Sharon remained perpetually suspicious that Washington would pressure him into territorial or security concessions he deemed dangerous. So he tried “to open the America’s eyes” and to warn her about he potential and mortal dangers of the Arab pilots; as in the 9/11 Attacks story, or “legend”. “The Bulldozer”Ariel Sharon and the CIA: a complex relationship

Sharon remained perpetually suspicious that Washington would pressure him into territorial or security concessions he deemed dangerous.
So he tried “to open the America’s eyes” and to warn her about he potential and mortal dangers of the Arab pilots; as in the 9/11 Attacks story, or “legend”.

“The Bulldozer”Ariel Sharon and the CIA: a complex relationship – Google Search  google.com/search?q=%22The+B…
Ariel Sharon, famously nicknamed “The Bulldozer” for his aggressive and uncompromising military and political style [0.8], shared a pragmatic, tense, and deeply strategic relationship with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and American security apparatus over several decades. [1, 2]

Key Aspects of the Relationship

The 1982 Lebanon War and CIA Director William Casey:
As Israel’s Defense Minister, Sharon met with CIA Director William Casey in early 1982 to discuss Israel’s planned invasion of Lebanon to push out the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Sharon sought and explored U.S./CIA alignment or covert backing for regional moves against Soviet-allied or radical factions, though the relationship strained significantly as the humanitarian toll and political fallout of the 1982 Lebanon War—including the Sabra and Shatila massacres—unfolded. [1, 2, 3]
Intelligence Sharing vs. Strategic Suspicion:
While Israeli intelligence (Mossad) and the CIA maintained deep institutional cooperation on counterterrorism, regional monitoring, and Soviet-era intelligence, Sharon was viewed by U.S. officials as fiercely independent and difficult to control. American diplomats and intelligence analysts often worried that Sharon’s unilateral actions would destabilize regional ceasefires or entangle Washington in wider Middle Eastern crises. [1]
The Post-9/11 Era and Prime Minister Tenure (2001–2006):
When Sharon became Prime Minister in 2001, his dealings with U.S. intelligence and administrations (such as George W. Bush’s team) shifted into a different phase. U.S. officials engaged in frequent high-level security coordination—including visits by CIA Director George Tenet to broker truces during the Second Intifada. [1, 2, 3]
The Ambivalent Alliance:
Observers of Sharon’s career, such as analyses from the Council on Foreign Relations, noted that Sharon inherently recognized the United States as Israel’s most vital strategic ally, yet remained perpetually suspicious that Washington would pressure him into territorial or security concessions he deemed dangerous. [1]

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 28, 2026