Mikhail Gorbachev freed the famous dissident Andrei Sakharov
(a Nobel Peace Prize-winning nuclear physicist and human rights champion, had been confined to the closed city of Gorky since 1980 for criticizing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) from internal exile in December 1986. In a historic move that signaled his new policy of glasnost (openness), Gorbachev personally telephoned Sakharov to tell him that he and his wife, Yelena Bonner, were free to return to Moscow. Shortly after releasing Sakharov, Gorbachev expanded his political reforms by freeing hundreds of other high-profile dissidents and “refuseniks”….A telephone appeared in a dissident’s apartment after years of enforced isolation. On December 15, 1986, Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner, received an unexpected visit from technicians accompanied by a KGB officer. They installed a telephone in the couple’s apartment in the closed city of Gorky, where Sakharov had been held in internal exile since 1980. The following afternoon, the telephone rang. At the other end was Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, informing Sakharov that he and his wife would be allowed to return to Moscow.
Sakharov was internationally famous for his scientific work on Soviet nuclear weapons and his increasingly public defense of human rights. He had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975, an honor Soviet authorities prevented him from collecting in person. His criticism of political repression and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought him into direct conflict with the government. In January 1980, he was sent without trial to Gorky, a city closed to most foreigners. Isolation there made contact with Western diplomats and journalists difficult. The KGB closely monitored his movements and communications, while his public dissent continued to infuriate the authorities.
Exile did not silence him. Sakharov protested restrictions on himself and Bonner and undertook hunger strikes over matters involving their family and personal freedom. His treatment included forced hospitalization and other coercive measures. Bonner became central to his ability to communicate with the outside world, carrying information and defending their rights despite intense pressure. The authorities periodically restricted correspondence, visits and telephone access. By the mid-1980s, Sakharov had become a prominent symbol of the broader Soviet problem of prisoners of conscience: people punished not for ordinary violent crimes but for expressing political or moral opposition to the state.
Gorbachev’s rise to power in March 1985 gradually altered the political landscape. He pursued reforms intended to address economic stagnation and improve Soviet governance while also seeking better relations with Western countries. The continued confinement of a Nobel laureate was an international embarrassment and a test of the sincerity of the new leadership’s promises. Sakharov had written to Gorbachev urging the release of political prisoners. In December 1986, the death of dissident Anatoly Marchenko following a prolonged hunger strike added urgency to the issue. It was in this atmosphere that the Soviet leadership decided to end Sakharov’s exile.
The details of the telephone call are unusually well documented. In his later account, Sakharov recalled the technicians arriving on December 15 and installing the telephone under security supervision. On December 16, the anticipated call came at approximately three in the afternoon. Gorbachev personally told him he could return to Moscow and resume his scientific work. Sakharov responded by raising the fate of other political prisoners, refusing to treat his own release as a complete solution. The conversation therefore went beyond an announcement of personal freedom. It also exposed the continuing disagreement between the dissident and the Soviet leadership over human rights.
— @archeohistories Oct 17, 2026
In August 1942, at a late-night dinner in the Kremlin during Winston Churchill’s visit to Moscow. Churchill asked Stalin whether the personal stresses of fighting World War II had been as difficult for him as enforcing the policy of agricultural collectivization. Churchill remarked that he thought collectivization would have been worse because it meant fighting millions of small farmers and peasants rather than a defined class of aristocrats or large landowners….
Winston Churchill asked Stalin whether destroying peasant resistance had been harder than fighting Germany. The question came during Churchill’s visit to Moscow in August 1942, when Britain and the Soviet Union were military allies against Nazi Germany. According to Churchill’s later account, Stalin acknowledged that collectivizing Soviet agriculture had involved an enormous struggle affecting millions of people. He nevertheless defended the policy as necessary for the country’s development. The conversation offered an unusual glimpse of how the Soviet dictator justified one of the most destructive campaigns of his rule.
Churchill had travelled to Moscow on an uncomfortable diplomatic mission. The Red Army was under immense pressure, and Stalin wanted Britain and the United States to open a second major front against Germany in Western Europe. Churchill had to explain why such an invasion could not take place in 1942. Their discussions were frequently tense, with Stalin criticizing Allied military strategy and Churchill defending decisions made in London and Washington. Yet the two leaders also needed each other. Their governments were separated by deep ideological hostility, but defeating Hitler required cooperation despite those differences.
During their discussions, Churchill raised a question about Soviet collectivization. Stalin had imposed the policy beginning in the late 1920s, replacing much of private peasant farming with collective agricultural enterprises controlled by the state. The campaign involved coercion, mass deportations, executions, confiscation of property and the destruction of established rural communities. Resistance was met with severe repression. Agricultural disruption and state grain procurement policies contributed to catastrophic famine in the early 1930s, particularly in Ukraine and other agricultural regions. Churchill knew that the policy had caused immense suffering, but he was now speaking directly to the man who had ordered and defended it.
In his wartime memoir The Hinge of Fate, Churchill recalled asking Stalin whether the struggle over collectivization had been more difficult than the war. Stalin reportedly responded that it had been extraordinarily severe and had continued for several years. When Churchill referred to the millions of ordinary peasants involved, Stalin answered by invoking ten million people. That figure has sometimes been repeated as though Stalin had confessed to killing exactly ten million peasants. Churchill’s account does not support such a precise interpretation. The number arose in a discussion of the scale of upheaval, repression and resistance, not as a verified statistical accounting of deaths.
Stalin’s explanation, as Churchill remembered it, centered on economic necessity. He argued that Soviet agriculture had to be mechanized and reorganized to prevent future shortages and improve production. The peasants had resisted because the new system threatened their traditional way of life and control over their land. Stalin described the campaign as a terrible struggle but insisted that the government had been compelled to carry it out. His justification treated collective farming as a requirement of national modernization, even while acknowledging the suffering associated with its introduction. The distinction between acknowledging hardship and accepting personal responsibility for crimes remained fundamental.
— @archeohistories Oct 17, 2026
State-Actor Hypotheses: Certain fringe political commentators suggest the FBI deliberately misdirected blame toward al-Qaeda to mask the alleged involvement of other foreign intelligence services.
The MISINVESTIGATIONS of 9/11 – Google Search google.com/search?q=The+MISI…
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 17, 2026
New details emerge on the activities of former #BND chief August #Hanning, who is under investigation by #Germany’s Federal Prosecutor’s Office for suspected espionage and treason. Who his potential clients were remains under investigation. What is clear is that he maintained sustained contact with #Putin’s inner circle.
– Hanning maintained privileged access to, and a degree of personal rapport with, one of Putin’s most senior and long-serving security figures.
– After retiring in 2009, he continued ongoing contact with Nikolai Patrushev, a longtime close associate of Vladimir Putin (both from St. Petersburg with KGB backgrounds).
– Patrushev succeeded Putin as FSB head in 1999 and later served as Secretary of the National Security Council during the 2014 Crimea annexation and the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
– Key documented contacts:
– As sitting BND chief, Hanning visited the war-damaged Chechen cities of Grozny and Gudermes in 2000 (criticized by the Greens and others as taking Russia’s side).
– 2014 (shortly after Crimea): Meeting with Patrushev, described by a friendly source as an attempt to warn of “negative consequences” (confirmed by Hanning’s lawyer).
– 2016: Attendance at a Moscow security conference opened by Patrushev, where Hanning advocated counter-terror cooperation with Russia, criticized sanctions, and called for jointly solving the “Ukraine problem.”
– 2019: Arctic Council-related visit to the Valaam Monastery (a Russian elite refuge on Lake Ladoga). A group photo shows Hanning standing next to Patrushev.
– Hanning’s repeated meetings with Nikolai Patrushev—including after Crimea and while advocating cooperation with Russia on Ukraine—demonstrate a striking degree of personal access to Putin’s inner circle that is difficult to reconcile with the role of a Western intelligence chief, even if the current espionage investigation centers more on other clients.
– What explains this level of access—and was it purely personal, or did it serve other purposes? The investigation may yet provide answers.
faz.net/aktuell/politik/inla…— @Shtuni Oct 17, 2026
9/11 Facts: Explore the evidence, make up your own mind | 911Truth.Org 911truth.org/
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 17, 2026
The FBI’s massive counterterrorism investigation into the plot and its wider support network has never been formally closed. [1]
Is 9/11 investigation resoved and closed? – Google Search google.com/search?q=Is+9%2F1…— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 17, 2026
Is 9/11 investigation resoved and closed? – Google Search google.com/search?q=Is+9%2F1…
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 17, 2026
building 7 of wtc housed counterintelligence archives – Google Search google.com/search?q=building…
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Oct 17, 2026
Categories
9/11 Truth – Google Search
The Russians don’t always need to steal CIA secrets. Sometimes they bait American spies with what looks like a golden intelligence opportunity. It’s called a “dangle,” and one wrong move can expose agents, compromise operations, and threaten U.S. security.
osintdaily.blogspot.com/2021… #CIA #Espionage #Counterintelligence— @Robert4787 Oct 17, 2026