South Caucasus: THAT’S HOW THE AZERBAIJAN SSS OPERATES: #LIARS, #FABRICATORS, NO-BRAINS DISGUSTING #STINKERS!
INVESTIGATE AND REFORM THESE MF-S NOW!!!
IT IS THEM WHO ARE THE BIGGEST THREAT TO SECURITY!
Read: “12 hours inside State Security Service of Azerbaijan – a personal experience – By Cavid Ağa” thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com…— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 26, 2025
Day: October 26, 2025
South Caucasus: THAT’S HOW THE AZERBAIJAN SSS OPERATES: LIARS, FABRICATORS, NO-BRAINS DISGUSTING STINKERS! INVESTIGATE AND REFORM THESE MF-S NOW!!! IT IS THEM WHO ARE THE BIGGEST THREAT TO SECURITY! Read: “12 hours inside State Security Service of Azerbaijan – a personal experience – By Cavid Ağa” thenewsandtimes.blogspot.com…
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 26, 2025
#SouthCaucasus
THAT’S HOW THE #AZERBAIJAN #SSS OPERATES:
#LIARS, #FABRICATORS, NO-BRAINS DISGUSTING STINKERS!
INVESTIGATE AND REFORM THESE MF-S NOW!!!
IT IS THEM WHO ARE THE BIGGEST THREAT TO SECURITY!
12 hours inside State Security Service of Azerbaijan – a personal experience | Cavid Ağa cavid.info/12-hours-insid
Quote: “Bahruz stood accused of collaborating with Armenian intelligence services. Yet the SSS interrogators frequently veered into bizarre tangents that seemed to have little bearing on matters of national security. At one point, they asked whether Bahruz belonged to a “sexual minority” — a question that left me genuinely puzzled about its relevance to a treason case. With dark humour born of exhaustion and absurdity, I replied that as far as I knew, he was quite the opposite — a notorious womaniser. I knew that they were looking for ways to humiliate Bahruz on TV. This indeed happened a few days later.”
THAT’S HOW THE #AZERBAIJAN #SSS OPERATES:
#LIARS, #FABRICATORS, NO-BRAINS DISGUSTING STINKERS!
INVESTIGATE AND REFORM THESE MF-S NOW!!!
IT IS THEM WHO ARE THE BIGGEST THREAT TO SECURITY!
12 hours inside State Security Service of Azerbaijan – a personal experience | Cavid Ağa cavid.info/12-hours-insid
Quote: “Bahruz stood accused of collaborating with Armenian intelligence services. Yet the SSS interrogators frequently veered into bizarre tangents that seemed to have little bearing on matters of national security. At one point, they asked whether Bahruz belonged to a “sexual minority” — a question that left me genuinely puzzled about its relevance to a treason case. With dark humour born of exhaustion and absurdity, I replied that as far as I knew, he was quite the opposite — a notorious womaniser. I knew that they were looking for ways to humiliate Bahruz on TV. This indeed happened a few days later.”
See more at: SSS – Azerbaijan – GS
Articles and Tweets
#SouthCaucasus
THAT’S HOW THE #AZERBAIJAN #SSS OPERATES:
#LIARS, #FABRICATORS, NO-BRAINS DISGUSTING STINKERS!
INVESTIGATE AND REFORM THESE MF-S NOW!!!
IT IS THEM WHO ARE THE BIGGEST THREAT TO SECURITY!
12 hours inside State Security Service of Azerbaijan – a personal experience | Cavid Ağa cavid.info/12-hours-inside/
Quote: “Bahruz stood accused of collaborating with Armenian intelligence services. Yet the SSS interrogators frequently veered into bizarre tangents that seemed to have little bearing on matters of national security. At one point, they asked whether Bahruz belonged to a “sexual minority” — a question that left me genuinely puzzled about its relevance to a treason case. With dark humour born of exhaustion and absurdity, I replied that as far as I knew, he was quite the opposite — a notorious womaniser. I knew that they were looking for ways to humiliate Bahruz on TV. This indeed happened a few days later.”See more at: SSS – Azerbaijan – GS
google.com/search?q=SSS+-+Az…— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 26, 2025
#SouthCaucasus
THAT’S HOW THE #AZERBAIJAN #SSS OPERATES:
#LIARS, #FABRICATORS, NO-BRAINS DISGUSTING STINKERS!
INVESTIGATE AND REFORM THESE MF-S NOW!!!
IT IS THEM WHO ARE THE BIGGEST THREAT TO SECURITY!
12 hours inside State Security Service of Azerbaijan – a personal experience | Cavid Ağa cavid.info/12-hours-inside/
Quote: “Bahruz stood accused of collaborating with Armenian intelligence services. Yet the SSS interrogators frequently veered into bizarre tangents that seemed to have little bearing on matters of national security. At one point, they asked whether Bahruz belonged to a “sexual minority” — a question that left me genuinely puzzled about its relevance to a treason case. With dark humour born of exhaustion and absurdity, I replied that as far as I knew, he was quite the opposite — a notorious womaniser. I knew that they were looking for ways to humiliate Bahruz on TV. This indeed happened a few days later.”See more at: SSS – Azerbaijan – GS
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 26, 2025
THAT’S HOW THE AZERY SSS OPERATES:
#LIARS, #FABRICATORS, NO-BRAINS DISGUSTING STINKERS! INVESTIGATE AND REFORM THESE MF-S NOW!!! IT IS THEM WHO ARE THE BIGGEST THREAT TO SECURITY!
12 hours inside State Security Service of #Azerbaijan – a personal experience | Cavid Ağa cavid.info/12-hours-inside/
Quote: “Bahruz stood accused of collaborating with Armenian intelligence services. Yet the SSS interrogators frequently veered into bizarre tangents that seemed to have little bearing on matters of national security. At one point, they asked whether Bahruz belonged to a “sexual minority” — a question that left me genuinely puzzled about its relevance to a treason case. With dark humour born of exhaustion and absurdity, I replied that as far as I knew, he was quite the opposite — a notorious womaniser. I knew that they were looking for ways to humiliate Bahruz on TV. This indeed happened a few days later.”— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 26, 2025
AI and Medicine: Doctors are beginning to use AI as a tool – Google Search google.com/search?q=AI+and+M…
Yes, doctors are increasingly using AI as a tool, particularly for reducing administrative burdens like documentation and for assisting with tasks such as diagnostic support and patient communication. This trend is growing rapidly, with surveys showing a significant jump in usage among physicians, though concerns about data privacy, bias, and over-reliance persist. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]
How AI is being usedReducing administrative tasks: AI tools, especially “AI scribes,” can transcribe patient encounters and generate visit notes, saving doctors significant time. This helps reduce burnout and allows for more direct patient interaction.
Improving diagnostics: AI assists in analyzing medical images like X-rays and MRIs to help detect abnormalities and patterns. It can also provide decision support and help doctors develop prognoses or predict adverse outcomes.
Enhancing patient care: AI can help generate discharge instructions and care plans, assist with translation, and answer patient messages. Some studies suggest AI scribes improve the quality of patient visits by allowing doctors to focus more on the patient.
Streamlining operations: AI can assist with data collection, patient triage, and other operational tasks, as noted by Cedars-Sinai. [1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9]Challenges and concerns
Skill degradation: There is a potential for doctors to become overly reliant on AI, which could lead to a decline in their own diagnostic skills over time, as suggested by a study on colonoscopies, reports NPR.
Privacy and bias: Physicians remain concerned about issues like data privacy, the potential for bias in AI algorithms, and the risk of AI making incorrect conclusions, says the American Medical Association.
Liability: Introducing new technologies also introduces new liability concerns for doctors, notes the American Medical Association. [3, 10]AI responses may include mistakes.
[1] ama-assn.org/practice-manage…
[2] ama-assn.org/practice-manage…
[3] ama-assn.org/practice-manage…
[4] ama-assn.org/practice-manage…
[5] ama-assn.org/press-center/am…
[6] ama-assn.org/practice-manage…
[7] pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/article…
[8] cedars-sinai.org/blog/what-y…
[9] ama-assn.org/practice-manage…
[10] npr.org/sections/shots-healt…— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 26, 2025
share.google/aimode/T6NMJuCm…
Ukraine’s recent drone attacks deep inside Russia: Were the drones secretly prepared and hidden ahead of the attacks or flew from Ukraine at the time of the attacks?
20 hours agoahead of time and launched them from within the country. Other attacks have been carried out by new Ukrainian-made long-range drones flying directly from Ukrainian territory.For some drone attacks deep insideRussia,Ukrainesecretly smuggled the drones intoRussia
Drones launched from within Russia
In a major, coordinated attack on Russian airbases on June 1, 2025, Ukraine used drones that had been pre-staged inside Russian territory.
Operation Spiderweb: This covert operation, conducted by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), involved secretly moving drones into Russia over several months.
Method of transport: The drones were concealed in special wooden containers with remotely controlled lids and transported on trucks.
Launch and targets: When the time came, the trucks parked near Russian airbases. The lids of the containers opened remotely, and the drones were launched for short-distance strikes. This allowed strikes on targets in Siberia and the Arctic region, thousands of kilometers from the Ukrainian border.
Long-range drones flying from Ukraine
Ukraine has also developed a range of drones capable of reaching targets deep inside Russia without needing to be hidden beforehand. A key figure in Ukraine’s drone program stated in October 2025 that their drones are flying distances of up to 2,000 kilometers (1,242 miles) to strike Russian oil facilities.
Examples of long-range drones flying from Ukraine:
FP-1: This drone, developed by a Ukrainian startup, can reportedly travel up to 1,600 kilometers (994 miles) and is credited with 60% of Ukraine’s deep strikes inside Russia as of August 2025.
“Beaver” drones: This model has a reported range of 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) and has been used to attack Moscow and other locations.
AI-powered drone: In October 2025, reports indicated that Ukraine was using an AI-powered strike drone called the ARM 20, capable of flying 1,600 kilometers to its target.
Why Ukraine uses both methods
These two different approaches are used to overcome different challenges and exploit vulnerabilities in Russia’s defense systems.
Internal launches: By launching from inside Russia, drones can evade long-range radar detection and other air defense systems. This tactic relies on secrecy and surprise to attack targets that would otherwise be out of reach.
External long-range launches: By advancing drone technology, Ukraine can hit strategic targets from its own territory. This approach is more sustainable and avoids the complex logistics of smuggling materials and operatives across enemy lines.— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 26, 2025
the role of the laser based air defenses in anti-drone warfare – Google Search google.com/search?q=the+role…
Laser-based air defenses play a critical role in anti-drone warfare by offering a fast, precise, and cost-effective method to neutralize drones through high-energy beams that can cause structural damage or disrupt electronics. They are highly effective against drones and drone swarms and can be deployed from various platforms, protecting critical infrastructure and military assets. These systems are more economical than traditional missile-based defenses because the cost per interception is significantly lower. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
Key roles and capabilitiesPrecise and fast engagement: Lasers operate at the speed of light, allowing for near-instantaneous engagement and neutralization of threats. The beams can be precisely aimed at specific drone components, such as sensors or critical structures.
Cost-effectiveness: Compared to expensive missiles, laser intercepts are significantly cheaper, especially for the high volume of low-cost drone threats encountered in conflicts. The primary “cost per shot” is the energy to power the laser.
Scalability and versatility: Laser systems can be scaled to different power levels and are effective against a wide range of threats, including drone swarms. They can be integrated into various platforms, including ground-based vehicles, ships, and aircraft.
“Deep magazine” capacity: Unlike systems limited by the number of physical projectiles, laser systems have a nearly unlimited number of “shots” as long as they have sufficient power and cooling capacity. This is a major advantage against sustained or large-scale drone attacks.
Silent and covert operation: Laser beams are often invisible to the naked eye and the systems make no noise, which allows for silent, covert operations. This can help avoid alerting the enemy and prevent confusion.
Non-kinetic options: Some laser systems can be used with less than full power to “dazzle” or disrupt drone sensors and navigation, without destroying the drone. This can be useful for intelligence gathering or for situations where a complete destruction is not necessary. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]Challenges and limitations
Weather dependency: Adverse weather conditions like fog, dust, and heavy clouds can significantly degrade the performance and effectiveness of the laser beam.
Power and cooling: High-power lasers require a substantial amount of energy and generate a significant amount of heat, which must be managed by robust power and cooling systems.
Atmospheric turbulence: Atmospheric conditions can cause the laser beam to waver and lose focus, which is a challenge that requires advanced adaptive optics and targeting algorithms to overcome. [1, 8, 9, 10, 11]AI responses may include mistakes.
[1] avi-8.com/blogs/the-aviation…
[2] insidefpv.com/blogs/blogs/de…
[3] thegeopolitics.com/enhanced-…
[4] youtube.com/watch?v=tFAZmb56…
[5] zenadrone.com/drone-defense-…
[6] youtube.com/watch?v=mKYFqWiu…
[7] youtube.com/watch?v=mvpQcB04…
[8] twz.com/air/mq-20-avenger-de…
[9] lieber.westpoint.edu/drone-t…
[10] avi-8.com/blogs/the-aviation…
[11] congress.gov/crs-product/R44…— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 26, 2025
What are the best military strategies for Ukraine to win the war? – Google Search google.com/search?q=What+are…
There is no single consensus on the best military strategy for Ukraine, as the conflict with Russia has evolved into a new phase of strategic deadlock. Instead of focusing on large-scale counteroffensives, recent military analysis suggests a long-term approach that centers on inflicting disproportionate costs on Russia and leveraging asymmetric advantages. [1, 2]
Current and proposed strategies for Ukraine include:
Strategic neutralization A long-term, defense-in-depth strategy focused on making Russian aggression futile, even if the conflict is prolonged.• Methodology: Neutralize key Russian capabilities, such as logistics and air power, rather than pursuing full-scale territorial liberation.
• Approach: Employ intelligence, precision strikes, and electronic warfare to paralyze critical Russian operational systems with lower costs in manpower and material.
• Objective: Shift the war from a contest of attrition to one of “operational irrelevance,” where Russia can still fight but cannot achieve its objectives. [1]Porcupine strategy This approach focuses on making Ukraine’s defense so robust and costly for an invader that it deters future aggression.
• Objective: Develop a permanent, resilient defense posture to function as a system of deterrence by denial.
• Approach: Invest heavily in Ukraine’s defense industrial base with European support and prioritize sustained resistance.
• Outcome: Ukraine would remain a sovereign and secure state under permanent threat, but its strength would be the first line of defense. [3]Asymmetric warfare with innovative technology Ukraine is actively leveraging technology and agile tactics to counter Russia’s resource superiority.
• Drones: Using cheap, mass-produced aerial and naval drones to overwhelm expensive Russian air defense systems and sink naval vessels.
• Innovation: Rapidly adapting to new battlefield conditions by integrating civilian technologies, such as satellite internet (Starlink) and AI-powered combat management systems.
• Special Operations Forces (SOF): Integrating highly adaptable SOF units that use decentralized decision-making and incorporate new technology. [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]Offensive pressure and long-range strikes To impose costs on Russia and improve its position for a potential future negotiation, Ukraine can increase its long-range strike capabilities.
• Targeting: Hit Russian energy infrastructure, logistics hubs, and military assets deep inside Russian territory.
• Purpose: Disrupt Russia’s war economy and supply chains, forcing Moscow to reallocate air defense systems away from the front lines.
• Capability enhancement: Increasing domestic production of long-range strike weapons, potentially with Western assistance. [9, 10, 11]Sustaining and increasing international support Continuous Western military and economic aid remains critical for Ukraine’s ability to maintain its defense and impose a cost on Russia.
• Key Needs: Timely delivery of advanced weapons, munitions, air and missile defense systems, and long-range precision weapons.
• International Diplomacy: Continuous diplomatic efforts to ensure international unity and financial support, especially in light of a potential decline in U.S. aid.
• Training and Integration: Developing Ukraine’s interoperability with NATO standards through training programs and joint analysis centers. [9, 13, 14, 15, 16]A note on decisive victory Many military and policy analysts no longer consider a swift, clear-cut military victory a realistic near-term possibility for either side. A potential end to the conflict is more likely to involve a combination of a battlefield stalemate and a negotiated settlement, though a durable ceasefire would still require strong security guarantees for Ukraine. [1, 17, 18, 19, 20]
AI responses may include mistakes.
[1] carnegieendowment.org/resear…
[2] theconversation.com/the-secr…
[3] carnegieendowment.org/resear…
[4] csis.org/analysis/lessons-uk…
[5] reddit.com/r/Military/commen…
[6] gcsp.ch/publications/ten-les…
[7] atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/uk…
[8] beatenzone.vc/yesterdays-wea…
[9] cepa.org/comprehensive-repor…
[10] csis.org/analysis/russias-wa…
[11] hudson.org/defense-strategy/…
[12] ausa.org/publications/russo-…
[13] mwi.westpoint.edu/evaluating…
[14] nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topic…
[15] nato-pa.int/news/nato-pa-urg…
[16] armyupress.army.mil/Journals…
[17] csis.org/analysis/what-could…
[18] mwi.westpoint.edu/evaluating…
[19] news.northeastern.edu/2025/0…
[20] eurotopics.net/en/337640/ukr…— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 26, 2025