forces colonel who became a central architect of al-Qaeda’s security committee, overseeing counter-espionage, high-value target casing, and stringent vetting protocols.

Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri & Mohammed Atef (Abu Hafs al-Masri): Former Egyptian police and security veterans who structured al-Qaeda’s early military and operational planning cells along rigid hierarchical and compartmentalized lines.

2. Core Intelligence and Counterintelligence Capabilities
Al-Qaeda adapted traditional state intelligence disciplines to the constraints of a stateless, transnational network across four primary domains:

Intelligence DisciplineAl-Qaeda Operational AdaptationHistorical Execution & Tradecraft ExamplesHUMINT & Pre-Operational ReconnaissanceMulti-year target casing separated from execution cells; reliance on clean-skin operatives (“white পাসপোর্ট” holders) and detailed analytical dossiers.Prior to the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings, Ali Mohamed and reconnaissance teams spent nearly five years conducting covert photography, mapping guard shifts, and submitting formal feasibility studies to leadership in Khartoum.Compartmentalization & CutoutsStrict horizontal isolation (siriya) between strategic planners, financial facilitators, and tactical operatives, bridged only by vetted cutouts.During the 9/11 plot, the Hamburg pilot cell had no direct contact with the “muscle” hijackers during training; coordination ran exclusively through Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh.Defensive Counterintelligence & VettingMulti-stage screening at transit guesthouses (madafat), confiscation of personal electronics, mandatory kunyas (noms de guerre), and internal mole-hunting units.Recruits arriving in Peshawar or Kandahar underwent weeks of isolated biographical cross-examination to catch inconsistencies in cover stories before gaining access to training camps or leadership.Offensive Counterintelligence (Double Agents)Running controlled dangles and triple-agent operations against adversary intelligence services to penetrate forward operating bases.The December 2009 Camp Chapman attack in Khost, Afghanistan, where Humam Khalil al-Balawi (a Jordanian doctor recruited by Jordanian GID and the CIA) was turned into a triple agent to eliminate an entire CIA forward base.
Pre-Operational Intelligence & OSINT Integration
Al-Qaeda’s external operations wing treated target selection as an intelligence collection cycle rather than a tactical raid. Operatives such as Dhiren Barot (Issa al-Hindi) produced exhaustive casing reports on Western financial and transit infrastructure that read like professional engineering and security audits—complete with structural vulnerability assessments, CCTV blind-spot diagrams, emergency response timelines, and open-source financial data integrated with physical surveillance.
Communications Security (COMSEC) Evolution
Recognizing early on that Western signals intelligence (SIGINT) could geolocate satellite phones—a vulnerability exposed after the 1998 U.S. cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan—al-Qaeda’s security committee enforces radical COMSEC discipline:
Human Courier Networks: High-level strategic communications were completely removed from the electromagnetic spectrum, relying instead on multi-layered human couriers (ibrid) who memorized routes and exchanged encrypted flash drives at physical dead drops (the exact system that shielded Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad for years).
Digital Dead Drops & Steganography: At the tactical level, cells pioneered the use of shared draft folders in webmail accounts—allowing two operatives to read and write messages using a single login without ever transmitting an email across network routers—alongside basic key-code ciphers and commercial encryption.

Offensive CI: The Camp Chapman Operation
The pinnacle of al-Qaeda’s offensive counterintelligence capability occurred in December 2009 at Forward Operating Base Chapman. Recognizing that the CIA and Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) were desperate for high-level HUMINT access inside the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to locate Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban (TTP) counterintelligence handlers fed genuine, verifiable “bait” intelligence (including proof-of-life videos) through Humam al-Balawi. By validating al-Balawi’s access in the eyes of CIA analysts, al-Qaeda induced a fatal breakdown in standard security protocols—allowing al-Balawi to enter the base unsearched and detonate a suicide vest during a debriefing with senior CIA counterterrorism officers.

3. Structural Vulnerabilities of a Non-State Intelligence Apparatus

Despite its operational sophistication, running a state-style intelligence agency without the legal, territorial, and infrastructural protections of a sovereign state introduced three fatal systemic vulnerabilities:

The Bureaucratic Paradox: Because al-Qaeda operated as a formal bureaucracy that demanded accountability from dispersed cells, it generated massive paper and digital trails. Captured archives—from the Harmony Database files seized in Afghanistan and Iraq to the Abbottabad compound hard drives—revealed personnel rosters, expense vouchers, disciplinary memos, and strategic debates. Whenever a single courier or safe house was compromised, the organization’s own archival rigor turned into an intelligence windfall for counterterrorism analysts.
COMSEC-Induced Command Paralysis: While abandoning electronic communications protected leadership from SIGINT and drone strikes, relying on physical couriers slowed the organization’s command-and-control (C2) cycle from minutes to months. Strategic directives often arrived long after tactical realities on the ground had shifted, gradually severing central leadership (al-Qaeda Core) from its regional affiliates.

Counterintelligence Paranoia and Internal Purges: Under relentless pressure from U.S. drone strikes in Waziristan—which relied on a combination of SIGINT, overhead ISR, and local HUMINT networks—al-Qaeda’s internal security wing (Amniyat) spiraled into acute paranoia. The organization diverted substantial resources into hunting for planted infrared beacons and GPS chips, detaining and executing suspected informants, and imposing travel bans that crippled its ability to recruit and deploy external operatives.
Want to examine how the Abbottabad documents exposed al-Qaeda’s internal counterintelligence failures?

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 10, 2026

The post Al-Qaeda’s Clandestine Intelligence Apparatus al-Qaeda as a highly sophisticated intelligence and counterintelligence entity. Viewing al-Qaeda solely as an ideological militia obscures the primary reason it survived decades of global counterterrorism pressure: from its formative years in the late 1980s and its 1991–1996 sanctuary in Khartoum, the organization was deliberately architected as a clandestine, non-state intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) service. By absorbing veterans of state military and security apparatuses—most notably through its merger with Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)—al-Qaeda institutionalized state-grade first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

 

Articles, Blog, and Tweets

47 min ago

@mikenov: 9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED, e.g.: OPSEC, COMMUNICATIONS. By whom? Not by Bin Laden & Co. #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search

Articles, Blog, and Tweets

56 min ago

@mikenov: Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search

Articles, Blog, and Tweets

1 hrs ago

@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor” The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticated

The News And Times Information Network – Blogs By Michael Novakhov – thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com

The post 9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

 

Articles, Blog, and Tweets

47 min ago

@mikenov: 9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED, e.g.: OPSEC, COMMUNICATIONS. By whom? Not by Bin Laden & Co. #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search

Articles, Blog, and Tweets

56 min ago

@mikenov: Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search

Articles, Blog, and Tweets

1 hrs ago

@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor” The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticated

The News And Times Information Network – Blogs By Michael Novakhov – thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com

The post 9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

 

Articles, Blog, and Tweets

47 min ago

@mikenov: 9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED, e.g.: OPSEC, COMMUNICATIONS. By whom? Not by Bin Laden & Co. #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search

Articles, Blog, and Tweets

56 min ago

@mikenov: Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search

Articles, Blog, and Tweets

1 hrs ago

@mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor” The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticated

The News And Times Information Network – Blogs By Michael Novakhov – thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com

The post 9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

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The man behind ChatGPT is a 41 years old openly gay man, who is currently married to another man and raising a child together.

Sam Altman is the co-founder and CEO of OpenAI, the company behind ChatGPT. Yes, your favorite AI chatgpt.

His husband, Oliver Mulherin, 32 years, is an Australian software engineer.

The two got married in January 2024 in an intimate beachside wedding.

They welcomed their first child, a baby boy in February 2025 through surrogacy.

While millions of people around the world use ChatGPT, its CEO goes home to his handsome husband and their little boy🥰.

— @Hanny4190 Nov 10, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: The man behind ChatGPT is a 41 years old openly gay man, who is currently married to another man and raising a child together. Sam Altman is the co-founder and CEO of OpenAI, the company behind ChatGPT. Yes, your favorite AI chatgpt. His husband, Oliver Mulherin, 32 years, is an Australian software engineer. The two got married in January 2024 in an intimate beachside wedding. They welcomed their first child, a baby boy in February 2025 through surrogacy. While millions of people around the world use ChatGPT, its CEO goes home to his handsome husband and their little boy🥰. first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

#CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google
x.com/mikenov/status/2120140…
Search google.com/search?q=Alternat…

Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad

Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor”

The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticated intelligence and counterintelligence entity.

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search

In the fields of intelligence studies, national security, and military history, “alternative counterintelligence analyses” of the 9/11 attacks refer to rigorous, unconventional assessments conducted within the professional defense community to evaluate how the attacks occurred. Unlike mainstream historical narratives focusing primarily on political ideology, or unverified public conspiracy theories, these specialized analyses examine the events strictly through the lens of professional tradecraft: intelligence gathering, operational security (OPSEC), deception, and structural penetration. [1, 2, 3]
The primary alternative counterintelligence perspectives analyzed by security experts include:
google.com/search?q=Alternat…

Search also:
Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs

x.com/mikenov/status/2120135…

The post @mikenov: 9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED, e.g.: OPSEC, COMMUNICATIONS. By whom? Not by Bin Laden & Co. #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

#CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google
x.com/mikenov/status/2120140…
Search google.com/search?q=Alternat…

Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad

Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor”

The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticated intelligence and counterintelligence entity.

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search

In the fields of intelligence studies, national security, and military history, “alternative counterintelligence analyses” of the 9/11 attacks refer to rigorous, unconventional assessments conducted within the professional defense community to evaluate how the attacks occurred. Unlike mainstream historical narratives focusing primarily on political ideology, or unverified public conspiracy theories, these specialized analyses examine the events strictly through the lens of professional tradecraft: intelligence gathering, operational security (OPSEC), deception, and structural penetration. [1, 2, 3]
The primary alternative counterintelligence perspectives analyzed by security experts include:
google.com/search?q=Alternat…

Search also:
Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs

x.com/mikenov/status/2120135…

The post @mikenov: 9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED, e.g.: OPSEC, COMMUNICATIONS. By whom? Not by Bin Laden & Co. #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED, e.g.: OPSEC, COMMUNICATIONS.
By whom? Not by Bin Laden & Co.

#CIA CIA  #FBI FBI  #Mossad Mossad

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google
x.com/mikenov/status/2120140…
Search  google.com/search?q=Alternat…Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) #CIA CIA  #FBI FBI  #Mossad Mossad

Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor”

The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticated intelligence and counterintelligence entity.

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search

In the fields of intelligence studies, national security, and military history, “alternative counterintelligence analyses” of the 9/11 attacks refer to rigorous, unconventional assessments conducted within the professional defense community to evaluate how the attacks occurred. Unlike mainstream historical narratives focusing primarily on political ideology, or unverified public conspiracy theories, these specialized analyses examine the events strictly through the lens of professional tradecraft: intelligence gathering, operational security (OPSEC), deception, and structural penetration. [1, 2, 3]
The primary alternative counterintelligence perspectives analyzed by security experts include:
google.com/search?q=Alternat…

Search also:
Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs

x.com/mikenov/status/2120135…—  https://x.com/mikenov/status/2120140707906093460

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 10, 2026

The post 9/11 HIJACKERS WERE PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED, e.g.: OPSEC, COMMUNICATIONS. By whom? Not by Bin Laden & Co. #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad

Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor”

The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticated intelligence and counterintelligence entity.

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search

In the fields of intelligence studies, national security, and military history, “alternative counterintelligence analyses” of the 9/11 attacks refer to rigorous, unconventional assessments conducted within the professional defense community to evaluate how the attacks occurred. Unlike mainstream historical narratives focusing primarily on political ideology, or unverified public conspiracy theories, these specialized analyses examine the events strictly through the lens of professional tradecraft: intelligence gathering, operational security (OPSEC), deception, and structural penetration. [1, 2, 3]
The primary alternative counterintelligence perspectives analyzed by security experts include:
google.com/search?q=Alternat…

Search also:
Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs

x.com/mikenov/status/2120135…

The post @mikenov: Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad

Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor”

The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticated intelligence and counterintelligence entity.

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search

In the fields of intelligence studies, national security, and military history, “alternative counterintelligence analyses” of the 9/11 attacks refer to rigorous, unconventional assessments conducted within the professional defense community to evaluate how the attacks occurred. Unlike mainstream historical narratives focusing primarily on political ideology, or unverified public conspiracy theories, these specialized analyses examine the events strictly through the lens of professional tradecraft: intelligence gathering, operational security (OPSEC), deception, and structural penetration. [1, 2, 3]
The primary alternative counterintelligence perspectives analyzed by security experts include:
google.com/search?q=Alternat…

Search also:
Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs

x.com/mikenov/status/2120135…

The post @mikenov: Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google
x.com/mikenov/status/2120140…
Search  google.com/search?q=Alternat…Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) #CIA CIA  #FBI FBI  #Mossad Mossad

Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor”

The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticated intelligence and counterintelligence entity.

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search

In the fields of intelligence studies, national security, and military history, “alternative counterintelligence analyses” of the 9/11 attacks refer to rigorous, unconventional assessments conducted within the professional defense community to evaluate how the attacks occurred. Unlike mainstream historical narratives focusing primarily on political ideology, or unverified public conspiracy theories, these specialized analyses examine the events strictly through the lens of professional tradecraft: intelligence gathering, operational security (OPSEC), deception, and structural penetration. [1, 2, 3]
The primary alternative counterintelligence perspectives analyzed by security experts include:
google.com/search?q=Alternat…

Search also:
Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs

x.com/mikenov/status/2120135…—  https://x.com/mikenov/status/2120140707906093460

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 10, 2026

The post Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor”

The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticated intelligence and counterintelligence entity.

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search

In the fields of intelligence studies, national security, and military history, “alternative counterintelligence analyses” of the 9/11 attacks refer to rigorous, unconventional assessments conducted within the professional defense community to evaluate how the attacks occurred. Unlike mainstream historical narratives focusing primarily on political ideology, or unverified public conspiracy theories, these specialized analyses examine the events strictly through the lens of professional tradecraft: intelligence gathering, operational security (OPSEC), deception, and structural penetration. [1, 2, 3]
The primary alternative counterintelligence perspectives analyzed by security experts include:
google.com/search?q=Alternat…

Search also:
Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs

x.com/mikenov/status/2120135…

Michael Novakhov (@mikenov)Full article: The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.…

The post @mikenov: #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor” The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticated first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

#CIA CIA  #FBI FBI  #Mossad Mossad

Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor”

The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticated intelligence and counterintelligence entity.

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search

In the fields of intelligence studies, national security, and military history, “alternative counterintelligence analyses” of the 9/11 attacks refer to rigorous, unconventional assessments conducted within the professional defense community to evaluate how the attacks occurred. Unlike mainstream historical narratives focusing primarily on political ideology, or unverified public conspiracy theories, these specialized analyses examine the events strictly through the lens of professional tradecraft: intelligence gathering, operational security (OPSEC), deception, and structural penetration. [1, 2, 3]
The primary alternative counterintelligence perspectives analyzed by security experts include:
google.com/search?q=Alternat…

Search also:
Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs

x.com/mikenov/status/2120135…Michael Novakhov (@mikenov)Full article: The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence  tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.…—  https://x.com/mikenov/status/2120135378971791695

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 10, 2026

The post #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Al-Qaeda as an “Intelligent Counterintelligence Actor” The most prominent alternative analysis shifts the focus from viewing al-Qaeda as a group of irrational fanatics to analyzing them as a highly sophisticated intelligence and counterintelligence entity. Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks In the fields of intelligence studies, national security, and military history, “alternative counterintelligence analyses” of the 9/11 attacks refer to rigorous, unconventional assessments conducted within the professional defense community to evaluate how the attacks occurred. Unlike mainstream historical narratives focusing prima first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

x.com/mikenov/status/2120135…

Michael Novakhov (@mikenov)Full article: The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.…

The post @mikenov: Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks In the fields of intelligence studies, national security, and military history, “alternative counterintelligence analyses” of the 9/11 attacks refer to rigorous, unconv first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks – Google Search
In the fields of intelligence studies, national security, and military history, “alternative counterintelligence analyses” of the 9/11 attacks refer to rigorous, unconventional assessments conducted within the professional defense community to evaluate how the attacks occurred. Unlike mainstream historical narratives focusing primarily on political ideology, or unverified public conspiracy theories, these specialized analyses examine the events strictly through the lens of professional tradecraft: intelligence gathering, operational security (OPSEC), deception, and structural penetration. [1, 2, 3]
The primary alternative counterintelligence perspectives analyzed by security experts include:
google.com/search?q=Alternat…

x.com/mikenov/status/2120135…Michael Novakhov (@mikenov)Full article: The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence  tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.…—  https://x.com/mikenov/status/2120135378971791695

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 10, 2026

The post Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks In the fields of intelligence studies, national security, and military history, “alternative counterintelligence analyses” of the 9/11 attacks refer to rigorous, unconventional assessments conducted within the professional defense community to evaluate how the attacks occurred. Unlike mainstream historical narratives focusing primarily on political ideology, or unverified public conspiracy theories, these specialized analyses examine the events strictly through the lens of professional tradecraft: intelligence gathering, operational security (OPSEC), deception, and structural penetration. [1, 2, 3] The primary alter first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. were undoubtedly the most brazen and shocking terrorist attacks conducted by a sub-state group in history. Al Qaeda’s capacity to achieve this outc…

The post The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

The post The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Full article: The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence  tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 10, 2026

The post Full article: The 9/11 Attacks—A Study of Al Qaeda’s Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

The post Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs – Google Search  google.com/search?q=Alternat…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 10, 2026

The post Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

The post Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

The post Alternative counterintelligence analyses of the 9/11 Attacks and the declassified PDBs first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Hoover Acquires the Papers of Legendary East German Spymaster Markus J. Wolf

hoover.org/news/hoover-acqui…

— @Sandbagger_01 Nov 10, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: Hoover Acquires the Papers of Legendary East German Spymaster Markus J. Wolf first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

#CIA CIA  #FBI FBI  #Mossad Mossad
Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms.  thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com…
Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs
The signs of skillful strategic deception:
– The reliance on unverified sources, 
– Placement of information by adversaries, 
– And severe warning fatigue within the administration.  
These are the signs of skillful strategic deception.  The discussion revolves around these three core intelligence failures.
Main Article:  The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks: Was it his Very Special Political Intelligence Operation?
Search: 
skillful strategic deception
📷
Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of the skillful strategic deception – Google Search
AI Mode
An analysis of the declassified 9/11 President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) reveals specific intelligence vulnerabilities that commentators and researchers characterize as indicators of skillful strategic deception. Rather than viewing the tragedy purely as a failure of imagination or information sharing, asymmetric warfare frameworks suggest that the systemic weaknesses in how intelligence was ingested and processed were leveraged effectively against the United States. [1, 2]
The discussion around these declassified briefs outlines three core intelligence failures that altogether signal a broader pattern of strategic deception: [1, 2]
1. The Reliance on Unverified Sources

Declassified briefings show that intelligence analysts frequently had to wade through an influx of data originating from questionable channels. A notable brief from July 3, 1998, explicitly highlighted attack plots originating from “highly questionable sources,” yet noted a strike remained “plausible”. [1]
The Deception Element: Feeding an intelligence apparatus a mix of legitimate threats and unverified, fabricated information dilutes the credibility of genuine warnings, causing analysts to waste critical investigative resources parsing out noise from actionable signals. [1]
2. Strategic Placement of Information by Adversaries
A hallmark of strategic deception is the deliberate planting or leak of specific intelligence to manipulate the target’s threat perception. By orchestrating how and when information surfaced, adversaries could obscure their primary objective. [1, 2]
The Deception Element: If national security agencies are coaxed into looking toward specific regions, targets, or methods because of placed intelligence, it creates structural blind spots. This allows the actual operational axis (such as domestic flight schools and hijacked commercial airliners) to proceed with minimal disruption. [1]

3. Severe “Warning Fatigue” Within the Administration
In the months leading up to September 11, the CIA provided “long and loud strategic warnings” regarding the imminent threat posed by Usama bin Laden. However, because these alarms were sustained over a prolonged period without a definitive timeline or precise location, policymakers became desensitized to them. [1]
The Deception Element: Sustained, high-amplitude “chatter” can be utilized to induce warning fatigue. When an administration is consistently told that a threat is imminent but nothing immediate occurs, the psychological urgency drops—rendering the system highly vulnerable when the actual operation is executed. [1, 2]

Summary of Core Failures
Element of Deception
Systemic Vulnerability Impact on 9/11 Preparedness Noise & Fabrication
Heavy reliance on unverified sources 
Diluted the credibility of genuine, high-priority threats.
Misdirection
Placement of information by adversariesDirected intelligence focus away from domestic operational vectors.
Desensitization Chronic warning fatigue
Lowered the defensive urgency of administrative policymakers.

While institutional retrospective analyses, such as the 9/11 Commission Report, traditionally focus on a “lack of imagination” and poor inter-agency communication, alternative counterintelligence analyses argue that the system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. [1, 2]
–
AI Overview
The analysis of declassified President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) regarding September 11 centers on systemic intelligence failures, warning fatigue, and the challenges of evaluating threat streams in real time. [1, 2]

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 10, 2026

The post #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs The signs of skillful strategic deception: – The reliance on unverified sources, – Placement of information by adversaries, – And severe warning fatigue within the administration. These are the signs of skillful strategic deception. The discussion revolves around these three core intelligence failures. Main Article: The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks: Was it his Very Special Political first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

#CIA CIA  #FBI FBI  #Mossad Mossad
Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms.  thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com…
Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs
The signs of skillful strategic deception:
– The reliance on unverified sources, 
– Placement of information by adversaries, 
– And severe warning fatigue within the administration.  
These are the signs of skillful strategic deception.  The discussion revolves around these three core intelligence failures.
Main Article:  The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks: Was it his Very Special Political Intelligence Operation?
Search: 
skillful strategic deception
📷
Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of the skillful strategic deception – Google Search
AI Mode
An analysis of the declassified 9/11 President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) reveals specific intelligence vulnerabilities that commentators and researchers characterize as indicators of skillful strategic deception. Rather than viewing the tragedy purely as a failure of imagination or information sharing, asymmetric warfare frameworks suggest that the systemic weaknesses in how intelligence was ingested and processed were leveraged effectively against the United States. [1, 2]
The discussion around these declassified briefs outlines three core intelligence failures that altogether signal a broader pattern of strategic deception: [1, 2]
1. The Reliance on Unverified Sources

Declassified briefings show that intelligence analysts frequently had to wade through an influx of data originating from questionable channels. A notable brief from July 3, 1998, explicitly highlighted attack plots originating from “highly questionable sources,” yet noted a strike remained “plausible”. [1]
The Deception Element: Feeding an intelligence apparatus a mix of legitimate threats and unverified, fabricated information dilutes the credibility of genuine warnings, causing analysts to waste critical investigative resources parsing out noise from actionable signals. [1]
2. Strategic Placement of Information by Adversaries
A hallmark of strategic deception is the deliberate planting or leak of specific intelligence to manipulate the target’s threat perception. By orchestrating how and when information surfaced, adversaries could obscure their primary objective. [1, 2]
The Deception Element: If national security agencies are coaxed into looking toward specific regions, targets, or methods because of placed intelligence, it creates structural blind spots. This allows the actual operational axis (such as domestic flight schools and hijacked commercial airliners) to proceed with minimal disruption. [1]

3. Severe “Warning Fatigue” Within the Administration
In the months leading up to September 11, the CIA provided “long and loud strategic warnings” regarding the imminent threat posed by Usama bin Laden. However, because these alarms were sustained over a prolonged period without a definitive timeline or precise location, policymakers became desensitized to them. [1]
The Deception Element: Sustained, high-amplitude “chatter” can be utilized to induce warning fatigue. When an administration is consistently told that a threat is imminent but nothing immediate occurs, the psychological urgency drops—rendering the system highly vulnerable when the actual operation is executed. [1, 2]
Summary of Core Failures
Element of DeceptionSystemic VulnerabilityImpact on 9/11 PreparednessNoise & FabricationHeavy reliance on unverified sourcesDiluted the credibility of genuine, high-priority threats.MisdirectionPlacement of information by adversariesDirected intelligence focus away from domestic operational vectors.DesensitizationChronic warning fatigueLowered the defensive urgency of administrative policymakers.
While institutional retrospective analyses, such as the 9/11 Commission Report, traditionally focus on a “lack of imagination” and poor inter-agency communication, alternative counterintelligence analyses argue that the system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. [1, 2]
–
AI Overview
The analysis of declassified President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) regarding September 11 centers on systemic intelligence failures, warning fatigue, and the challenges of evaluating threat streams in real time. [1, 2]

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 10, 2026

The post #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs The signs of skillful strategic deception: – The reliance on unverified sources, – Placement of information by adversaries, – And severe warning fatigue within the administration. These are the signs of skillful strategic deception. The discussion revolves around these three core intelligence failures. Main Article: The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks: Was it his Very Special Political first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

#CIA CIA  #FBI FBI  #Mossad Mossad
Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms.  thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com…
Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs
The signs of skillful strategic deception:
– The reliance on unverified sources, 
– Placement of information by adversaries, 
– And severe warning fatigue within the administration.  
These are the signs of skillful strategic deception.  The discussion revolves around these three core intelligence failures.
Main Article:  The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks: Was it his Very Special Political Intelligence Operation? https://Search:  skillful strategic deception
📷
Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of the skillful strategic deception – Google Search
AI Mode
An analysis of the declassified 9/11 President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) reveals specific intelligence vulnerabilities that commentators and researchers characterize as indicators of skillful strategic deception. Rather than viewing the tragedy purely as a failure of imagination or information sharing, asymmetric warfare frameworks suggest that the systemic weaknesses in how intelligence was ingested and processed were leveraged effectively against the United States. [1, 2]
The discussion around these declassified briefs outlines three core intelligence failures that altogether signal a broader pattern of strategic deception: [1, 2]
1. The Reliance on Unverified Sources

Declassified briefings show that intelligence analysts frequently had to wade through an influx of data originating from questionable channels. A notable brief from July 3, 1998, explicitly highlighted attack plots originating from “highly questionable sources,” yet noted a strike remained “plausible”. [1]
The Deception Element: Feeding an intelligence apparatus a mix of legitimate threats and unverified, fabricated information dilutes the credibility of genuine warnings, causing analysts to waste critical investigative resources parsing out noise from actionable signals. [1]
2. Strategic Placement of Information by Adversaries
A hallmark of strategic deception is the deliberate planting or leak of specific intelligence to manipulate the target’s threat perception. By orchestrating how and when information surfaced, adversaries could obscure their primary objective. [1, 2]
The Deception Element: If national security agencies are coaxed into looking toward specific regions, targets, or methods because of placed intelligence, it creates structural blind spots. This allows the actual operational axis (such as domestic flight schools and hijacked commercial airliners) to proceed with minimal disruption. [1]

3. Severe “Warning Fatigue” Within the Administration
In the months leading up to September 11, the CIA provided “long and loud strategic warnings” regarding the imminent threat posed by Usama bin Laden. However, because these alarms were sustained over a prolonged period without a definitive timeline or precise location, policymakers became desensitized to them. [1]
The Deception Element: Sustained, high-amplitude “chatter” can be utilized to induce warning fatigue. When an administration is consistently told that a threat is imminent but nothing immediate occurs, the psychological urgency drops—rendering the system highly vulnerable when the actual operation is executed. [1, 2]
Summary of Core Failures
Element of DeceptionSystemic VulnerabilityImpact on 9/11 PreparednessNoise & FabricationHeavy reliance on unverified sourcesDiluted the credibility of genuine, high-priority threats.MisdirectionPlacement of information by adversariesDirected intelligence focus away from domestic operational vectors.DesensitizationChronic warning fatigueLowered the defensive urgency of administrative policymakers.
While institutional retrospective analyses, such as the 9/11 Commission Report, traditionally focus on a “lack of imagination” and poor inter-agency communication, alternative counterintelligence analyses argue that the system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. [1, 2]
–
AI Overview
The analysis of declassified President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs) regarding September 11 centers on systemic intelligence failures, warning fatigue, and the challenges of evaluating threat streams in real time. [1, 2]

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 10, 2026

The post #CIA CIA #FBI FBI #Mossad Mossad Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The system was effectively blindfolded by these classic deceptive mechanisms. Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs The signs of skillful strategic deception: – The reliance on unverified sources, – Placement of information by adversaries, – And severe warning fatigue within the administration. These are the signs of skillful strategic deception. The discussion revolves around these three core intelligence failures. Main Article: The Mastermind: Putin and the 9/11 Attacks: Was it his Very Special Political first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of the skillful strategic deception – Google Search  google.com/search?q=Analysis…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 10, 2026

The post Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of the skillful strategic deception first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Fotografía de identificación criminal de un joven Iósif Stalin realizada el 23 de marzo de 1910.

En el momento en que se tomó este retrato policial, el futuro líder de la Unión Soviética tenía 31 años y utilizaba su nombre de nacimiento, Ioseb Jughashvili. Su detención fue ejecutada por la Ojrana, la temida policía secreta del Imperio Ruso, en la ciudad de Bakú, situada en el actual Azerbaiyán. Para la corona zarista, el joven georgiano era considerado un peligroso agitador político debido a su activa participación en la clandestinidad con la facción bolchevique del Partido Obrero Socialdemócrata de Rusia.

Durante esa época en el Cáucaso, la labor del joven Jughashvili consistía en desestabilizar el régimen zarista mediante la propaganda, la organización de huelgas masivas entre los trabajadores petroleros de Bakú y la recaudación de fondos para la causa revolucionaria. Estos métodos de financiamiento a menudo incluían actividades extremas como la extorsión a refinerías de petróleo y asaltos a bancos locales.

Tras ser arrestado en la primavera de 1910, las autoridades imperiales lo encerraron durante aproximadamente seis meses en la prisión de Bailov, una cárcel conocida por sus duras condiciones y el hacinamiento de presos políticos.
Finalmente, la justicia zarista resolvió su caso imponiéndole una condena de dos años de exilio forzoso en la remota e inhóspita localidad de Solvichegodsk, ubicada en el norte de Rusia.

Este arresto no fue un hecho aislado en su trayectoria revolucionaria, ya que entre 1902 y 1913 sufrió múltiples detenciones y deportaciones a Siberia, de las cuales logró escapar en casi todas las ocasiones gracias a su ingenio y a una red de contactos clandestinos. Dos años después de este encierro en Bakú, a principios de 1912, comenzó a firmar sus artículos y cartas con el seudónimo de Stalin, un alias derivado de la palabra rusa para el acero que acabaría definiendo su figura histórica.

— @redhistoria Nov 9, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: Fotografía de identificación criminal de un joven Iósif Stalin realizada el 23 de marzo de 1910. En el momento en que se tomó este retrato policial, el futuro líder de la Unión Soviética tenía 31 años y utilizaba su nombre de nacimiento, Ioseb Jughashvili. Su detención fue ejecutada por la Ojrana, la temida policía secreta del Imperio Ruso, en la ciudad de Bakú, situada en el actual Azerbaiyán. Para la corona zarista, el joven georgiano era considerado un peligroso agitador político debido a su activa participación en la clandestinidad con la facción bolchevique del Partido Obrero Socialdemócrata de Rusia. Durante esa época en el Cáucaso, la labor del joven Jughashvili consis first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

In ancient Sparta, the lawgiver Lycurgus made marriage a legal and civic duty because the state desperately needed to produce future warriors. Refusing to marry was treated as a crime against the collective survival of Sparta…

Sparta’s population of full citizen-soldiers (Spartiates) was chronically small and constantly at risk of shrinking through war or disease. Marriage was viewed purely as a state breeding contract rather than a matter of romance. To reinforce this duty, the society rewarded men who had large families (such as being exempted from military service or taxes if they had three or four sons) while treating bachelors as social outcasts.

. . .

According to the historian Plutarch, unmarried men (agamoi) faced strict public humiliation every winter to shame them into compliance…

In the freezing cold of winter, officials forced unmarried men to march in circles around the public marketplace (agora) completely naked. As they walked, they had to sing a self-mocking song or a specific derogatory tune written about themselves, publicly confessing that they were justly punished for disobeying the laws.

Bachelors were stripped of certain honors and citizen rights. Younger men were also permitted and even expected—to disrespect or withhold the customary signs of deference that older men normally received, such as yielding seats or standing up for them. Furthermore, they were banned from attending the sacred athletic and religious dances of the Gymnopaedia festival.

#archaeohistories

— @histories_arch Nov 9, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: In ancient Sparta, the lawgiver Lycurgus made marriage a legal and civic duty because the state desperately needed to produce future warriors. Refusing to marry was treated as a crime against the collective survival of Sparta… Sparta’s population of full citizen-soldiers (Spartiates) was chronically small and constantly at risk of shrinking through war or disease. Marriage was viewed purely as a state breeding contract rather than a matter of romance. To reinforce this duty, the society rewarded men who had large families (such as being exempted from military service or taxes if they had three or four sons) while treating bachelors as social outcasts. . . . According to the first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Russian spies are moving closer to America. From Mexico to Nicaragua, Moscow is building networks that could threaten U.S. secrets, businesses, and national security. Here’s why you should care.
osintdaily.blogspot.com/2026…
#RussianSpies  #CIA  #NationalSecurity

— @Robert4787 Nov 9, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: Russian spies are moving closer to America. From Mexico to Nicaragua, Moscow is building networks that could threaten U.S. secrets, businesses, and national security. Here’s why you should care. #RussianSpies #CIA #NationalSecurity first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

The hypocrisy of the KGB and its officers (Putin) has no limits – Google Search  google.com/search?q=The+hypo…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 9, 2026

The post The hypocrisy of the KGB and its officers (Putin) has no limits first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

🇷🇺 RUSSIAN GENERAL WHO WARNED AGAINST INVADING UKRAINE NOW SAYS PUTIN IS DESTROYING RUSSIA 🇺🇦

Retired Russian General Leonid Ivashov warned against invading Ukraine before the war began. Nearly four years later, his assessment of Vladimir Putin and the state of Russia is devastating.

Ivashov, a former senior military officer and longtime geopolitical analyst, has accused Putin of living in a fantasy while ordinary Russians struggle with poverty, rising prices and deteriorating public services.

“I saw neither a leader, nor a commander, nor a defender of the people. I saw only a man living in a fairy tale, while the rest of the country is trying to survive on 16,000 rubles a month.”

His criticism extends far beyond Russia’s military performance in Ukraine.

Ivashov argues that the war has exposed serious weaknesses across the Russian state. He points to declining industrial capacity, underfunded healthcare, problems in education and scientific research, and an economy increasingly unable to deliver improvements in ordinary people’s lives.

He is particularly concerned about Russia’s demographic decline. The loss of working-age men, combined with an ageing population and longstanding demographic pressures, could leave consequences that persist long after the fighting ends.

Nor does he share the Kremlin’s confidence in its international partnerships.

Ivashov questions how much Belarus and North Korea can realistically contribute to Russia’s long-term stability. He also rejects the idea that China’s economic relationship with Moscow makes Beijing a dependable military ally.

His most serious warning concerns Russia’s future as a state. Ivashov believes a strategic defeat in Ukraine could eventually threaten the Russian Federation’s political and territorial integrity.

What makes his criticism significant is his background.

Ivashov spent decades within Russia’s military establishment. In February 2022, before the full-scale invasion, he publicly warned that war with Ukraine would damage Russia’s security, international standing and future.

He was not predicting a quick Russian victory. He was warning Putin against starting the war at all.

Now, almost four years later, he sees a country paying an enormous price for the decision he opposed from the beginning.

— @WW3finalboss Nov 9, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: 🇷🇺 RUSSIAN GENERAL WHO WARNED AGAINST INVADING UKRAINE NOW SAYS PUTIN IS DESTROYING RUSSIA 🇺🇦 Retired Russian General Leonid Ivashov warned against invading Ukraine before the war began. Nearly four years later, his assessment of Vladimir Putin and the state of Russia is devastating. Ivashov, a former senior military officer and longtime geopolitical analyst, has accused Putin of living in a fantasy while ordinary Russians struggle with poverty, rising prices and deteriorating public services. “I saw neither a leader, nor a commander, nor a defender of the people. I saw only a man living in a fairy tale, while the rest of the country is trying to survive on 16,000 rubles first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

🚨 BREAKING: MOSCOW TRIED TO FLEX, ELON MUSK JUST DROPPED A TOTAL ORBITAL BLACKOUT! 🚀🇷🇺💥

🇷🇺 Vladimir Putin: “Elon Musk, your Starlink constellations operating along our border zones violate national security! Ground those telemetry signals immediately, or we will deploy orbital jammer arrays and seize all SpaceX domestic assets!” 🇷🇺😡⚡

🚀 Elon Musk: “You confused terrestrial borders with low-Earth orbit. In space, satellite constellations don’t bow to Kremlin decrees. Try deploying your jammers—your operators can write all the warnings they want, but your regional logistics will collapse without high-speed telemetry.” 🚀💪🔥

🇷🇺 Vladimir Putin: “We will freeze all SpaceX commercial accounts across Eurasia and target your satellite ground relays!” 🇷🇺⚠️🛑

🚀 Elon Musk: “Freeze whatever accounts you like, Vladimir! The moment your order goes live, SpaceX software locks orbital telemetry feeds for foreign maritime shipping hubs. Good luck guiding commercial fleets through Arctic storms on pitch-black screens!” 🚀⚔️💀📉
Video
 

— @AmericanpowerUs Nov 9, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: 🚨 BREAKING: MOSCOW TRIED TO FLEX, ELON MUSK JUST DROPPED A TOTAL ORBITAL BLACKOUT! 🚀🇷🇺💥 🇷🇺 Vladimir Putin: “Elon Musk, your Starlink constellations operating along our border zones violate national security! Ground those telemetry signals immediately, or we will deploy orbital jammer arrays and seize all SpaceX domestic assets!” 🇷🇺😡⚡ 🚀 Elon Musk: “You confused terrestrial borders with low-Earth orbit. In space, satellite constellations don’t bow to Kremlin decrees. Try deploying your jammers—your operators can write all the warnings they want, but your regional logistics will collapse without high-speed telemetry.” 🚀💪🔥 🇷🇺 Vladimir Putin: “We will freeze all Sp first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

🇺🇦🇷🇺 BUDANOV SAYS PUTIN HAS REACHED A DEAD END

Kyrylo Budanov 🇺🇦 – “Everyone understands this is a collapse.

Putin has reached a dead end: he can neither end the war nor win it.

Victory is no longer possible for objective reasons.

But to stop the war would mean admitting that Russia is not as strong or as great as he wanted.”

Budanov’s point is that Putin is trapped by the war he created. He cannot achieve the victory he promised, but ending the war would expose the failure behind Russia’s imperial myth.

That is why Moscow keeps fighting. Not because it has a real path to victory, but because admitting defeat would mean admitting that Ukraine broke the image of Russian power Putin built his regime around.

— @WW3finalboss Nov 9, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: 🇺🇦🇷🇺 BUDANOV SAYS PUTIN HAS REACHED A DEAD END Kyrylo Budanov 🇺🇦 – “Everyone understands this is a collapse. Putin has reached a dead end: he can neither end the war nor win it. Victory is no longer possible for objective reasons. But to stop the war would mean admitting that Russia is not as strong or as great as he wanted.” Budanov’s point is that Putin is trapped by the war he created. He cannot achieve the victory he promised, but ending the war would expose the failure behind Russia’s imperial myth. That is why Moscow keeps fighting. Not because it has a real path to victory, but because admitting defeat would mean admitting that Ukraine broke the image of Russian first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

The post @washingtonpost: RT by @mikenov: Decreasing or stopping military aid to Israel is now a position supported by the majority of Americans, according to a poll, and backed by parties from left-wing progressives to mainstream Democratic leaders to the White H first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Decreasing or stopping military aid to Israel is now a position supported by the majority of Americans, according to a poll, and backed by parties from left-wing progressives to mainstream Democratic leaders to the White House.  wapo.st/488Tqjf

— @washingtonpost Nov 9, 2026

The post RT by @mikenov: Decreasing or stopping military aid to Israel is now a position supported by the majority of Americans, according to a poll, and backed by parties from left-wing progressives to mainstream Democratic leaders to the White House. first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

The post Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The reliance on unverified sources, placement of information by adversaries, and severe warning fatigue first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The reliance on unverified sources, placement of information by adversaries, and severe warning fatigue – Google Search  google.com/search?q=Analysis…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Nov 9, 2026

The post Analysis of the Declassified 9/11 PDBs: The signs of skillful strategic deception: The reliance on unverified sources, placement of information by adversaries, and severe warning fatigue first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.

The post Putin and the 9/11 Attacks first appeared on The News And Times Review - NewsAndTimes.org.