Day: October 29, 2025

putin’s nuclear blackmail – Google Search  google.com/search?q=putin%27… Following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has repeatedly used nuclear threats, which analysts have described as “nuclear blackmail” aimed at intimidating the West and weakening its support for Kyiv. Russian President Vladimir Putin and other officials have regularly escalated their nuclear rhetoric in response to battlefield setbacks and increased Western military assistance to Ukraine. [1, 2] 
Key developments in Russia’s nuclear threats • Initial invasion (2022): When Russian forces first crossed the border, Putin warned against foreign intervention, indicating that any attempts to interfere would be met with consequences “such as you have never seen”. Days later, he placed Russia’s nuclear forces on high alert.
• Failed offensives (2022): As Russian forces retreated near Kyiv and from other areas, Putin escalated his rhetoric, vowing to use “all means at our disposal” to defend annexed Ukrainian territories and stating, “This is not a bluff”.
• Tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus (2023): In March 2023, Russia announced the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to its ally, Belarus. While not a direct violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the move was widely seen as a further escalation of nuclear signaling.
• Targeting European vulnerabilities (2024): In June 2024, Putin explicitly warned European nations that Russia held a significant advantage in tactical nuclear weapons and that “Europe does not have a developed [early warning system]”.
• Lowering the nuclear threshold (2024): In September and November 2024, Russia updated its nuclear doctrine, reportedly lowering the threshold for nuclear use. The new policy expanded the scenarios in which Russia might use nuclear weapons, including in response to a conventional attack on Russia or Belarus if it “creates a critical threat to their sovereignty and (or) territorial integrity”. It also stipulated that any aggression by a non-nuclear state with the support of a nuclear state would be considered a joint attack. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] 

The West’s struggle with Russia’s nuclear threats Putin’s nuclear coercion has influenced Western decision-making and created a fear of escalation that has limited military aid to Ukraine.

• Restricted aid: Fear of escalation has led to delays in delivering crucial military aid and restrictions on the types of weapons provided to Ukraine.
• Challenging the bluff: Despite the threats, Ukraine and some Western allies, particularly those closer to Russia, have called Putin’s bluffs. Ukraine has repeatedly crossed Russia’s self-proclaimed “red lines”—such as striking military targets within Russia—without triggering a nuclear response.
• Counter-escalation debate: While some have argued that the West should stand up to the threats, others have voiced concerns about the potential for accidental escalation. Western responses have included quiet warnings to the Kremlin and debates on the credibility of Russia’s threats.
• Maintaining deterrence: NATO and the United States have consistently affirmed that their nuclear deterrence remains credible, and some European nations have considered hosting their own nuclear weapons in response to Russian aggression. [1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] 

Current situation (late 2025) As of late 2025, Russia continues its nuclear saber-rattling amidst the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

• Continued cognitive warfare: Russia is reportedly intensifying efforts to blame the U.S. for its own failed diplomatic engagements while continuing nuclear threats.
• New weapons tests: Putin recently announced the deployment of the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, a move dismissed by some Western analysts as a bluff but viewed by others as a dangerous escalation of brinkmanship.
• Ongoing tensions: The U.S. and NATO acknowledge that Russian nuclear threats have constrained their actions in supporting Ukraine, but they remain committed to their foreign policy goals. Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to monitor Russia’s adherence to arms control agreements. [9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] 

AI responses may include mistakes.

[1]  atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/uk…
[2]  atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/uk…
[3]  bbc.com/news/articles/c5yjej…
[4]  pbs.org/newshour/world/putin…
[5]  nbcnews.com/news/world/putin…
[6]  commonslibrary.parliament.uk…
[7]  congress.gov/crs_external_pr…
[8]  atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/uk…
[9]  congress.gov/crs_external_pr…
[10]  atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/uk…
[11]  brookings.edu/articles/nucle…
[12]  heritage.org/defense/comment…
[13]  understandingwar.org/researc…
[14]  thebulletin.org/premium/2025…
[15]  nbcnews.com/world/russia/rus…
[16]  prio.org/comments/1827
[17]  stimson.org/2025/an-unreal-p…

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 29, 2025